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**ТАЙНАЯ  
ЖИЗНЬ  
ГЕНЕРАЛА  
СУДОПЛАТОВА**

**ЛОСЬЕ**

ПРАВДА  
И ВЫМЫСЛЫ  
О МОЕМ ОТЦЕ

**2**



## Abstract

For a long time I led the service of reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the Soviet security agencies from the late 30s to the early 50s, including the period of the Great Patriotic War. However, my work was precisely aimed at countering terror, criminal elements that waged a secret armed struggle against our state and society ... (From the last interview of P. A. Sudoplatov, given by him a month and a half before his death)

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<b>A. Sudoplatov. The secret life of General Sudoplatov. Book 2</b>
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**Andrey Pavlovich Sudoplatov**  
**THE SECRET LIFE OF**  
**GENERAL**  
**SUDOPLATOV Truth and fiction**  
**about my father Book Two**

## Chapter 15

### OMSBON IN THE LINE OF FIRE

The main weapon with which the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD fought the enemy was the famous Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes of the NKVD of the USSR, known under the abbreviated name OMSBON. In fact, this military unit was the first "special forces" in our country. The formation of the OMSBON took place in late June - early July 1941. Here is how

the father explained the organizational reasons for creating this structure in one of his interviews: "We needed a huge number of people - thousands and thousands. No states of the NKGB could stand it. Thus, the idea arose to create a special military unit, which would have to deal exclusively with reconnaissance and sabotage work. "[1]

The abbreviation "OMSBON" did not appear immediately. As I wrote above, initially the functions that then passed to the Fourth Directorate were performed by the Special Group under the NKVD, headed by my father. It was under this group that on June 26 a unit was created, called the "troops of the Special Group." Initially, they were led by the brigade commander Pavel Mikhailovich Bogdanov, the chief of staff was Vyacheslav Vasilievich Gridnev. The military unit consisted of two brigades, which included battalions, divided into detachments, and detachments, in turn, into special groups. In October 1941, the troops of the Special Group were reorganized into OMSBON as part of a four-battalion, two motorized rifle three-battalion with special units (sapper subversive company, auto company, communications company, special forces, a school of junior officers and composition and with this name, regiments: specialists). In this OMSBON existed until October 1943, when it was renamed the Separate Special Purpose Detachment of the NKGB of the USSR. The initial task of the brigade was reconnaissance and sabotage activities on the most important communications

the enemy, the elimination of enemy agents. However, soon these tasks were added to a much more important one. OMSBON was called upon to become the core of the unfolding partisan movement, to provide it with comprehensive assistance, and to create an underground in the cities. During the war years, 212 detachments and special forces groups with a total number of about 7,500 people were abandoned behind enemy lines by the Fourth Directorate.

A major role in the formation and combat activities of the OMSBON was played by the deputy head of the Special Group, and then the brigade commander (since October 15, 1941), Colonel Mikhail Fedorovich Orlov. This extraordinary man was extremely close to his father during the war years. He was born in the working settlement of the Belevsky district of the Tula province in the family of a worker-mechanic. In 1919, he joined the RKSM and began working as an authorized committee of the Komsomol for the organization of volost cells, and then became chairman of the district committee of the Komsomol. In December 1920, he voluntarily joined the Red Army, participated in the suppression of anti-Soviet rebellions, then graduated from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Joint Military School. In 1924 he became a candidate, in February 1926 - a member of the CPSU (b). In 1930-1931 he took part in the fight against banditry in Azerbaijan and against the Basmachi in Central Asia. For a long time he served in the NKVD troops, worked in military educational institutions. Before the start of World War II, Mikhail Fedorovich worked as head of the Sebez military school of the NKVD and at the same time studied in absentia at the Military Academy named after M.V.

Frunze. Aleksey Alekseevich Maksimov, an engineer by education, was appointed commissioner of the OMSBON. Maximov's successor was the regimental commissar Archil Stepanovich Maisuradze. In this position, he went through the entire Great Patriotic War, and after its completion, he worked for many years in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army. In

OMSBON, as in all other units and formations of the Red Army, there was a political department, which was headed by Lev Aleksandrovich Studnikov. A former laborer and then a Komsomol worker, he worked in the North Caucasus, was the secretary of the Grozny city committee, the responsible instructor of the North Caucasian regional committee and the secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee of the Komsomol. In 1930



Studnikov joined the party, and then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sent him to the party-political work in the Red Army. Lev Alexandrovich was sent to study at the Military-Political Academy named after V. I. Lenin. The study was interrupted twice: in 1939 due to a military conflict with Japan on the Khalkhin Gol River, where Studnikov was sent as a representative of GlavPURKKA, and in 1940 due to the Soviet-Finnish war. Studnikov graduated from the Academy in June 1941, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The arrival of an experienced political worker with an academic education, multiplied by the experience of two wars, was of great importance and testified to how carefully the political apparatus of the brigade was formed. The reconnaissance leaders of the brigade were Antufeev and Major

border guard B.K. Spiridonov.

The backbone of the command staff of the brigade was made up of teachers and students of the Higher School of Border Troops and the Higher School of the NKVD, and other educational

institutions of the NKVD of the USSR. The commander of the 1st regiment (after the secondment of N.E. Rokhlin, who was briefly in this position, to another job) was Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Gridnev, who had previously been the chief of staff of the Special Group. In 1942–1943 he commanded the OMSBON. The milestones of his life path are: the October Revolution, of which he was an ordinary participant in Petrograd; during the capture of the Petrograd Telegraph, he was among the soldiers of the electrical battalion, in 1918 he joined the ranks of the RCP (b); fought on the Eastern Front, smashed the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Saratov; in 1921 he began working in the Moscow Extraordinary Commission. From that day on, his entire future life is connected with the protection of the security of our homeland. After graduating from the Higher Border School, he became the commandant of the border station, which guarded the Soviet-Iranian border. Here he fought with the Basmachi, who repeatedly tried to cross the border. Gridnev's biography also includes the liquidation of Kabil Kasumogly's gang. Gridnev served on the border for twelve years. major general in retired.

Sergei Ivanovich Volokitin, later known as the famous partisan commander Sergo, became the commissar of the 1st regiment. His father is a hereditary glassblower, the first worker -

director of the Krasny May plant after October. Like other young men of his generation, Sergei Ivanovich studied at the FZU, was a mechanic, turner, foreman of the Moscow plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze. The nineteen-year-old Komsomol leader was sent in 1931 to study at a Chekist school. By the beginning of the war, he was a senior lieutenant of state security. We add to this: he came to OMSBON as an order bearer. The

first regiment of OMSBON was international. The decisive role in its formation was played by the Executive Committee of the Third Communist International and its General Secretary Georgy Dimitrov, as well as the leaders of the communist parties who were then in Moscow: Wilhelm Pick, Maurice Thorez, Palmiro Togliatti, José Diaz and Dolores Ibarruri, Johann Koplenig, Klement Gottwald, Harry Podlit and others. They did everything possible to gather their compatriot political emigrants scattered throughout the Soviet Union for various reasons and send them to OMSBON. Stella Blagoeva, the daughter of the founder of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Dimitar Blagoev, gave a lot of effort to the formation of the brigade. On behalf of Georgy Dimitrov, she selected volunteers, often visited the brigade, inspired the Omsbonites with her fiery comradely conversations.

The most complete information about this regiment has been preserved thanks to the memoirs of the outstanding son of the Bulgarian people Ivan Tsolovich Vinarov, who became the deputy commander of the regiment, and the Spaniard Serna Roque, who at one time was a representative of the Spanish Communist Party in the Popular Front of his country, who fought on the Madrid and Catalan fronts, a fighter of OMSBON, who fought in the Red Army as a commissar of a battalion, brigade, division. Recently, some information about the Vietnamese, who also fought as part of a brigade, has become known.

The international regiment of the brigade was unstable. Initially, it consisted of a little less than a thousand fighters. Almost a third of them were Spanish communists who left their homeland after the defeat of the Spanish Republic. The other part was made up of Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Austrians, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Romanians, Greeks, Italians, Germans, Vietnamese, French, Finns. There were also a few British members of the communist



parties that the Patriotic War found in Moscow, where they arrived on party business. There were also many Austrians, they were second in number after the Spaniards. For the most part, these were Schutzbundists who emigrated to the Soviet Union after the July Uprising of 1927 and the second Vienna Uprising of 1934, who were suppressed by the Austrian bourgeoisie. Among the Austrians was the future member of the secretariat of the Communist Party of Austria, Johann Steyer. I. Vinarov tells a

little more about the Bulgarians. There were over a hundred of them. These were primarily representatives of those groups that had previously carried out underground work in their homeland on the instructions of the Communist Party of Bulgaria. In the Moscow region and the Crimea (before its occupation), about sixty more Bulgarian political emigrants were trained, who at any moment were ready to go on a combat mission behind enemy lines. Fifteen political emigrants and party leaders, as well as the sons and daughters of party veterans who grew up in the Soviet Union and received education here, were enrolled in the international regiment. These were: Georgy Pavlov Gonyu, Petko Katsarov, Gustav Vlahov, Pencho Stolor, Ilia Denev, Ivan Krekmanov, doctor Vera Pavlova (daughter of an old party functionary and major philosopher Todor Pavlov), Vihra Atanasov, Agga Dimitrova (daughter of party veteran Stefan Dimitrov), the sons of Georgy Mikhailov - Ognyan and Kremen, the daughter of Georgiy Karastyanova - Lilia, the son of Ivan Pashov - Georges, the daughter of Georgy

Damyanov - Rosa and others. About Ivan Tsolovich Vinarov himself, one can say in the words of General S. M. Shtemenko: "Ivan Vinarov was a Bulgarian revolutionary. At one time, he was forced to leave his homeland and emigrated to the USSR, graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze and received the rank of colonel in the Red Army. This was followed by work in the apparatus of the Comintern and the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee of the BRP. In the post-war years, Lieutenant

General Ivan Vinarov became a prominent military figure in People's Bulgaria. The Spanish Internationalists were under the command of Captain Peregrin Pérez Galarza, their commissar was Cefarico Alvarez. They were divided into three platoons. One of the platoons was commanded by Ser

they were especially distinguished by Maria Fernandez, Angel Sanchez, who bore the party nickname Africa, and Juanita Prot.

José Viesca was also a notable figure among the Spanish internationalists. The son of a major mine owner, Count, he joined the Communist Party of Spain as a young man and was an active participant in the Asturian uprising of 1934. Sentenced to death, commuted to thirty years in prison, he received his freedom thanks to the establishment of republican power in Spain. In Spain, Viesca was a battalion commissar and later commanded a brigade.

Of the six Vietnamese Omsbons mentioned by I. Vinarov, after a long search, in which the council of OMSBON veterans (A. S. Kazitsky), activists of the Central Council of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society, television and a number of Moscow newspapers (especially Pravda) and Hanoi ("Nyanzan"), their names have now become known: Lee Nam Thanh, a native of a revolutionary family (Nguyen Shin Thanh), originally from the province where Ho Chi Minh was born; Lee Tuhk Chat (Vuong Thun Thai), also from a revolutionary family; Vuong Thun Tinh, who joined the revolutionary youth association of Vietnam in 1925; Li An Tao (Hoang An To), Li Fu Shang.

The commander of the 2nd regiment was Major Sergei Vyacheslavovich Ivanov. This is one of those Ivanovs on whom the Russian land truly rests. And all this despite the bleak, orphan childhood and harsh youth. He received his labor hardening in the mines of Donbass. After returning to his native Voronezh after October, Ivanov voluntarily joined the cavalry division and for almost two years did not part with his saber. And then study at the Moscow Infantry School, teaching at the border school (taught tactics and topography), during which he graduated in absentia from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. The Great Patriotic War found him in the position of inspector of the Main Directorate of the Moscow Air Defense. And one more touch to his biography: it was Colonel Ivanov who, after Dmitry Medvedev's illness, was instructed to lead the famous "Winners" detachment at the final stage of its hostilities. Sergei Trofimovich Stekhov, major, was appointed commissar of the 2nd regiment. That's what they

called him "our major." Like Gridnev, he became a member

Bolshevik Party in 1918. Then he joined the Red Army, was an active participant in the Civil War. There is also such a "record" in his biography: he worked as a telegraph operator in the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, provided communications for S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, and participated in the defense of Vladikavkaz. After the end of the Civil War, Stekhov worked in the system of the People's Commissariat of Communications, first in his homeland - Stavropol (he was born in Georgievsk), then in Moscow. Already in these years, he begins to engage in journalism, collaborates in the Peasant Newspaper. In 1939, the party sent him to work in the NKVD. In the 2nd regiment and in the entire brigade, Sergei Trofimovich enjoyed great prestige

and great respect. The second regiment consisted mainly of workers, athletes, students and schoolchildren (who had just graduated from the tenth grade), mostly who came in the direction of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. The formation of the regiment took place at the Dynamo stadium. Most of the data was preserved about athletes, among whom there were many famous ones who glorified their homeland at international competitions. Among them were: boxers Nikolai Korolev, Sergei Shcherbakov, Eduard Lazovsky; track and field athletes Georgy and Serafim Znamensky, Grigory Ermolaev, Moses Ivankovich, Leonid Mitropolsky; wrestlers Grigory Pylnov, Anatoly Katulin, Leonid Egorov, Shalva Chikhladze; weightlifters Nikolai Shatov, Vladimir Krylov; rowers Alexander Dolgushin, Ippolit Rogachev, Alexei Smirnov, Sergei Sheremetiev; cyclists Fedor Tarachkov, Viktor Seipold; speed skaters Konstantin Kudryavtsev, Anatoly Kapchinsky; skier Lyubov Kulakova and others. To this list we must add teachers and students of the Moscow Institute of Physical Education, headed by the Vice-Rector. In

OMSBON, according to M. F. Orlov, there were about 800 athletes. If earlier they defended the sporting honor of their homeland in stadiums, in swimming pools and on the starting tracks, now they have come to OMSBON to defend it with weapons in their hands from the fascist invaders. Their influence in the brigade was very great. They became mentors to soldiers who were not yet physically tempered. In the future, behind enemy lines, athletes were always among the first in heavy battles with the enemy.

Volunteer students from Moscow universities were also enrolled in the regiment. About thirty people came from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature (MIFLI). Many fighters were yesterday's students and graduate students of Moscow State University, historical and archival, construction, mining, leather, machine tool and other metropolitan universities. There were many workers, technicians, engineers from the car factory and other enterprises in OMSBON.

A little later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, by its decree of September 4, 1941 "On the mobilization of Komsomol members for service in the troops of the Special Group under the NKVD of the USSR", sent 800 urban and rural Komsomol members from fourteen regions of the RSFSR to the OMSBON. Tulyaks, Yaroslavl, Ryazan, Kuryan, Penza, Saratov, Ural and

Kazan filled the barracks of the brigade. Komsomol members of Moscow were also added here. The replenishment of the personnel of the brigade, said the father, was carried out throughout the years of the war. Its fighters were partisans who joined the special detachments, communist volunteers and Komsomol members. The total number of soldiers of the brigade exceeded 10,500 people. But at the same time, its backbone, the most active and mobile part, remained the Chekists, border guards and volunteers who were the first to

join the brigade: athletes, workers, students of Moscow, foreign internationalists. From the very first days of its existence, a large group of women came to OMSBON, mostly radio operators and nurses. I will name just a few of them: Masha Petrushina, Galina Efimova, Lydia Sherstneva, Lyudmila Potanina, Zina Chernysheva, Shura Pavlyuchenkova, Olya Mikhailova, Dusya

Prikazchikova, Tosya Karaseva Button, Tonya Anisimova, Lyuba Kapitonova. Volunteers who had just passed the state exams at the medical institute were put at the head of the medical service of the regiments: Albert Tsessarsky and Ilya Davydov. Vera Davydova (Pavlova) was also a doctor; Victor Strelnikov and

Vladimir Nazarov came to the brigade from the fourth year of medical school. When the formation of the brigade was completed, and its composition gained experience in combat operations at the front and behind enemy lines, the process of "returning" its fighters and commanders to separa

border guards, special schools, etc.). Only from 1941 to 1944, 5074 people were seconded from OMSBON. I will try to

at least briefly talk about the activities of the OMSBON fighters during the war years. First of all, about the big role they played in the battle near Moscow. My father told many episodes about this. Some things have stuck in my memory since my childhood. Father considered all the fighters of this special forces detachment to be heroes.

According to incomplete data, more than one thousand Omsbonites defended Moscow. Their contribution to the defense of the capital, however, is not limited to this figure. Let's compare it with the following facts: if the OMSBON miners put 40 thousand mines on the Western Front, then the entire Kalinin Front - 4500; The peculiarity of this work was that new equipment was used exceptionally widely: guided land mines, fire land mines PT, MZD. And all this at a distance of over 100 km; according to the same incomplete data, it was determined that 30 German tanks, 20 armored cars, 68 vehicles with motorized infantry, 19 cars with officers, 53 motorcycles were blown up on land mines and mines set by a combined detachment in the Moscow region. The brigade subdivisions seized 17 vehicles in good condition, 35 motorcycles with sidecars, many machine guns, radios and other military equipment; in addition, 156 vehicles were destroyed by aircraft in traffic jams near minefields.

These numbers may not seem like much. Maybe it is so. But these data must be multiplied by a more important indicator - the gain in time, which is so important for the Red Army, which fought on the outskirts of the capital, which made it possible to slow down the operational pace of the enemy's motorized and tank units, which had lost a significant part of their military equipment in the minefields. In a narrower sense, these data indicate that the Germans were unable to break through to Dmitrov, and also to transfer tanks to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga Canal. Consequently, the enemy's strategic plan - bypassing Moscow from the north - was thwarted. Finally, it is also indisputable that the engineering barriers set up by the OMSBON detachments, together with other parts of the Western Front, played a role in preparing the counteroffensive near Moscow. Let us add to this the following circumstance: during the defeat of the German troops near Moscow and their retreat, the system created by the Omsbonites

engineering minefields played its role for the second time: it forced the Germans to abandon their numerous motorized equipment at the passages through the minefields, and thousands of fascists died in panic under the blows of the Red Army in the traffic jams that were created.

The combat mission of setting up barriers on the outskirts of Moscow was brilliantly accomplished by the Omsbonovites. Here is their official assessment, expressed in the order for the engineering troops of the Western Front in July 1942: "A characteristic feature of the OMSBON is the clarity and excellent organization shown in the performance of the tasks of the front. The work of the OMSBON provided great assistance to the front. "The barrage work carried out by them was of great scope ... and played a large role in the defense of Moscow." For their valor and courage, 75 brave soldiers of the OMSBON were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. Among them: M. F. Orlov, M. N. Shperov, M. S. Prudnikov, A. P. Shestakov, P. P. Sharov, M. V. Breusov, A. I. Avdeev, I. Yu. Davydov , A. Draganov, A. L. Sakhovaler, A. P. Maltsev, A. P. Kruglyakov, Maria Petrushina, Alexandra Pavlyuchenkova. These orders and medals are

special. Special, not only because in the harsh and difficult year of 1941, awards were rarely given, but also because they are associated with the salvation of Moscow.

High official recognition does not exhaust, however, everything that the battle for Moscow gave to all Omsbon members who participated in it. Soldiers, officers and political workers withstood the first test of fire, meeting face to face with the Nazis. And this is the most important test for the defender of the motherland. Without this, there could not have been that selfless courage and devotion that subsequently manifested itself behind enemy lines.

This is also confirmed by data on the actions of OMSBON on the front lines for 1941-1943: soldiers and officers prepared 128.5 kilometers of railways, highways and highways for destruction, dug 11,564 high-explosive funnels on them, manufactured and reloaded 8998 mines, laid 2057 land mines , blew up a roadbed and highways with a length of 71.5 kilometers, laid 49,252 minefields, prepared 205 for the explosion, blew up 95 bridges, set 94 kilometers of mine blockages, prepared for the destruction and decommissioning of more than 36 industrial enterprises,

trained 2,469 demolition workers from among the workers and employees of local enterprises,

etc. To these data, let's add a few more facts and figures: when the counteroffensive began, 26,779 mines of various systems were removed, 500 kilometers of oil pipelines were demined, 1,500 enemy bombs were neutralized, more than a thousand were destroyed soldiers and officers of the

Wehrmacht. And one more thing: a number of fighters of Shperov's consolidated detachment were involved as mine-laying instructors in units and subunits of the Red Army defending Moscow. Soon,

most of the defenders of Moscow - the Omsbonovites were recalled to the city. This was due not only to the fact that they completed their tasks, but also to the fact that they were replaced by newly formed units of sapper and engineering units. It was also taken into account that, despite the counteroffensive of our troops, the danger of a possible enemy breakthrough in some sector of the front was likely, and therefore the strengthening of the city's defense itself, and especially its center, was not

removed from the agenda.

Omsbonovtsy contributed to the fact that near Moscow the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled, that the first cruel defeat was inflicted on fascism here and there was hope for a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus ended the first front-line period in the history of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purpose. It can be briefly characterized by the following words: we withstood and, having shown courage and courage, grew stronger and matured, gained combat experience, which was multiplied in the battles in the rear of the fascist troops.

Already in the summer of 1941, the OMSBON command began to form and deploy the first detachments and groups behind enemy lines. They, along with reconnaissance and sabotage, were tasked with collecting detailed and qualified information about the specific situation that had developed in the occupied territory; about the policy of the occupying authorities; on the system of guarding the rear of the Nazi troops; about the development of the partisan movement and the struggle of the underground, about the nature of the assistance they needed. The first detachments of the OMSBON were called upon to establish contacts with the partisans, to establish their connection with Moscow, to promote



the formation of new detachments and the intensification of the fighting of the partisans. They also had to create bases on the ground for the deployment of the activities of the OMSBON detachments; to test in practice the effectiveness of the tactics and methods of combat proposed by the command in the conditions of the enemy rear, to identify new opportunities for their development; to accumulate certain experience that would be taken into service by those detachments and groups that, following them, will be sent behind enemy lines.

When forming detachments, the command of the OMSBON sought to appoint to the posts of leaders of the partisan movement combat officers loyal to our homeland who had experience in partisan struggle, reconnaissance and sabotage work gained during the Civil War, and who proved themselves in extermination battalions and in detachments of the people's militia. This principle remained fundamental for the OMSBON command in the selection of personnel for commanders of special detachments and special groups throughout the years of the war. The commanders of the first detachments that went behind enemy lines in August 1941 were Chekists D.N. Medvedev and A.K. Flegontov, who had experience in partisan and

underground activities. In the summer of 1941, a detachment of senior lieutenant V. Zuenko and a reconnaissance group consisting of associate professor of Moscow State University Ya. S. Kumachenko, 3. A. Pivovarova, a former teacher at the Institute of Foreign Languages, and radio operator N. G. Abramkin .

The scouts managed to get a job as translators at the headquarters of the German tank division and win the trust of the Nazi command. Through the Zuenko detachment, the Kumachenko group transmitted valuable intelligence information to Moscow. Until October 1941, 3. A. Pivovarova and her scouts advanced along with the tank division towards Moscow. And all this time the Center received more and more information from them. In October, Pivovarova's group managed to quietly leave the division headquarters, join up with Zuenko's detachment, and return to Moscow with him. At

the end of the summer of 1941, several more operational groups under the command of V. I. Pudín, I. P. Galkovsky, L. L. Chantsev and

other Chekists-Omsbonovtsy in order to collect information and intelligence. Chantsev's group was preparing the detachment "Mitya" - Dmitry Medvedev's detachment - for the

transfer to the rear of the enemy. From August to October 1941, a detachment under the command of A.K. Flegontov successfully operated in the Smolensk region. An experienced security officer, he led the partisan movement in the Far East in the early 1920s. The detachment carried out bold raids on enemy cavalry patrols and carts, carried out several sabotage on enemy communications, collected valuable intelligence data, and returned to Moscow

in October 1941. From July to October 1941, a special special group of OMSBON created bases for the actions of brigade detachments on the territory of the Gomel, Bryansk, and

Oryol regions. Of paramount importance in these first, most difficult months of the Great Patriotic War was the organizational, reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the first large Omsbon detachment, which received the code name "Mitya" - after the name of its commander, later the famous writer Dmitry Nikolayevich Medvedev. The detachment consisted of 30 fighters, mainly soldiers-athletes, participants in the Moscow battle. The chief of staff of the detachment was a polar explorer, engineer-geologist D. D. Staroverov. On September 13, 1941, after several

unsuccessful attempts, the detachment crossed the front line near the village of Belogolovka, Zhukovsky district, in the defense sector of the 217th division. The first base of the detachment was in the Kletnyansky forests, where it was replenished with a group of encircled. Operating in the Bryansk region, and then on the territory of the Mogilev and Oryol regions, the detachment carried out more than 50 combat operations. As a result of the actions of the Mitya detachment, three railway and seven highway bridges were blown up, nine enemy aircraft were destroyed, the railway track was badly damaged in 13 places, and three enemy military echelons were derailed. The fighters of the detachment defeated several garrisons and police posts, destroyed six telegraph communication points, disabled six factories fulfilling military orders, destroyed two generals, 17 officers, and more than 400 German soldiers. Just retribution befell 45 traitors to the motherland. January 14, 1942, having successfully completed the task, the detachment in

consisting of 272 people crossed the front line in the Lyudinov area and returned to Moscow.

The combat activity of the Omsbonovites behind enemy lines in 1942-1944 was carried out on the instructions of the commanders of the Western, Central, Bryansk, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. They had the following main tasks:

- collection of intelligence data and information of a military, economic and socio-political nature; the destruction of strategic

- railways and highways and other communications in the frontline zone and deep behind enemy lines, the disabling of important transport hubs; disruption of rail and road transportation of enemy manpower and equipment to the

- front; destruction of bridges, station structures; any obstacle to the export to Germany of

- Soviet citizens, equipment and the national property of the Soviet people and the property of citizens stolen by the Germans; defeat of military, gendarmerie and police garrisons; disruption of industrial enterprises, power plants,

means of communication.

On January 11 and 13, 1942, the command of the Western Front ordered the commander of the OMSBON, Colonel M. F. Orlov, to form four detachments to carry out mainly reconnaissance and sabotage missions in the immediate rear of the enemy in the Vyazma-Dorogobuzh region. The brigade command decided to

- select 80-90 people for each detachment, mainly athletes, sappers, students and workers. From the 1st regiment - two detachments and the same number from the 2nd. Their organization in the 1st regiment was entrusted to Captain Nikolai Alexandrovich Vasin and Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Konstantinovich Bazhanov, and in the 2nd Regiment - to Senior Lieutenant Kirill Zakharovich Laznyuk and Captain Nikita Semenovitch Gorbachev. At the same time, Vasin's detachment was planned to be sent to the northern part of the Bryansk Forest, the remaining detachments were to paralyze traffic on the section of the Moscow-Smolensk railway Smolensk - Vyazma - Orsha and the Minsk highway. However, due to

sudden breakthrough of the front by the Germans, three of these four detachments were not thrown into the rear, but were used in late January - early February as combined arms units in order to delay the German offensive. Only Bazhanov's detachment crossed the front line, which completed a number of combat missions in the area of the villages of Dubrovka, Repitsa and others. As a result of the actions of four detachments of Omsbonovtsy, from January 20 to February

14, 600 enemy soldiers and officers, 3 tanks, 28 carts with ammunition and food were destroyed, 8 carts with ammunition were captured. The losses of the Omsbonites amounted to 56 killed, 36 wounded and about 40 missing.

In February-June 1942, more than 20 detachments went behind the front line. At the beginning of 1942, most of the detachments crossed the front line in the Kaluga region in the sectors of the 10th and 16th armies. From there they went to the territories assigned to them, mainly to the Bryansk and Oryol regions, to the regions of the Belarusian and Ukrainian Polissya. The second direction of the mass exit of detachments into the deep rear of the enemy was at that time the path to Belarus and the Smolensk region through the forests of the western part of the Kalinin region with the center in Toropets. During 1942 and 1943, detachments and special groups of OMSBON were abandoned on the territory of

almost all temporarily occupied regions of the RSFSR, in Ukraine and Belarus, in the Baltic republics and in the North Caucasus. All detachments and groups of OMSBON were assigned code names, and they retained their independence during the entire time they were behind enemy lines. Depending on the nature of the main task, the detachments either retained their original composition, its expansions (mainly detachments that had special reconnaissance tasks), or grew into brigades and formations (if the main task included such a goal).

avoiding

March 1942 was perhaps the most stressful in terms of the number of crossings of the front line by the OMSBON detachments through the Surazh "gates": the detachment commanders sought to have time to get behind enemy lines before the start of the spring thaw. Among the first came the

detachment of Captain M. Mironov, who operated in the Pskov and Porkhov regions.

On January 22, 1942, the Pobeda detachment headed from Moscow to the rear of the enemy under the command of Lieutenant I. M. Kuzin, consisting of 36 Human.

At the beginning of March 1942, the "Local" detachment, consisting of 25 people, mostly border guards and residents of Belarus (hence the name), crossed the front line. The detachment was headed by Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Vaupshasov, who adopted the pseudonym Gradov. Senior Lieutenant G. S. Morozkin became the commissar of the detachment, and Captain A. G. Lunkov became the chief of staff. On March 18, 1942, a

special detachment under the command of P. G. Lopatin (Uncle Kolya), consisting of 23 people, headed to the front from Toropets. Most of the detachment was made up of fighters from the Mitya detachment, hence its code name "Experienced". The commissar of the detachment was A. Ezubchik (later - Chulitsky), the head of intelligence - V. Rudak, the chief of staff - V. Bolshakov.

From Toropets in the fall of 1942, a raid behind enemy lines by the "Combat" detachment under the command of A.K. Flegontov began. The commissar of the detachment was G.R. Chervonkov, the chief of staff was F. F. Taranenko, doctor - M. I. Lagutin, radio operators - N. Bushkov and Khorobrikh.

On October 26, 1942, the Sokol special group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel K. P. Orlovsky (Roman) was parachuted into the Brest region. In August 1943, a

detachment of captain A. G. Mironov consisting of 28 people was sent from Moscow to strengthen reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the south of Western Belarus. The paratroopers landed near the village of Peschanka, Minsk region, at the location of the Gradov brigade, from there, accompanied by a group of guides, they left for the base of the Sokol detachment. In May 1943, a special group "Yuri" consisting of 18 people was landed in the

Minsk region. The experienced intelligence officer Yu. M. Kutsin was appointed commander of the group. In June 1942, in the area of st. Zlenka was abandoned by the reconnaissance and sabotage

detachment "Braves" consisting of 14 people under the command of Chekist A. M. Rabtsevich. The commissar of the detachment was a German communist, political emigrant K. Linke.

Along with Belarus, one of the main directions for sending detachments and special groups of OMSBON in 1942 were the Ukrainian

Polissya and the Dnieper region.

One of the first in the summer of 1942, a detachment of Colonel D. N. Medvedev "Winners" was sent to Ukraine. S. T. Stekhov, deputy commander of the 2nd OMSBON regiment for political affairs, became the commissar of the detachment, Major Pashun became the chief of staff, S. Tvorogov, the intelligence chief, and A. Tsessarsky, the doctor. As part of the detachment, the scout N.I. Kuznetsov, whose name later became legendary, was sent to the rear of the enemy.

On March 14, 1942, the Walkers detachment, consisting of 15 a man under the command of E. I. Mirkovsky.

In August 1942, in the area of the city of Olevsk, Zhytomyr region, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Prokopyuk "Hunters" consisting of 64 people was dropped by parachute. The commissar was Major I.P. Galiguzov, the chief of staff was Senior Lieutenant A.A. Gorovich. In the spring of 1942, the OMSBON command was instructed to form a

detachment to carry out a special task of the Headquarters in the Zaporozhye region. For this purpose, a special group of Energetiki was created, consisting of the commander - Lieutenant V.P. Shepel, master of sports, former instructor of the DSO "Dynamo", commissioner V.A. Laskin, deputy commander for intelligence - captain of state security A.A. Vishnevsky, radio operators A. Soboleva. In March 1943, a detachment named after Bogdan Khmelnytsky under the command of Major V. V. Lebed was parachuted into the base of the formation of General Saburov, who

was at that time on the territory of Belarus. Starting from the second half of 1943, the OMSBON command already had the ability to throw large detachments of up to 150 people behind enemy lines. Such was, for example, the detachment "Guards" of Captain V.N. Voronov, sent to the area

of Lake Beloye (Rivne region). The OMSBON command paid great attention to helping Sevastopol and the Crimean partisans. In 1942, special groups of V. Aranov "Knights" and Kahar Adashev "Krymchaks" were dropped into the Crimea. In March 1943, Major Arabadzhiev's special group "Falcons" was sent to the Crimea. Arabadzhiev took over the leadership

activities of the Omsbon paratroopers in the Crimea and those associated with them underground.

Some of the successful operations of the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD, carried out during the war years, are described in the book by F. Sergeev (Sergeev F. Covert operations of Nazi intelligence. 1933-1945. M.: Politizdat, 1991). One of the brilliant operations carried out by the Fourth Directorate during the war years was the penetration into the Smolensk intelligence school of the Germans, located in the village of Krasny Bor. In June 1942, the Soviet intelligence agent

Mikhailov was introduced to penetrate this one of the most active sabotage schools in the center of Russia. As expected, on the way to Smolensk, he was detained by the Nazis. He was subjected to a thorough interrogation and placed in the Vyazma prisoner of war camp. There, among other prisoners of war, he was recruited into the Russian National Army. Mikhailov agreed, believing that in this way he would be able to quickly come to the attention of intelligence. And I wasn't wrong. Soon, he, who had just voluntarily appeared "from the other side", began to be processed by the Abwehr. They "inclined" him to secret cooperation and sent him to a sabotage school. During his stay there - from August 1942 to February 1943 - Mikhailov managed to gain confidence, establish friendly relations and win over 12 fellow students to his side. Before being sent to the Soviet rear, he provided them with a password to appear at the state security agencies. Together with another Soviet intelligence officer, Borisov, Mikhailov thwarted several sabotage actions planned by the Nazis. After a certain time, Mikhailov returned safely from the enemy lair. Borisov, who remained at school, continued to carry out the tasks of the Soviet counterintelligence. The information he obtained about the planned punitive operation against the Belarusian partisans in the Surazh region allowed the partisans to deliver warning strikes against the punitive forces. For the successful completion of tasks, Mikhailov and Borisov were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. An example of such determination of a Soviet man who found himself in German captivity is the surrender of the agent-radio operator Panin, who was abandoned by the Abwehr on the territory of the Moscow region. Before the war, he worked and lived in Gorky, and in the summer of 1941, voluntarily



went to the front. The unit in which he served was surrounded, and soon many of its servicemen were captured. According to Panin, in captivity he constantly thought about escaping in order to return to duty, but for quite a long time the circumstances were unsuccessful. Once he was summoned to the camp commandant's office, where, after a long conversation, he was offered to enter the German intelligence school. "At first," Panin said, "I was ready to spit in the face of the recruiter, then the thought dawned on me, or maybe this is the beginning of the path of returning to my own people. He said neither "yes" nor "no" and was released. Returning to the barracks, he regretted that he had not

agreed."

But the recruiter did not consider the conversation over. He called Panin several more times, and he, pretending that the recruiter's arguments worked, finally agreed to go to intelligence school. "The most difficult thing was," Panin said during interrogation, "not to arouse suspicion in anyone about my true intentions. I tried to maintain discipline, did not get close to anyone, and even on the plane I was afraid to give myself away. I breathed a sigh of relief only when the parachute opened above me. Left alone, he put on his back a walkie-talkie and other spy equipment, went to the nearest village, sought out the chairman of the collective farm. In the evening, he delivered him to the NKVD regional department. The sincerity of Panin's act was not in doubt, and it was decided to try to start a radio game with the intelligence center through him. The specialists

asked in detail how the training at the intelligence school went, who was its chief of technical training, sorted out the codes and ciphers, and were already about to go on air on behalf of Panin at the agreed time. But he opposed this decision: "I worked with the boss for quite some time. His walkie-talkie was in Smolensk, and I was in Krasny Bor. He praised me more than once for my, as he said, special radio handwriting. And if another one works on the key, he will easily guess. Trust me, I won't let you down." Panin's arguments were considered, and on the day and hour agreed by the intelligence center, the radio operator got in touch. He reported that the group at the time of landing dispersed at a great distance from each other, the fate of the rest is unknown to him. He himself

managed to settle in Volokolamsk, in the house of an old woman, managed to collect some information that he is ready to convey.

The center approved Panin's actions and, having agreed on the next communication session, ended the first contact with him on the air. In the course of the further game, a large volume of messages, specially prepared by the Chekists with the participation of specialists from the General Staff, left for the enemy. How deliberately this was done can be judged by the fact that, for example, the "troop movements" described by Panin in the event of an enemy check would have been confirmed as a result of certain actions staged on the railway by the military communications command of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense.

The radio game developed successfully. Panin's "resourcefulness" and "efforts" were highly appreciated by the intelligence center. In one of the communication sessions, he was informed that the German command "for the regular communication of valuable information and the courage shown in the performance of the mission" awarded him a high award - the Iron Cross. Participation in the operational game was quite long. The time has come when, according to the technical parameters, the radio should have run out of power. A courier was called to Volokolamsk to deliver the batteries. When the courier returned across the front line, he was arrested. But the game went on. After the completion of the operation, Panin, who honestly fulfilled his civic duty and thus benefited his homeland, was awarded the medal "For Courage".

The SD and the Abwehr tried to make up for the miscalculation, which consisted in the rate of prisoners of war, by intensifying recruitment work among the population of the regions of Soviet territory occupied by German troops, giving preference to criminals. But even this idea does not reach its goal. In this situation, a new monstrous plan arose: to use teenagers as saboteurs. It was based on a completely understandable calculation: teenage saboteurs are unlikely to attract the attention of Soviet counterintelligence. And the population will  
condescending towards children.

A sabotage school for teenagers is being created near the city of Kassel. To search for candidates for concentration camps, in the settlements of the occupied Soviet territory, and especially in orphanages that did not have time to evacuate, special teams of recruiters from the SD are sent. At school, future saboteurs stubbornly

they hammer in that they are the children of great Germany, that Soviet Russia no longer exists. They are guarded by "caring" instructors and mentors, who see their task not only in instilling the skills of subversive work in their wards, but in their comprehensive corruption. At school, fights are readily encouraged and even inspired, the cult of force is preached in every possible way, children are taught to be cruel.

On the night of August 28-29 and September 1, 1943, a large group of teenagers were parachuted into the rear of the Red Army - from Kalinin to Kharkov. Each of those thrown is dressed in worn clothes, in bags they have a supply of food and explosives embedded in small pieces of coal. They had to throw these pieces into the tenders of steam locomotives or coal warehouses. But this seemingly carefully prepared operation also fails.

Here is what was said about this in one of the documents of the Chekist apparatus of the Tula region: "Report about the appearance of two teenage saboteurs. On September 1, 1943, two teenagers appeared at the headquarters of the military unit in Plavsk: Mikhail, 15 years old, and Peter, 13 years old. They said they were abandoned along with other teenage saboteurs to plant explosives in the tenders of steam locomotives. We

studied at a dacha near Kassel." Misha says: "... almost all the former orphanage residents, knowing that they would have to commit sabotage, agreed to secretly not carry out the tasks of the Germans, not to harm their own, but immediately appear

at any headquarters of the Red Army and tell everything ..." And indeed, as a rule, teenagers they themselves appeared in military units, police, state security agencies, handed over sabotage equipment and parachutes, reported everything about themselves,

about fellow students and the school where they were trained.[2] In the Caucasus direction, judging by some fragmentary data, from January to November 1942, about 170 Abwehr agents were exposed and neutralized. At Stalingradskoye, in September, October 1941 and the first half of 1942 alone, almost 200 enemy agents were suppressed. But it is quite obvious that not all of those who were transferred across the front line turned themselves in, and even more so - far from all the agents who acted stubbornly and skillfully were neutralized. The authors of Zeppelin

successful close undercover reconnaissance (to a depth of 50 kilometers). Here, according to archival data, 10 percent of the deployed agents returned. This means that every tenth in that huge mass that was prepared within the framework of the Zeppelin, one way or another, carried out its subversive work.

It is alleged that during the years of the Great Patriotic War, KGB agencies neutralized several thousand Nazi spies in the rear areas of the country, including 1,750 paratrooper agents. But does this mean that none of the German agents thrown behind our lines managed to get past the counterintelligence barrier? Of course it doesn't. It is known, for example, that in a number of

cases sabotage groups of the Abwehr and SD operated successfully. In only fourteen days of August 1941, seven acts of sabotage were committed on the Kirov and October railways. The saboteurs repeatedly managed to seriously disrupt communications between the headquarters of the military formations of the Red Army. On the night of October 17, 1944, Abwehr agents committed a major sabotage on the Lanovtsy-Kornochevka railway line, and traffic on the highway was delayed for five days.

More than once I had to hear from my father the warmest words addressed to the fighters of the OMSBON, about their courage, determination, always aimed at a feat. "These were iron people, devoted to their homeland and our Chekist cause," he said. "I loved them all like a brother." And, apparently, it was no coincidence that at the civil memorial service in connection with the funeral of my father, there were many among those present who, with weapons in their hands, fought the German invaders as part of a special-purpose brigade created by my father.

## Chapter

# 16 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN THE YEARS OF THE FASCIST INVASION

Soviet intelligence also made a significant contribution to the victory over fascism, but it also shares with the military-political leadership of the country the responsibility for miscalculations and mistakes made during the war years. My father, in his memoirs, speaks quite frankly about this. Naturally, in describing the events of 1941-1945, with which this chapter will be filled, I rely entirely on his evidence.

In July 1941, as a result of the merger of the state security and internal affairs agencies into a single NKVD that followed after the start of World War II.

The first department was transferred to the new people's commissariat on July 17, 1941. By the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops", the following tasks were set for the intelligence agencies:

- setting up work to identify the military-political plans of Nazi Germany and its satellites during the war; revealing
- the true plans and intentions of the United States and England on the conduct of the war and the post-war system; the
- creation of special detachments for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy
- lines; conducting intelligence in neutral countries in order to prevent their transition to the side of the "axis" countries;
- implementation of scientific and technical intelligence in order to strengthen the military and economic
- power of the USSR. As a result, intelligence functions were divided between the First Directorate of the NKVD and the independent intelligence and sabotage service created in July 1941 - the Special Group (OG) under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

On July 20, 1941, the First

(Intelligence) Directorate. Approved on August 12, 1941, the structure of the central apparatus of the First Directorate looked like this: a) Intelligence Directorate (chief and

his deputies) and b) School for Special Purposes (SHON). c) Groups "A" and "B". d) Department "X" (communication).

e) Operational

departments: 1st (Central

Europe): Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ukrainian branch;

2nd (Balkan): Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece; 3rd (Western Europe): France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium; 4th (Scandinavian):

Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland; 5th (Anglo-American): England,

USA, Canada, Latin America; 6th (1st Far East): Japan, Manchuria, Korea; 7th (2nd

Far East): China, Thailand, Xinjiang; 8th (Middle Eastern): Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, India;

9th (sovcolony, operational accounting, entry and exit visas). The 5th (Anglo-American) department included the branch of the scientific and technological revolution, which in 1939–1942 it was headed by L. R. Kvasnikov.

From October 1941 to February 1942, the headquarters of the First Directorate, along with most of the NKVD services, was evacuated in Kuibyshev. The families of employees of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence were evacuated to Alma-Ata and Novosibirsk.

In April 1943, the NKVD of the USSR was again divided into the people's commissariats for state security and internal affairs. The first (Intelligence) Directorate came under the jurisdiction of the NKGB of the USSR. In total, by the end of the war, over 96 legal and illegal NKGB residencies were operating abroad, in some countries (USA, China, Iran, Great Britain, etc.), as before, there were several reconnaissance vehicles. During the Great Patriotic War, intelligence

activities were subordinated to one task - to defeat the enemy. The slogan "Everything for

front, everything for victory" was the law of all scouts. The work was carried out in three main areas:

1. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the rear of the Nazi troops. More than two thousand KGB detachments and groups operated here. Large detachments were led by scouts - D. N. Medvedev, S. A. Vaupshasov, K. G. Prokopyuk, D. N. Orlovsky, V. A. Karasev, D. M. Rabtsevich. Based in the detachment of Medvedev, N. I. Kuznetsov carried out his reconnaissance operations and actions of retribution.

2. Extraction of information on Germany, Italy, Japan and their satellites. Intelligence received information about the plans of the German military command. For example, in March 1942 - about the preparation of German divisions for an offensive in the Stalingrad direction. In May 1943 - about the preparation of the Germans for the offensive on the Kursk Bulge (a message from the London residency and intelligence officer N. I. Kuznetsov).

Important information on Japan was obtained by our agent in China, Penkovsky. In particular, he received information that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union. This confirmed the similar information of Sorge and made it possible to make a decision on the transfer of our troops from the Far East to the West. Intelligence officers infiltrated

the enemy's reconnaissance and other subversive centers and German reconnaissance schools. Scout Burkhanov was introduced into the pro-fascist so-called "Turkestan Committee" created by the Germans, where he skillfully conducted intelligence, "rose" to the rank of major of the SS troops. The agents of our intelligence became the main

core of the anti-fascist organization in Germany, which the Gestapo called the "Red Chapel". In France, our agents created and led the Resistance detachments. In Italy, Agent Caluzzi formed a guerrilla unit that fought valiantly against the Nazis. In the battle, Caluzzi died as a national hero and was awarded the Gold Medal by the Italians.

3. Intelligence in the allied countries, about their actual plans and intentions. The obtained materials greatly facilitated the leadership of the country and the Soviet Army to properly plan and conduct combat operations, to coordinate their actions with the allies. Through agents, information was received about attempts at separate negotiations between our allies and the Germans. Particularly should



to note the active work in extracting the information necessary for the Soviet Union by Kim Philby, Donald McLane and some other sources in the USA and England. There

is an idea that the intelligence and operational groups of the network of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (as the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU was then called) and the Foreign Department (INO) of the NKVD owned reliable agents that had access to the highest echelons of the military command of the Wehrmacht and the political leadership of Germany, and that the Soviet the leadership ignored the materials coming from these sources about the preparations and immediate plans for Hitler to unleash a war against the Soviet Union.

The intelligence department of the General Staff and the INO NKVD did have important sources of information with access to the leading circles of the German military command and political leadership, but did not have access to the documents. In addition, the information received from circles close to Hitler reflected the hesitation in the German leadership on the issue of making the final decision to attack the Soviet Union.

In the early and mid-1930s, as already noted above, Berzin, Uritsky, Artuzov, Borovich (through the Red Army Intelligence Department), Slutsky, Spiegel Glas, Serebryansky, Eitingon (through the OGPU-NKVD) managed to create in Western Europe and in the Far East (China-Japan) a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus, which had more than 300 sources of information. A special role in the creation of this apparatus was played by the so-called illegal special agents. I have already named their names above, but they are worthy of being repeated more than once - these are Arnold Deutsch (Lang), an Austrian who attracted the well-known "five" of Kim Philby and others in England to cooperate; Theodor Malli, a Hungarian former Catholic priest, worked in England and France; Boguslavsky, Pole, former intelligence officer of the Polish General Staff; Sandor Rado, Leopold Trepper, Richard Sorge, Ernst Wollweber.

In 1939, a connection was established with a valuable agent under the pseudonym Friend, who was brought to cooperation ten years ago, being the deputy chief of Rem's stormtroopers. He was considered an influential person surrounded by aspiring to power

Hitler. After the execution of Rem, Drug was kept by the German authorities in custody. Released in 1939, he was appointed to Shanghai as Consul General of Germany. There he regularly met with Sorge, disavowing some of the materials transmitted by the latter. Melnikov, deputy chief of foreign intelligence of the NKVD for the Far East, worked directly with the Drug. The fate of these people was different. Deitch died in 1942 on a

Soviet transport torpedoed by a German submarine en route to England. Malli and Boguslavsky were shot on the orders of Yezhov during the years of terror. Rado and Trepper, having spoiled the nerves of the Germans with the Red Chapel, ended up in the NKVD-MGB camps. Sorge was hanged by the Japanese. Wollweber headed intelligence, then the MGB of the GDR, but became a victim of Ulbricht's intrigues.

I have already said that the mass repressions in 1937-1938 dealt a severe blow to our intelligence services, but intelligence activities continued. Although we temporarily lost contact with a number of valuable agents, the agent networks in Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux countries were lucky. Sources of information in Germany (the Schulze-Boysen group - the headquarters of the Air Force, Harnack - the Ministry of Economics, Kukkhoff and Stebe - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lehmann - the Gestapo) were attracted to cooperation by illegal immigrants, the Zarubin spouses, resident Belkin, agent Hirschfeld, who escaped repression. Communication with them was maintained regularly. In addition to these sources, in 1940 they were supplemented by the famous actress Olga Chekhova and Prince Janusz Radziwill, who collaborated with us on the basis of trust and recruitment obligations, and had direct access to Goering. The NKVD resident Gudimovich, together with his wife Mordzhinskaya, managed to create a powerful group in Warsaw, which carefully monitored the German transportation of troops and equipment to Poland in 1940-1941. Serious agent

positions, as the reader will remember, we also had in Italy. Back in 1937, our intelligence, under the leadership of the deputy head of the INO NKVD Shpigelglas, obtained important documentary information about the operational-strategic games conducted by the command of the Reichswehr (later the Wehrmacht). These documents were destined to play a significant role in the development

events and changes in the actions of our leadership before the German-Soviet war. It seems that it was these actions that prompted Hitler to take the initiative in 1939 to conclude a non-aggression pact. It is significant, however, that the Germans preferred to carry out probing approaches to the Soviet leadership to implement this idea not through intelligence, but through diplomatic channels through their ambassador to Turkey, von Papen, back in April 1939.

of

the year. Intelligence materials from Berlin, Rome, Tokyo, which is confirmed by archival documents now made public, were regularly reported to the government. However, the intelligence leadership was not aware that after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, secret negotiations began with Germany. Thus, the obvious inevitability of a military clash at the same time was combined with a very serious consideration of Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of geopolitical interests of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR.

It is only now clear that the probing conversations between Molotov and Schulenburg, the German ambassador to the USSR, in February-March 1941 reflected not only Hitler's attempt to deceive Stalin and take him by surprise with sudden aggression, but also hesitations in the German leadership on the question of war with the Soviet Union. Union until victory over England. Information received by Soviet intelligence and disinformation from Lettish, who collaborated with the Gestapo, reflected these fluctuations. That is why, I think, it is not superfluous to repeat once again that even reliable sources, reporting on Hitler's decision to attack the USSR (reports of Harnack, Schulze-Boysen, the wife of a prominent German diplomat (code name Yun), close to Ribbentrop) in September 1940 - May 1941 years, did not vouch for the reliability of the data received and, with references to Goering, linked to one degree or another the impending aggression of Hitler against the USSR with a possible agreement on a truce with the British.

Unfortunately, the correct conclusion about the obvious preparation for war on the basis of the information received by the NKVD was also associated with the results of the allegedly upcoming German-Soviet negotiations at the highest level on territorial problems, and according to reports from England (Philby, Cairncross, etc.), and with a possible

settlement of the issue of ending the Anglo-German war. It is still difficult to judge in detail how seriously Hitler actually thought to negotiate with Stalin. After all, there were also reports that Ribbentrop consistently, right up to Hitler's final decision, opposed the war with Russia, at least until the Anglo-German military confrontation was settled. Although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials, at the same time he sought to use them in order to

prevent war through secret diplomatic negotiations on territorial issues, and also - through the agent-operational network - to bring to the German military circles information about the inevitability for Germany long war with Russia. The emphasis was on the fact that the Soviet Union had created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.

Unfortunately, our intelligence, both military and political, having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of an imminent war, did not predict the rate of the Nazi command on the "blitzkrieg" tactics. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the "blitzkrieg" indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England. A major shortcoming of our intelligence work was the poor organization of the analysis of the information received by agents. Convincing proof of this conclusion can be the fact that only during the war both the Intelligence Agency and the NKVD created departments in the system of intelligence directorates for the constant evaluation and processing of intelligence information coming from foreign sources. On the very first day of the war, my father was

instructed to lead all reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army through the Soviet state security agencies. For this, a special unit was formed in the NKVD - the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. By order of the People's Commissariat, the appointment of my father as the head of the group was formalized on July 5, 1941. Eitingon, Melnikov, Kakuchaya were appointed as his deputies. Heads of the leading directions in the fight against the German armed forces invading the Baltic states, Belarus and

Ukraine, became Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Gudimovich, Orlov, Kiselev, Massya, Lebedev, Timashkov, Mordvinov. The heads of all services and divisions of the NKVD, by order of the People's Commissariat, were obliged to provide the Special Group with assistance with people, equipment, weapons for the deployment of reconnaissance and sabotage work in the near and far rear of the

German troops. The main tasks of the Special Group were: conducting intelligence operations against Germany and its satellites, organizing a guerrilla war, creating an agent network in the territories under German occupation, directing special radio games with German intelligence in order to misinform the enemy.

A military unit of the Special Group was immediately created - the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON NKVD of the USSR), which was commanded at different times by Gridnev and Orlov (how and from whom it was formed is described in the interview given above). By decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Comintern, all political emigrants who were in the Soviet Union were invited to join this unit of the Special Group of the NKVD. The brigade was formed in the first days of the war at the Dynamo stadium. It soon included more than twenty-five thousand soldiers and commanders, of which two thousand foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians. Among the 320 volunteers - former soldiers of the army of the Republican Spain, who embarked on the path of partisan struggle in the temporarily occupied territory of the Soviet Union, there were fifteen captains, twenty-nine majors, four lieutenant colonels and seventy-four political workers of the republican army. All of them went through almost a three-year school of the civil war in Spain, although incomparable in scale with the Great Patriotic War, but a modern war. So, Lieutenant

Colonel Domingo Ungria, to whom my father happened to be an adviser in Spain, commanded the famous 14th partisan corps there, four were division commanders, four more division commissars, ten brigade commanders and ten brigade commissars. Among these volunteers were thirty-five pilots and aviation technicians, twenty-five

sailors. Seven people had experience in guerrilla warfare, sixteen had experience of underground activities in Spain.

In October 1941, the Special Group, due to the expanded scope of work, was reorganized into an independent 2nd department of the NKVD and was still directly subordinate to Beria. My father continued at the same time to be the deputy head of the NKVD foreign intelligence service. The outbreak of the war

dramatically changed the attitude of the Soviet leadership to intelligence work and incoming information. Intelligence agencies were reorganized. Two intelligence departments were created in the General Staff: one - headed by F. Kuznetsov - to directly serve the needs of the fronts and the Headquarters in the war with Germany, and the other - headed by I. Ilyichev - to coordinate foreign intelligence in the USA, England and other areas, did not become German occupation zones. The First (Intelligence) Directorate was divided in 1942 into two: The Fourth - headed by my father - for reconnaissance and sabotage work against the Germans and Japan on our territory, in the occupied countries of Europe and the Middle East; and the First - headed by P. M. Fitin, whose scope extended to the USA, England, Latin America, India, Australia, etc. The Navy did not divide its Intelligence Directorate headed by Vorontsov.

An independent department for sending agents and sabotage groups to the rear of the German armed forces was created in 1943, headed by Selivanovskiy, in the SMERSH military counterintelligence. The intelligence department, headed by the heads of the NKVD of Ukraine and Belarus T. Strokach and S. Belchenko, also acted in the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, but it performed mainly coordinating functions, without conducting undercover intelligence in the rear of the German troops without interacting with military intelligence, the NKVD and the military counterintelligence. Some independence was shown only by party and Komsomol functionaries, who were mainly engaged in propaganda work behind enemy lines. However, they also relied mainly on the secret support of their activities through our military intelligence and the NKVD.

Important information obtained was reported to Stalin, and the direct coordination of intelligence work was carried out first by Molotov, then by Golikov, and at the end of the war by Beria. In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities, departments for processing and analyzing valuable information were created in each intelligence department, which greatly facilitated the task of the Headquarters in making decisions. The intelligence agencies of the USSR took an active part in the development of the partisan movement in the rear of the German troops. They became the main supporting military training base of this movement. The partisans rendered great assistance to the front-line intelligence agencies of the Red Army. A lot of work has rightly been devoted to this topic.

War is known to be cruel work. She was grinding thousands of human lives. This also applied to intelligence. She constantly needed qualified personnel. My father suggested that former intelligence and state security officers be released from prisons. Basically, these were people whom the father or his deputy Nikolai Melnikov knew personally and could vouch for them. It has already been said above how Serebryansky was rescued from the dungeons. Sobol, Klyukin, Kutsin (formerly Eitingon's deputy for Shanghai), Kochetkov, Zolotar, Lukin, Frolov, Agabekov (not to be confused with a defector), Perminov, Terekhov, Belyaev, Yakushev-Babkin, Miroshnichenko, Kaminsky were also released from prison cells. . Ivan Nikolaevich Kaminsky was an exceptionally interesting person, a talented intelligence officer. He was fluent in Polish, Ukrainian, German, and knew Western Europe very well. This, by the way, he reported on the impending attempt on the life of Litvinov, when he was supposed to be in the United States to meet with Roosevelt on the issue of recognition by the United States of the USSR. The measures taken made it possible to timely prevent a terrorist attack, which was being prepared by a group of opponents of the rapprochement of our countries. All of them were hidden behind bars for some time. In addition to those who were in

prison, a large group of Chekists who had previously been dismissed from the authorities was returned, including Dmitry Medvedev, Lopatin, Prokopyuk and others. Beria's cynicism and simplicity in deciding people's destinies, according to my father, were clearly manifested in his reaction to this proposal:



"Beria was not at all interested in whether those whom we recommended for work were guilty or innocent. He asked one single

question: "Are you sure we need them?"

"Quite sure," I replied. - Then contact

Kobulov, have them freed. And immediately use everyone for their intended purpose. I got to view the case of

the people I requested. From them it followed that everyone was arrested on the initiative and direct order of the top leadership - Stalin and Molotov. Unfortunately, Spiegelglas, Karin, Malli and other scouts had already been shot by this time. After being released, some of my close friends found

themselves homeless in Moscow: their families were evicted from the capital. They all settled in my apartment, on Gorky Street, in the house where the Dynamo sports store was located. The floor above was the apartment of Merkulov, Beria's first deputy, who sometimes came down to me if something urgent needed to be discussed. Both of our apartments were also used as safe houses for meetings with foreign diplomats. It so happened that Merkulov called me just at the moment when my "guests" were sitting in the living room, and since he was going to come in to talk about urgent matters, I had to hide them in the bedroom in order to avoid meeting the people's commissar with the recently released former criminals. Of the four friends who lived in my apartment, as I said above, Kaminsky was a very experienced employee - he remained

with me until he was sent to Zhitomir, behind the lines of the Germans. In his pince-nez and three-piece suit, Kaminsky looked like a typical French businessman. Seeing him off, my wife could not hold back her tears. Kaminsky himself exuded optimism. According to him, he is truly happy that he was again attracted to work. Interspersing his speech with French anecdotes, in order to reassure my wife a little, Kaminsky said that this was a great success for him, even if he was destined to die. He was issued immediately after landing in Zhytomyr. This was done by a priest, an agent of the local NKVD, who by this time had already

collaborated with the Gestapo. Kaminsky immediately sensed the ambush set up in the safe house and shot himself. We learned about his fate three or four months later. Everyone who was close to him was blocked and killed in the firefight. Other Chekists, released from prison and previously dismissed, began to work in the bodies, but with a demotion. Most of them were sent at the head of special groups to the rear of the Germans. Some of them died, but some - Medvedev and Prokopyuk - received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for successful partisan operations in the rear of the Germans.

The repressions of 1938-1939 taught me a lot: I was not so naive now as to sign documents for the rehabilitation of my friends who were released from prison in 1941. My reputation had already been "tarnished by association with these people" who were arrested as "enemies of the people." In order for their rehabilitation to look objectively justified, I asked Fitin to sign the documents necessary for the return to service of people, especially those close to me. This turned out to be a far-sighted step: in 1946 and 1953, when I was accused of contributing to the release of my friends who were "enemies of the people", I had the opportunity to refer to Fitin's signature. In the fate of Serebryansky, my petition for his reinstatement in the party in 1941 played a fatal role: in 1953 he was accused of escaping capital punishment only thanks to the intercession of a traitor like me. He died in prison during interrogation by the investigator Tsaregradsky in 1956.

On June 26, 1941, my father received another appointment - to the post of deputy chief of staff of the NKVD for combating German paratroopers. In 1942, a select unit of paratroopers was transferred under his command. They were assigned a squadron of transport aircraft and long-range bombers. Throughout the war, they maintained close cooperation with the commander of long-range aviation, Marshal Golovanov, a close friend of Eitingon in the Military

academy.

The situation at the front after the German invasion developed, as you know, tragically. The power of the German tank armada surpassed all preliminary data obtained by intelligence and

through official channels. The scale of the defeat of the Red Army in the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine was staggering. Until August 1941, the Soviet intelligence services undertook several sabotage operations to rescue Red Army units that were surrounded, but the attempts failed: these units were dispersed and could no longer be a base for deploying a partisan war.

Then, in cooperation with regional and local party organizations, partisan formations began to be sent to the rear of the Germans, including experienced intelligence officers and radio operators in their composition. During the war years, the Special Group - the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD and its military formations, as follows from official documents, carried out the responsible tasks of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (1941-1945), the Moscow Defense Headquarters (October-December 1941), the commander of the Western Front (1941-1943), Headquarters of the Defense of the Main Caucasian Range (1942-1943), Commander of the North Caucasian Front (1942-1943), Commander of the Transcaucasian Front (1942-1943), Commander of the Central Front (1943-1944), Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front (1943-1944).

More than two thousand operational groups with a total number of fifteen thousand people were sent to the rear of the enemy. Twenty-three officers received the highest government award - they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. More than eight thousand people were awarded orders and medals. Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky specifically appealed to the NKVD with a request to provide them with detachments from the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD to destroy enemy communications and support the offensive operations of the Red Army in Belarus, Poland and the Caucasus. The units of the Fourth Directorate and the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose destroyed 157 thousand German soldiers and officers, liquidated 87 high-ranking German officials, exposed and neutralized 2045 enemy agent groups.

I think that there is also a considerable share of the merit of my father and his friend Naum Eitingon, who skillfully managed all these operations. In the history of the NKVD, this is perhaps the only chapter that his successors continue to be proud of. At all official

events dedicated to the next anniversary of the battle of Moscow or Stalingrad, as well as the liberation of Belarus, always mention the names of partisans and underground fighters who were under the command of the NKVD. Kuznetsov, Medvedev, Prokopyuk, Vaupshasov, Karasev, Mirkovsky, Prudnikov, Shikhov, Kudrya, Lyagin were and remain true heroes of resistance to fascism in the occupied territories.

From 1945 to 1992, about five thousand books and articles were published in our country about the military operations of the Special Group and the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD in the Great Patriotic War. During these years, my father was in active service, then was arrested, imprisoned, finally released from prison and rehabilitated. And in none of these publications you will find the name of my father. An ellipsis appeared where his signature was on the documents. At first, he was not mentioned for reasons of secrecy, and later the name of Sudoplatov was withdrawn, since he was a convicted "criminal", or rather, an unwanted witness for many powerful people of this world. However, it should also be cited that in the collections edited by my father, published in 1970-1992, more than three thousand names of heroes who fought in the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes are named.

As before, based on the testimonies of my father, I would like to dwell on the most important operations of Soviet intelligence, tell about the heroes of the secret war, about whom little is known, but who played a significant role in the military-political events of that time. A significant

contribution to our reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines was made by a partisan formation under the command of Colonel Medvedev. He was the first to get in touch with Otto Skorzeny, the head of the special operations of the Nazi security service. Dmitry Medvedev and Nikolai Kuznetsov established that Skorzeny was preparing groups to attack the American and Soviet embassies in Tehran, where the first Big Three conference was to take place in 1943. A group of militants Skorzeny was trained near Vinnitsa, where Medvedev's partisan detachment was operating. It was here, on the territory occupied by the Nazis, that Hitler placed a branch of his headquarters.

A young employee of the Special Group, Nikolai Kuznetsov, under the guise of a senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, established friendly relations with an officer of the German special services, Oster, who was just busy looking for people with experience in fighting Russian partisans. He needed these people for an operation against the Soviet high command. Having owed Kuznetsov, Oster offered to pay him off with Iranian carpets, which he was going to bring to Vinnitsa from a business trip to Tehran. This message, immediately transmitted to Moscow, coincided with information from other sources and helped to prevent actions in Tehran against the Big Three.

Kuznetsov (code name Pooh) personally eliminated several governors of the German administration in Galicia. These acts of retribution against the organizers of terror against the Soviet people were committed by him with unparalleled courage in broad daylight on the streets of Rovno and Lvov. Dressed in a German military uniform, he boldly approached the enemy, announced the death sentence and fired at point-blank range. Each carefully prepared action of this kind was insured by the

combat support group. Once he was received by Hitler's assistant Gauleiter Erich Koch, head of the administration of Poland and Galicia. Kuznetsov was supposed to kill him. But when Koch told Kuznetsov to return to his unit as soon as possible, because a major offensive was to begin near Kursk in the next ten days, Kuznetsov decided not to kill Koch in order to be able to immediately return to Medvedev and transmit an urgent radiogram to Moscow.

On the instructions of the Headquarters, Kuznetsov's information about the preparation by the Germans of a strategic offensive operation was rechecked and confirmed by scouts Aleksakhin and Vorobyov sent to the occupied Orel. Various

rumors circulate around Kuznetsov's personality, casting doubt on the fact that he could have successfully played the role of a German officer for so long. I heard that he was sent to Germany even before the start of the war. Activists of Memorial, an organization that unites Gulag prisoners, tried to associate his name with repressions against Germans deported to Kazakhstan from Siberia and the Volga region. Kuznetsov had nothing to do with this. He was Russian, originally from Siberia, knew German well and was fluent in

spoke it because he lived among the Germans living there. He was attracted to work by the local NKVD and in 1939 he was sent to Moscow to study. He was trained individually as a special agent for possible use against the German embassy in Moscow.

Handsome, blond, he could pass for a German, that is, a Soviet citizen of German origin. He had a network of informers among Moscow artists. As an actor, he was introduced to some foreign diplomats. Gradually, the German embassy workers began to pay attention to an interesting young man of typical Aryan appearance, with a well-established reputation as a connoisseur of ballet. It was led by Raikhman, deputy head of the counterintelligence department, and Ilyin, state security commissar for work with the intelligentsia. Kuznetsov, performing their tasks, will always receive maximum information not only from diplomatic workers, but also from friends whom he made among artists and writers. The personal file of agent Kuznetsov contains information about him as a lover of most of the Moscow ballet stars, some of them he shared with German diplomats in the interests of business.

Kuznetsov participated in operations to intercept German diplomatic mail, since from time to time diplomatic couriers stayed at the Metropol and Nationals hotels, and not at the German embassy. Using his diplomatic connections, Kuznetsov was able to warn the NKVD about when the diplomatic couriers were going to arrive and when it would be possible for our agents, stationed in these hotels and equipped with the necessary photographic equipment, to quickly reshoot the documents. In 1942, Kuznetsov

was abandoned in the Rivne region. He appeared there in the form of a German quartermaster officer. According to the legend developed by the NKVD, Kuznetsov was allegedly on wounded leave and was instructed to organize the delivery of food and warm clothes for his division located near Leningrad. He posed as a German who lived for several years in the Baltic states, where he was mobilized. According to him, he returned to Germany only in 1940 as a repatriate. There was a war going on, the movement of people was very intense, it would take a long time for the Abwehr or the Gestapo to verify his identity. Documents for his work in

the German rear were made by the Austrian Miller and his student Gromushkin. Our operative Okun actively participated in the preparation of Kuznetsov for operations behind German lines. My father told me a lot about how he spent many hours with Kuznetsov preparing for future assignments. He remembered him as a man of rare talent to remain calm when performing combat missions, realistic and reasonable in his actions. But gradually Kuznetsov began to believe very

much in his luck and made a fatal mistake, trying to cross the front line to meet with units of the Red Army. Kuznetsov and his people were captured by Bandera, who collaborated with the Germans. This happened in 1944 in one of the villages near Lvov. An investigation by the Soviet secret services later showed that Kuznetsov blew himself up with a hand grenade: a telegram was found in the Gestapo archives in which the Bandera men informed the Gestapo about the capture of a group of Red Army officers, one of whom was dressed in a German uniform. Bandera believed that this man, who was killed in a shootout, was exactly the one whom the German special services had been unsuccessfully looking for all this time. The Germans were handed over some forged documents made in the name of Lieutenant Paul Siebert (Kuznetsov's pseudonym), and part of Kuznetsov's report to the Center with amazing details of the destruction of high-ranking German representatives in Ukraine. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Operations carried out by combat groups of

partisans sometimes acquired strategic importance and played an important role in the disruption of rear communications when our offensive in Belorussia was launched in 1944. These operations are known as "Rail War", or "Concert". On the eve of the offensive in Belarus, the partisans put out of action the main railway supply lines of the German army.

There is evidence that during the period of intense fighting near Moscow in November 1941, the task force and the raid partisan detachment under the command of V. A. Karasev defeated one of the German military headquarters. Under the line of the NKVD, the forces of sabotage detachments of the Special Group carried out mining of highways

near Moscow and Tula, which reduced the offensive capabilities of German tank groups.

The partisans of the Separate Special Purpose Brigade also provided very significant assistance to the Red Army units during the battle near Moscow. When the Germans approached the capital in the fall of 1941, the Separate Brigade of the NKVD was given the task of protecting the center of Moscow and the Kremlin at all costs. Its fighters took up positions in the House of Unions, in close proximity to the Kremlin. At this critical moment for the fate of the capital, the Separate Brigade was, perhaps, the only combat formation that had a sufficient number of mines and people capable of laying them. By direct order of the General Staff and Zhukov personally, the far and near approaches to Moscow were mined, and the motorized part of the brigade helped eliminate German motorcyclists and armored personnel carriers that broke through to the bridge across the Moscow River near Sheremetyevo Airport. The Germans were no longer able to get closer to this place to Moscow. Today, huge anti-tank gouges stand here in memory of those days - a symbol of the courage of the defenders of the capital.

In case the Germans succeeded in capturing the city, a special NKVD brigade mined a number of buildings in Moscow where meetings of the German high command could be held, as well as important structures both in the capital and around it. Several government dachas near Moscow were also mined (among them, however, there was no Stalin's dacha).

My father repeatedly told different stories. Here, in particular, one of them.

During the training of saboteurs, he, along with Maklyarsky, had the opportunity to instruct a young officer, Igor Shchors, who joined the NKVD in 1940. As a result, they provided him with documents and got him a job as the chief engineer of the water industry in the suburbs of Moscow, not far from the Stalinist dacha. In the event that the area was occupied by the Germans, he was to use the water and sewer systems for sabotage and hiding agents. As a result of the bombing, part of the water pipes were damaged, and this prevented the normal supply of water to Stalin's dacha. Shchors supervised the repair work that was carried out



security personnel, the accident was quickly eliminated in three hours. He was awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor, but he could not receive this award, since it was awarded to a person whose documents Shchors used to get a job, and at that time it was impossible to reveal his real name. In 1945, Shchors was sent to Bulgaria, where he was to ensure the extraction and shipment of uranium to the Soviet Union for our nuclear industry. After my father's arrest

in 1953, he learned that he was also accused of planning to use mines planted in government dachas to destroy Soviet leaders. Investigators said the mines could be set off by remote control on Beria's orders to destroy Stalin's successors. All this was a crude invention. But it was.

In October 1941, Moscow was in serious danger. Most of the NKVD apparatus and the families of its employees were evacuated to the east. Those who remained in Moscow moved from Lubyanka to the premises of the Fire School, located in the northern suburbs of the capital near the headquarters of the Comintern. Father was sitting in a room with Serov, Chernyshev and Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputies. It was a reserve command post for the NKVD forces, created in case of hostilities in the city, if the Germans broke through our defenses. These days, on the orders of Beria, my

father was engaged in recruiting the intelligence network in Moscow. It has created three independent intelligence networks. One was led by his old friend from Ukraine, Major Drozdov (he later received the rank of general). For the purpose of conspiracy, he was made deputy head of the Moscow Pharmacy Department. In the event of the occupation of Moscow, he was supposed to supply medicines to the German command and gain confidence in him. He was not known in Moscow, as he was appointed deputy head of the Moscow police just a few months before the start of the war. Fedoseev, head of the

counterintelligence department of the NKVD Directorate for Moscow, did a great deal of work in preparing the Moscow underground and mobilizing agents to counter German sabotage in Moscow. In the line of intelligence, Maklyarsky and Massya were responsible for this work. One of the underground workers, on which

Beria stopped his choice, was Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik. In 1953, he - the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR - was shot along with Beria. In addition to these two intelligence networks, another autonomous group was created, which was supposed to destroy Hitler and his entourage if they appeared in Moscow after its capture. This operation was entrusted to the composer Knipper, brother of Olga Chekhova, and his wife Marina Garikovna. Fedotov, head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKVD, was supposed to lead the

underground. Various books, in particular Khrushchev's memoirs, talk about the panic that seized Stalin in the first days of the war. However, my father claimed to have seen nothing of the sort. Stalin did not take refuge in his dacha. Published records of the Kremlin visitor's log show that he regularly received people and directly followed the worsening situation every day. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin hosted Beria and Merkulov in his Kremlin two or three times a day. They usually returned to the NKVD late in the evening, and sometimes transmitted their orders directly from the Kremlin. "It seemed to me," my father recalled,

"that the mechanism for managing and monitoring the execution of orders worked without any failures. Both Eitingon and I lived in a deep faith in the final victory over the Germans, which was due in no small part to the calm, businesslike manner in which daily leadership was carried out from above. I must say that sometimes it was extremely difficult to carry out the orders received. When in October 1941 I was called to Beria's office, where Malenkov was, and ordered to mine the most important structures in Moscow and on the outskirts of it, such as the main railway stations, defense industry facilities, some residential buildings, some metro stations and a stadium "Dynamo", the explosives were supposed to be ready in twenty-four hours. We worked around the clock to fulfill the order. And Malenkov and Beria at that time, without rest, calmly, in a businesslike manner, worked in the NKVD on the Lubyanka.

On November 6, 1941, my father received an invitation to a solemn meeting dedicated to the October Revolution, which should

was not to be held at the Bolshoi Theatre, but for security reasons - on the platform of the Mayakovskaya metro station.

"We went down the escalator and went out onto the platform," my father recalled. — On one side was an electric train with open doors, where there were tables with sandwiches and soft drinks. At the end of the platform was a platform for members of the Politburo. The government

arrived by train from the other side of the platform. Stalin got out of the car, accompanied by Beria and Malenkov. The meeting was opened by the Chairman of the Moscow Council Pronin. Stalin spoke for about half an hour. His speech made a deep impression on me: the firmness and confidence of the leader convinced us of our ability to resist the enemy. The next day, the traditional parade took place on Red Square, which was held with great enthusiasm, despite the heavy snowfall. There was a stamp on my pass: "Access everywhere" - this meant that I could also go to the main tribune of the Mausoleum, where the Soviet leaders who were hosting the parade were standing.

Beria and Merkulov warned me that in case of emergencies I should immediately report to them by going up to the Mausoleum. The situation was actually critical: the advanced units of the Germans were very close to the city. Among the operational workers serving the parade were young Fisher, the head of the communications department of our service, and a radio operator with all the necessary equipment. We maintained constant contact with the headquarters of the brigade defending Moscow. The snowfall was so thick that the Germans were unable to send planes to bomb Red Square. The order to the troops participating in the parade was clear: no matter what happened, remain calm and maintain discipline. This parade further strengthened our faith in the ability to defend Moscow and ultimately defeat the enemy. Even in these troubled hours for the country, we were looking

for the enemy's weak points in order to turn the course of events in our favor. We received valuable information from Count Nelidov, a former officer in the tsarist and White armies, a major double agent for the Abwehr and British intelligence. On the instructions of Canaris, Count Nelidov took part in the strategic military "games" of the German General Staff in 1936-1937

years. On the eve of the German invasion of Poland (he was in Warsaw on a reconnaissance mission), he was arrested by Polish counterintelligence. Having seized Western Ukraine in 1939, we found him in the Lvov prison and brought him to Moscow. Nelidov was developed by

Vasily Zarubin, Zoya Rybkina and Pavel Zhuravlev, head of the German branch of intelligence of the NKVD. In 1941-1942, Nelidov was planned to be used to counter British intelligence agents who had settled in Moscow. At that time, Zhuravlev, Rybkina, and I did not attach due importance to Nelidov's testimony about the main orientation of the Abwehr in reconnaissance and sabotage work in the conditions of a blitzkrieg. However, the situation changed dramatically after our defeats in the first days and months of the war. It was then that we returned to the first interrogations of Nelidov. His testimony was compared with the materials received in 1937 from Spiegelglas on the military-strategic "games" at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, and the Germans' stake on the "blitzkrieg" became obvious to everyone. Stalin's reaction to our message was immediate. For extended interrogations of Nelidov and familiarization with all the operational documents of the 30s, the head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, Golikov, and the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General Vasilevsky, arrived at the NKVD. They were greatly impressed by his knowledge, connections and characterization of the mood of the German

high command."

Nelidov said that the Germans could defeat us only if the war continued for two or three months. But if during this time they do not take possession of Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Donbass, the North Caucasus and, of course, Baku with its oil, the German invasion is doomed to failure. A huge number of tanks and motorized formations necessary for the "blitzkrieg" could only operate effectively on territories with a fairly developed network of roads, and the Germans did not have a reserve of fuel to wage a protracted war, especially for ships of the German fleet, and in particular submarines. In October and November 1941, Soviet intelligence received reliable information from Berlin that the German army had almost run out of ammunition, oil and gasoline to continue

active offensive operations. Everything pointed to the imminent pause in the German advance. This data was transmitted by Arvid Harnack (code name Corsican), an anti-fascist, adviser to the German Ministry of Economics. A member of a prominent family of writers and philosophers, he was recruited during his visit to the Soviet Union in 1932 and from then on fed information to Soviet intelligence for a decade until he was exposed. In December 1942 he was tried and hanged. His wife, American Mildred Fish Harnack, whom he met while studying at the University of Wisconsin, was also arrested and executed in 1945 for anti-fascist activities. In March 1939, when my father became deputy chief of intelligence of the NKVD,

one of his main tasks was to infiltrate illegal immigrants in Western Europe and create an agent network connected with the Germans who had diplomatic cover. This was especially true of Germany, which was the focus of all intelligence work. After the repressions of 1937-1938, new people began to deal with German affairs in intelligence, and contacts between Soviet intelligence services and agents were temporarily interrupted. It was decided to sharply intensify these contacts. The flight of Alexander Orlov in 1938 cast suspicion on the leading cadres of the Foreign Department; Spiegelglas, Mally, Belkin, Serebryansky and other employees who controlled intelligence networks in Western Europe were arrested, which made it much more difficult to obtain intelligence information. When my father headed this section, he had to send new and often inexperienced people abroad. As a result, from November 1938 to March 1939, the flow of intelligence from Western Europe dropped sharply. The decision taken by Beria and Stalin in 1939 to open a special intelligence school for personnel training meant that the country would receive the first specialists no sooner than in two years. Meanwhile, the need for these personnel became more and more acute. The situation was heating up every day: Adolf Hitler instructed the Wehrmacht General Staff to hastily prepare for the capture of Poland. The prospects for unleashing a war in Europe loomed more and more distinctly. Stalin demanded from Beria details about the

German combat formations and the strategic plans of Berlin.

My father noted that since the people who had previously been in charge of the spy network in Western Europe (Orlov in Spain, Krivitsky in Holland, Reuss and Steinberg in Switzerland) either became defectors or were subjected to repression, it was extremely difficult to convince Beria and Merkulov to go take risks and activate those structures that they once led. Fortunately, not everyone involved in the selection and recruitment of agents were repressed. Some, like Lang and Hirschfeld, were temporarily placed in the active reserve while their fate was decided at the top. Our people were still in Berlin and Paris. The Cambridge group resumed its activities, despite fears that it was illuminated by Orlov, who had defected to the West. In the end, the father managed to convince Fitin that he should still take risks and restore his old agent connections, no matter how dangerous it might be. They came out with their proposal to Beria, and he was forced to agree with them. "The difficult decision to restore contacts with our agents interrupted for six months was nevertheless made," my father said, "although we feared that during this time some of them might have already been captured and recruited. But it was the end of April 1939, and the specter of war on the horizon was becoming more and more clear. I remember that it was then at

the Center that the fate of Kim Philby was decided. When permission was requested from London for his transfer to the headquarters of British intelligence, I personally agreed on the condition that he himself voluntarily decide on a "double game", taking into account the special risk. Vasilevsky was sent to

France as the new head of our residency, who was supposed to restore the decayed ties. A group of officers was assigned to Germany, Finland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It took them about half a year to check the condition and reliability of our agent network, with which no contacts have been maintained lately.

In 1939-1940, we restored ties and began active work. Created by military intelligence and the NKVD, an underground network known as the "Red Chapel" operated during almost the entire second world war. Agents of the "Red Chapel" transmitted coded messages to the Center by radio.

I will tell you from the words of my father how all this was carried out in practice. Military intelligence had its own intelligence network in Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland and operated independently of the NKVD. At the end of the 1930s, the military turned out to be quite far-sighted and sent two of their employees, Trepper and Gurevich, to France and Belgium. They left there together with radio operators to work in wartime conditions. During this period, the military also had its own illegal residency in Switzerland, led by the former worker of the Hungarian section of the Comintern, Sandor Rado and Ursula Kuczynska (codename Sonja), who later, in 1941, became a liaison between the Center and the German physicist Klaus Fuchs, who worked in England. Serious mistakes were made in the

preparation of residencies for operational activities in Western Europe in the conditions of hostilities and the transition to an illegal position. The agent network of Trepper, Gurevich and Rado was too strongly connected with sources of Jewish nationality, which made it vulnerable to the German secret services. The leadership of the Intelligence Agency, as well as the INO NKVD, neglected the proper training of radio operators to maintain communications in a war. On the eve of the war, the NKVD managed to create a powerful intelligence network in Germany, led by Amayak Kobulov, Korotkoe and Zhuravlev. Military intelligence in Germany also had important agents - Ilse Stebe in the press department of the Foreign Office and Rudolf Shelia, a high-ranking German diplomat.

In June 1941, when Germany attacked the USSR, the NKVD intelligence did not have centralized control over all the intelligence networks that sent their messages independently of each other. The Red Army Intelligence Directorate was better prepared to switch from couriers and diplomatic bags to clandestine radio broadcasts: the agents had the necessary equipment. Meanwhile, the Foreign Department of the NKVD only in April 1941 sent instructions to the residencies of Western Europe on preparation for work in the conditions of an imminent war. Amayak Kobulov and Alexander Korotkov, who were in Europe, were obliged to speed up the training of radio operators and provide them with reliable equipment, as well as create backup radio apartments.

Schulze-Boysen (Sergeant Major), Harnack (Corsican) and Kukhof (Old Man), badly instructed by Kobulov and Korotkov, violated the elementary rule of conspiracy: they maintained a linear connection. In addition, all three agents had one radio operator.

In October 1941, having lost contact due to poor-quality equipment and the unskilled work of radio operators of our agents in Berlin, the Military Intelligence Directorate and the NKVD made an unforgivable mistake. A resident in Brussels, Gurevich (Kent), received a cipher telegram by radio, according to which he was to leave for Berlin with a radio transmitter. He handed it over to the Corsican and the Chief. Upon returning to Brussels, Kent confirmed the successful completion of the mission by radio and reported to Moscow the information received in Berlin about the difficulties that the Germans were experiencing in supplying and replenishing reserves, about the realistic assessment by the German command of the failure of the Blitzkrieg, about a possible enemy offensive in the spring and summer of 1942 years with the aim of mastering our oil fields.

Such valuable information, transmitted in November 1941 and confirmed three months later, was reported to the government, but, unfortunately, did not play its due role, due to the fact that on December 13, 1941, the Kent radio operator and cipherman with codes were captured by German counterintelligence, and the Gestapo did not have much difficulty in 1942, after a brief development, to arrest the leaders of the "Red Chapel" in Berlin and other cities of Western Europe.

On August 5, 1942, the Intelligence Agency sent two paratrooper agents to Germany - Arthur Hessler and Albert Barth. But the Germans were already keeping under surveillance the group with which they were sent to communicate, and they were arrested. Hessler died in the Gestapo, and the Germans recruited Bart, and he began to conduct a radio game with Soviet intelligence, which, by the way, ours immediately figured out. During the interrogation, Bart uncovered the Soviet agent Willy Loman (Breitenbach), who had been collaborating with us since 1935. Loman was a member of the Gestapo and supplied Moscow with extremely important information. In 1935-1941, he handed over to us the most important materials on the developments of the Gestapo to introduce agents into the environment of Russian emigrants and into the communist underground.



At one time, Moscow also learned from Lehman which sources of Polish counterintelligence were recruited and used by the Germans after the exposure of the Polish resident Sosnowski in 1936 in Berlin. Leman was arrested on

the street and secretly, without trial, executed. The Gestapo informed the wife that her husband had disappeared and was being intensively searched for. After the war, only his registration card was found in the archives of the Plötzensee prison in Berlin - there were no other traces of him left. Leman during the war years was the only Gestapo officer who

collaborated with the Soviet Union. In the archives of the Gestapo, information about the "Red Chapel" was found. And although Bart's name appears there, Leman is not even mentioned. Perhaps this is due to the unwillingness to cast a shadow on the Gestapo, in the ranks of which was a Soviet agent. My father did not rule out that the Gestapo was afraid to report this to Hitler. Bart was taken prisoner by the British and handed over to us

in 1946. He was taken to Moscow, tried and shot for treason. A few words about the work of the Sorge (Ramsay) group in Tokyo. The information coming through this line from the circles of Prime Minister Konoe and the statements of the German Ambassador Ott were treated with some distrust in Moscow. And the point was not only that Sorge was recruited by the subsequently repressed Berzin and Borovich, who led the Red Army Intelligence Department in the 1920s and 1930s. Even before the arrest of Borovich, the direct curator of Sorge, the latter received permission from the top leadership to cooperate with German military intelligence in Japan. He received permission, but at the same time he fell under suspicion, since such special agents are traditionally not trusted and are regularly

rechecked in all special services. In 1937, the acting head of the Intelligence Agency Gendin, in his message to Stalin, emphasizing the double game of the valuable agent Sorge, who also obtained information for Ott, a resident of the German Abwehr in Tokyo, concluded that the said agent could not enjoy full confidence as a source of information.

According to my father, the tragedy of Sorge was that his heroic work and the information coming from him was practically not used by our command. Extremely important

data about the upcoming Japanese attack on the United States, about Japan's non-alignment with the German aggression against the USSR in September-October 1941, remained in our archives. And the divisions from the Far East were transferred to Moscow in October 1941 only because Stalin did not have other reserve combat formations ready for battle. If Sorge's information was taken into account at the same time, it did not play a significant role in the decision being made either. From 1941 to 1945, reports that the Japanese did not intend to fight with us regularly came from our trusted agents who held the positions of adviser to the Japanese embassy in Moscow and head of the gendarmerie service of the Kwantung Army, who transmitted to us documentary data on the deployment of Japanese formations in Manchuria. Among other things, it was possible to decipher the correspondence between the Japanese embassy in Moscow and Tokyo, from which it followed that the invasion of the USSR

in October 1941 by Japan was not planned. Sorge's behavior during the investigation after his arrest by the Japanese authorities caused serious irritation in Moscow. He violated the main directive of Soviet intelligence: never recognize espionage in any form in favor of the Soviet Union. Although the practice of exchanging arrested agents and intelligence officers in the 1930s was very limited, it was nevertheless occasionally used. The Poles, for example, freed the Soviet illegal Fedichkin in 1930, the Americans, the NKVD resident in New York Ovakimyan, in September 1941. The leadership of the Intelligence Agency, in view of Sorge's confessions,

did not raise the question of his possible exchange to anyone. By August 1942, the "Red Chapel" in Berlin, which included agents of military intelligence and the NKVD, was destroyed. But in Germany, a number of important sources of information and agents of influence survived. Some agents of the Hamburg group, created by Serebryansky and Eitingon, who were not connected with the Harnack-Schulze-Boysen group and settled in the Farben Industry and Thyssen concerns in the port of Hamburg, survived and went underground. The agent Yuna, who settled in Ribbentrop's department - the German Foreign Ministry, escaped arrest; Olga Chekhova and the Polish prince Janusz Radziwill were not compromised. However, there were no reliable I

the popular actor Carl Gerhard (Chansonnier) was suitable only for the role of couriers. Strinberg's trips to Germany turned out to be of little effect, and the Germans soon revealed Gerhard, since he did not hide his anti-Hitler sentiments. The agent network in France and Switzerland continued to operate.

In early 1941, Vasilevsky created a network of illegal immigrants in France. The main figure in contact with them was Colonel Schmidt, a senior member of the Abwehr cipher service. Vasilevsky learned that Schmidt had been recruited by French intelligence in the early 1930s. The French communists who helped Vasilevsky's people established that Schmidt also worked for the British secret service. The name of the English agent with whom Schmidt maintained contact in France was given to us by MacLean as early as 1939. From the nature of the materials given by Schmidt to Vasilevsky, we realized that the British regularly intercept and decipher German radio messages. The Germans tracked down Schmidt's suspicious connections and he disappeared without a trace.

Hundreds of radiograms to Moscow from the "Red Chapel" from Switzerland for the period from July 1941 to October 1943 contained the most valuable information: orders from the German high command, information about the movement of troops and a lot of operational details of the hostilities. This information was transmitted by Rudolf Ressler (People), but he stubbornly refused to name its source to the illegal Soviet resident Shandor Rado.

Ressler, a German émigré, met Rado when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. He made it clear that he considered Rado connected with Soviet intelligence, and suggested that he pass on information from German military circles. Knowing this, Moscow decided that Luci was simply trying to keep secret his source - an agent in the German General Staff. In fact, Ressler

passed on the information he received from the British. British intelligence knew about the work of the Rado group, since on the eve of the war they introduced their agent into the Red Chapel in Switzerland. Through diplomatic channels in London, through the British liaison mission in Moscow, the British did not transmit this information, fearing that the NKVD would not believe it and would demand to name the source. Soviet intelligence services did not know then that the British had

an analogue of the German Enigma encryption machine, which was assembled in 1938 for the British intelligence service by a Polish engineer who previously worked at a German secret enterprise that produced these machines. The British kept the existence of the Enigma, which enabled them to decipher German radio messages, a closely guarded secret. Information about her came to Moscow in 1945 from Philby and

Cairncross. My father said that Stalin did not trust the British, and there were

reasons for this. "When we compared intelligence from our agents in Switzerland and from London, we saw their striking coincidence. However, the information from London from the Cambridge group was more complete, and from the Luci group clearly redacted. It was clear that Luci's information was dosed and edited by the British intelligence services. Our

London station was periodically supplied with decrypted radio messages by John Cairncross, who worked in the British cipher center Bletchley Park. Later, speaking with my friend Kukin - he was a resident in London from 1943 to 1947 and led the Cambridge group - we recognized that Cairncross's contribution to our common cause and the materials received from him were of great value for revealing German operational plans. The decrypted materials from Cairncross were not only of military value, but also allowed us to trace the penetration of the British intelligence service into the Rado group.

In the spring of 1943, a few weeks before the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Russian station in London received information from the Cambridge group about the specific goals of the planned German offensive, code-named Operation Citadel. This message indicated the number of German divisions that were supposed to be used, and emphasized that the operation "Citadel" was aimed at Kursk, and not at Velikie Luki, that is, not to the west, but to the south-west of Moscow - we did not expect a German offensive there. The NKVD forwarded this information to the Soviet Supreme High Command on May 7, 1943. The message from London contained more detailed and accurate plans for the German offensive than those received through military intelligence from Luci from

Geneva. It became quite clear to the leaders of military intelligence and the NKVD that the British were giving us limited information, but at the same time they wanted us to thwart the German offensive. From this we concluded that they were interested not so much in our victory as in prolonging the fighting, which would lead to the exhaustion of the forces of both sides. At the beginning

of 1943, the head of military intelligence, General Ilyichev, sent a letter to the NKVD and to General Selivanovskiy, deputy head of military counterintelligence SMERSH, with the message that the German special services had penetrated the Red Chapel. An encrypted warning was received from an agent in Brussels, Gurevich (Kent), that he was working under German control. It was decided to continue these radio games with the Germans. In the autumn of 1943, radio operators of the Red Chapel were arrested in Geneva and Lausanne, but in Moscow they still continued to receive information from London from the Soviet resident Kukin, who replaced Gorsky. British intelligence has not yet acknowledged the

transfer of redacted decoded information to the Russian intelligence network in Switzerland. In Moscow, however, the Red Chapel has always been viewed with suspicion. Her heroic activity in Germany, France and Switzerland did not bring laurels in the eyes of the authorities to either the intelligence of the NKVD or the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army. No one treated her work as a priority, because the deciphered orders of the Germans, transmitted by the British, did not contain indisputable data based on genuine documents, but were based on oral information from sources. The Red Chapel is still considered in the West as the main source of intelligence information

that came to the Soviet Union during the war years, but in fact this information was of a secondary nature for Moscow. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that its agents acted with great courage and high professionalism, and many of them died heroic deaths. The leaders of the "Red Chapel" Trepper (Big Chief), Gurevich (Little Chief, or Kent) and Rado (Dora) were considered traitors in the Red Army Intelligence Agency. Trepper and Rado tried to hide from the Soviet authorities; their search and sending to Moscow

carried out by the British. In Moscow, they were arrested and imprisoned in the Lubyanka.

Trepper and Rado spent ten years in prison before being released and rehabilitated in the late 1950s. In their memoirs, they presented Gurevich as a traitor, but it was he who captured, recruited and left in Moscow in 1945 the chief investigator of the Gestapo who dealt with the case of the Red Chapel. When Gurevich was taken to the Gestapo in November 1942, as mentioned above, he managed to send a radiogram warning that he was now under the control of the Germans, and one of the instructions he received from the NKVD obliged him to continue radio games, which he did.

As soon as the war ended, Gurevich managed to convince the Gestapo officer Heinz Pannwitz, who was in charge of the Red Chapel case, to make contact with us. According to Gurevich, for Soviet intelligence, he will be a valuable acquisition, since he has information that allows him to identify those who sympathized with the Russians and those who were the enemy. <sup>Who</sup> This, he said, would secure an amnesty for Pannwitz and a job in the Soviet security agencies. Shocked by Germany's defeat, Pannwitz accepted Gurevich's offer of a secret meeting with a Russian representative. He was detained and, together with Gurevich, was immediately taken to Moscow. Pannwitz's revelations, however, had only limited interest in the eyes of the intelligence leadership.

The wide popularity of Pannwitz in the West ruled out the possibility of using him for our active operations. Since he could report on those Gestapo informants whom the Soviet intelligence services, together with British intelligence, were still looking for, it was decided not to liquidate him, but to keep him further in prison. Trepper, Rado and Gurevich shared his fate: they survived only because their testimony might be needed in the future. After ten years in prison, Pannwitz was repatriated to Germany.

From 1946, Rado and Trepper claimed that the failure of the Red Chapel was due to Gurevich's betrayal. After Stalin's death in 1953, as is now known, Comintern veterans petitioned for the rehabilitation of Rado and Trepper. Their case was reviewed, and in 1955 they were acquitted of the charge of treason, although the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff

and objected, putting forward their accusations against them - violation of the rules of secrecy and unauthorized spending of money. Gurevich was released in 1955 under an amnesty for those who were accused of collaborating with the Germans, but was not rehabilitated.

Gurevich personally turned to Khrushchev with a request to look into his case, but the KGB and military intelligence firmly stood their ground, deliberately making him a scapegoat for the failure of the Red Chapel. According to a special certificate prepared by the heads of the KGB intelligence Sakharovsky and Korotkov, in 1958 Gurevich was arrested again. The arrest warrant was signed by Serov, who by that time had become the head of the KGB, and Prosecutor General Rudenko. Gurevich was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, but in accordance with the new Criminal Code, this term was reduced to fifteen years. Since he had already served almost ten years, he was released after

five years.

After serving the full term of imprisonment, Gurevich settled in Leningrad, where he worked as an interpreter. Every year he filed for a review of his case, but the KGB and military intelligence persisted, still opposing his rehabilitation or a new trial. In the official history of Soviet military intelligence prepared in the 1960s and 1970s, Gurevich is presented as a traitor whose actions led to the failure of the Red Chapel in France and Germany. In the West, Gilles Perrault's *The Red Chapel* expresses the same point of view.

In 1990, the military prosecutor's office turned to my father in the case of Gurevich, who continued to insist on his rehabilitation. The prosecutor's office found a document of exceptional importance - a memo from the General Staff, sent to the NKVD with the approval of Gurevich's (Kent's) radio games with the Germans. When Gurevich's case began to be reviewed, it turned out that his only fault was that he started a family in the West (in France) without the approval of the Center. However, the leadership of military intelligence continued to stubbornly prevent the restoration of his rights. After Gurevich was finally rehabilitated in 1991, the Intelligence Department of the General Staff categorically refused to pay him compensation, assign a military pension and grant the status of a war veteran ... His wife died in Europe, and his son, along with his wife and children, came to

Petersburg to meet with his father. The story of Gurevich went through the pages of the Russian press, but no one asked the question, whose evil will in the intelligence agencies of the USSR continued to lay the blame on this man all these years?

In my father's memoirs of the Great Patriotic War, a special place is given to the plans of the Soviet leadership for a peaceful end to the war through Soviet-German negotiations and, as a result, territorial concessions: end in 1941 and 1942 and to stop the enemy at any cost

seemed natural and reasonable. Looking back, you see that the tragic defeats of the Red Army in Belarus, the loss of millions of human lives killed and taken prisoner near Kiev were just a tactical success for the Wehrmacht. The Germans faced the prospect of a protracted war, for which they had neither the necessary forces nor material resources to win.

By mid-July 1941 we received two important messages. One - by radio from Berlin, the other - from our diplomats and intelligence officers interned by the Germans in Italy and Berlin at the beginning of the war. After the exchange for German diplomats interned in Moscow, Berezkhov, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, and Amayak Kobulov, a resident of the NKVD, the younger brother of Beria's deputy Bogdan Kobulov, reported that Baron Botman, who accompanied the train with Soviet diplomats expelled from Germany, hinted to them: maybe the time will come when Germany and the USSR will prefer to regulate their relations on the basis of mutual concessions.

In exhausting battles near Smolensk, the tank army of General Guderian was stopped. There was growing disillusionment in the German high command, caused by the insufficiently fast pace of advance of the German troops in July 1941, as reported from Berlin by Arvid Harnack (Corsican). "The probing actions of our intelligence

during the war years were an integral component of its activities, as well as all the special services of the warring parties in 1941-1945. The Americans and the British, by the way, informed our Foreign Ministry about probe contacts



intelligence officers in Switzerland with representatives of the German military opposition to Hitler in 1943. In

our and foreign literature, meanwhile, everyday probing conversations between intelligence officers and its major agents during the war years are presented as secret peace talks. The truth, however, is that behind these conversations there was only a desire to reveal additional intentions of the enemy, to grope for possible forms of involving diplomacy in order to split the allies from the belligerents or plant strategic disinformation on the enemy. Such probing operations are carried out by all the special services of the world. Our response sounding, for

example, about Botman's statement took place after the instructions of Stalin, Molotov and Beria dated July 25, 1941, that is, already three days later. At a meeting with the Ambassador of Bulgaria in Moscow I. Stamenov (our agent since 1934) in the Aragvi restaurant, my father, namely, he was entrusted with this mission, informed him of rumors allegedly circulating in diplomatic circles that a peaceful end to the German- Soviet war on the basis of territorial concessions. It was understood that Stamenov, on his own initiative, would bring this information to the attention of Tsar Boris. Beria, with the knowledge of Molotov, categorically ordered not to instruct

Stamenov to bring this information to Sofia, otherwise he could have guessed that he was participating in a disinformation operation designed to buy time and strengthen the positions of those German military and diplomatic circles that did not leave hope for a compromise. peaceful end to the war. Below I quote in full a note from my father to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, drawn up by

him already during his imprisonment, apparently at the suggestion of the country's top leadership, presented to my father during one of the numerous interrogations:

"I report the following fact known to me. A few days after the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, around June 25-27, 1941, I was summoned to the office of the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

Beria told me that there was a decision of the Soviet government, according to which it was necessary to find out in an unofficial way under what conditions Germany would agree to end the war against the USSR and stop the offensive of the Nazi troops. Beria explained to me that this decision of the Soviet government was intended to create conditions that would allow the Soviet government to maneuver and buy time to gather forces. In this regard, Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, Stamenov, who, according to the information of the NKVD of the USSR, had connections with the Germans and was well known to them.

Beria ordered me to put four questions in a conversation with Stamenov. Beria listed these questions, looking in his notebook, and they boiled down to the following:

1. Why did Germany, violating the non-aggression pact, start a war against the

USSR; 2. What would suit Germany, on what conditions Germany agrees to end the war, which is necessary to end the war;

3. Will the Germans be satisfied with the transfer of such Soviet lands to Germany as the Baltic states, Ukraine, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the

Karelian Isthmus; 4. If not, then to which territories Germany additionally claims.

Beria ordered me that I should not conduct a conversation with Stamenov on behalf of the Soviet government, but put these questions in the course of a conversation on the topic of the military and political situation that had arisen and also found out Stamenov's opinion on the

substance of these four issues. Beria said that the point of my conversation with Stamenov was that Stamenov should remember these four questions well. At the same time, Beria expressed confidence that Stamenov himself would bring these issues

to the attention of Germany. Beria also instructed me about the procedure for organizing the meeting; it was to take place at the direction of Beria at the Aragvi restaurant in Moscow at a table prepared in advance in the general

hall of the restaurant. I received all these instructions from Beria in his office in the

building of the NKVD of the USSR. After that, I went to my room to prepare for the

On the evening of the same day, at about 7 pm, the duty secretary of the People's Commissar gave me an order to go to Beria's city apartment. I drove

up to the house where Beria lived, but I was not allowed into the apartment. Beria, walking with me along the sidewalk along the house in which he lived, looking into his notebook, again repeated to me the four questions that I had to ask Stamenov on his orders. Beria reminded me of his order to ask these questions

not directly, but in a conversation about the current military and political situation. For the second time here, Beria expressed confidence that Stamenov, as a person connected with the Germans, would report the questions posed to him to Germany. Beria both during the day and this time warned me sternly

that I must never, anywhere, ever tell anyone about this order of the Soviet government, otherwise I and my family would be destroyed.

Beria instructed to follow through the line of the decryption service in what form Stamenov would send a message on these issues abroad. I had an

agreement with Stamenov that allowed invite him to a meeting.

The next day, in accordance with the instructions received from Beria, I called the Bulgarian embassy, asked Stamenov to the office and arranged a meeting with him at the Tchaikovsky Hall on Mayakovsky Square.

Having met Stamenov, I invited him into the car and took him to the Aragvi

restaurant. In "Aragvi", as was provided for by Beria's instructions, I had a conversation with Stamenov. The

conversation began on the merits of the military and political situation that had been created by that time. I asked Stamenov about the attitude of the Bulgarians towards the German invasion of the USSR, about the possible position of France, England and the United States in this regard, and during the conversation, when we touched on the topic of the perfidious violation by the Germans of the non-aggression pact concluded by Germany with the USSR, I put before Stamenov the above four questions.

Everything I said, Stamenov listened attentively, but He did not express his opinion on these four questions.

Stamenov tried to behave like a man convinced of the defeat of Germany in this war. He did not attach much importance to the rapid advance of the Germans in the first days of the war. His main statements boiled down to the fact that the forces of the USSR undoubtedly surpass the forces of Germany and that even if the Germans occupy at first significant territories of the USSR and, perhaps, even reach the Volga, Germany will still be defeated and defeated in the future. After the meeting with Stamenov, I immediately, on the same evening, reported on its results to the then People's Commissar Beria in his office in the building of the NKVD of

the USSR. During my report, Beria made some notes in his notebook, then called a car in front of me and, having told the duty officer that he was going to the Central Committee, he left.

I did not talk to Stamenov again on the topics raised in the four questions, and in general I did not meet with him anymore. For some time, surveillance of Stamenov's encrypted correspondence continued. It didn't give any results. However, this does not exclude that Stamenov could have reported this conversation through diplomatic mail or diplomatic communications of those embassies and missions whose countries had not yet participated in the war by that time.

I did not receive any further instructions related to this case or the use of Stamenov. Whether Beria personally met with Stamenov, I do not know. To me the organization of such a meeting was not entrusted.

Fulfilling in June 1941 the order of the then People's Commissar Beria regarding a conversation with Stamenov, I was firmly convinced and proceeded from the fact that I was thereby fulfilling the instructions of the party and government.

Now, after the conversation held with me at the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the explanations received that there is no decision of the Soviet government about which Beria spoke, it is completely clear to me that Beria deceived me, apparently knowing full well that I was without I will not conduct such conversations with anyone under direct instructions from the government. Yes, I don't have these kinds of thoughts.

could.

Now, in the light of the facts of treasonous and treacherous activity revealed by the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is quite obvious that Beria, carefully disguised, even then, in 1941, at the most difficult time for the country, took the path of treason and tried behind the back of the Soviet government to collude with Nazi invaders, took the path of helping the enemy in the dismemberment of the USSR and the enslavement of the Soviet people by Nazi Germany. **P.**

**Sudoplatov**, August 7, 1953. It is

difficult to say how much the leadership counted on this information, but Beria, in his testimony on August 20, 1953, argued that the content of the conversation with Stamenov was sanctioned by Stalin and Molotov in order to "disinform the enemy and buy time for the Soviet government to gather forces." Stamenov, on his own initiative, did not report to Sofia about the rumors about rumors that were presented to him in Moscow, which our side was counting on. It is interesting, however, that the time of the proposed but not carried out by Stamenov sounding coincides with the first crisis in the decision-making by the Wehrmacht command and Hitler on the directions of the offensive of the German troops after the Smolensk defensive battle in July-August 1941. German historians, as well as F. Halder, G. Guderian, K. Tippelskirch and other generals of the German army wrote about this, as about the first crisis of the "blitzkrieg" in the USSR before the turn of the German armies to the south, bypassing Kiev. Stamenov was recruited by our experienced intelligence officer Zhuravlev in 1934 in Rome.

He worked as the third secretary of the Bulgarian embassy, sympathized with the Soviet Union and cooperated with us out of purely patriotic considerations. He was convinced of the need for a lasting alliance between Bulgaria and the USSR and regarded it as the only guarantee for the protection of Bulgarian interests in the Balkans and in European politics in general. Father also recalled: "When Beria ordered me to meet with Stamenov, he immediately contacted

Molotov by phone, and

I heard that Molotov not only approved this meeting, but even promised to get Stamenov's wife a job at the Institute of Biochemistry of the Academy of Sciences. Wherein

Molotov forbade Beria to meet with Stamenov himself, saying that Stalin ordered the meeting to be held by the NKVD worker with whom he was in contact, so as not to attach too much importance to the upcoming conversation in the eyes of Stamenov. Since I was the same worker, I met with the ambassador at Eitingon's apartment, and then again at the Aragvi restaurant, where our separate office was equipped with listening devices: the whole conversation was recorded on tape. I relayed to him the rumors, which frightened the British,

about the possibility of a peaceful settlement in exchange for territorial concessions. By this time, it became clear that the fighting near Smolensk had become protracted and the German tank groups had already suffered heavy losses. Stamenov did not express much surprise at these rumors. They seemed to him quite reliable. According to him, everyone knew that the German offensive did not develop in accordance with Hitler's plans and the war was clearly dragging on. He said that he was still confident in our final victory over Germany. In reply

I remarked to him:

"War is war. And maybe it still makes sense explore opportunities for negotiation. "I doubt anything will come of it. Stamenov objected. In a word, we acted in the same way

as the German side did. The conversation was a typical probing prelude. Botman, an employee of the Foreign Ministry, had similar conversations with Berezhkov.

Stamenov did not report the rumors I had told to Sofia, which we expected. We were convinced of this, since we completely controlled all the cipher correspondence of the Bulgarian embassy in Moscow with Sophia, having access to their ciphers, which we called among themselves "Bulgarian verses". Shura Kochergina, the wife of Eitingon, our experienced operative, contacted her agents in the Bulgarian diplomatic and émigré circles of Moscow and established that Stamenov did not take any steps to verify and spread the rumors we had launched ... And so it ended in late July - early August 1941, the whole this story".

However, when in 1953 Beria was accused of preparing a plan to overthrow Stalin and the Soviet government, this problem again

surfaced. It turns out, as my father wrote, "this plan provided for secret negotiations with Hitler's agents, who were offered a treacherous separate peace on the terms of territorial concessions. During interrogation in August 1953, Beria testified that he acted on the orders of Stalin and with the full approval of Foreign Minister Molotov. Two weeks before Beria's interrogation, his

father was summoned to the Kremlin with Stamenov's undercover case, where he reported the details of that conversation with the Bulgarian to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov and Malenkov. They listened attentively, without a single remark, to their father, but that meant nothing. Somewhat later, he was accused of playing the role of Beria's liaison in an attempt to use Stamenov to make peace with Hitler. Wanting to present Beria as a German agent and compromise him, Malenkov ordered Pegov, the secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to be sent to Sofia together with investigators from the prosecutor's office. They were supposed to bring Stamenov's testimony to Moscow. However, at that time Stamenov refused to give any written testimony.

True, he confirmed verbally that he was an agent of the NKVD and collaborated with Soviet intelligence in the interests of fighting fascism both in Germany itself and in the allied countries. Nothing, as the father said, did not lead to attempts to blackmail him, nor frank threats to deprive him of the pension he received from the Soviet government for his activities during the war. According to the testimony of Sukhanov, Malenkov's assistant, and the information of his father's younger brother (his wife worked in Malenkov's secretariat), Pegov returned from Sofia empty-handed - no evidence, no confessions. All this was kept secret, but figured in the verdict in the Beria case and, of course, in the case of my father.

In his memoirs, Khrushchev, who knew about all these details, still preferred to stick to the previous version that Beria negotiated a separate peace with Hitler, caused by Stalin's panic. Most likely, Stalin and the entire leadership felt that an attempt to conclude a separate peace in this unprecedentedly difficult war would automatically deprive them of power. Not to mention their genuinely patriotic feelings: any form of peace agreement was unacceptable to them. As experienced politicians and

leaders of a great power, they often used for their own purposes the intelligence that came to them for probing actions, as well as for blackmailing competitors and even allies.

Thus, the Russian agents, who had access to the entourage of the young Romanian king, sounded out the mutual interest of his court and the Soviet leadership in Romania's exit from the pro-Hitler coalition. As in the case of Finland, Soviet diplomats prepared and executed an agreement on Romania's withdrawal from the war against the USSR, England and the USA and on its entry into the war with Germany. This was preceded by another important event: a group of militants of the Romanian Communist Party, led by our operatives, detained the leader of the fascists, Prime Minister Antonescu, when he visited the king.

During the war years, my father had to take part in the development of decisions on military issues. Particularly important in this regard were his contacts with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces, Admiral Isakov, and officers of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff.

"In August 1942," my father recalled, "Beria and Merkulov (Malenkov was also present at this conversation) instructed me to equip 150 climbers in just twenty-four hours for combat operations in the Caucasus. As soon as the climbers were ready to carry out the combat mission, Beria ordered me, together with him and Merkulov, to fly from Moscow to the Caucasus in several transport planes. The flight was very long. In Tbilisi, we flew through Central Asia on S-47 aircraft received from America under Lend-Lease. Our operations were supposed to stop the advance of German troops in the Caucasus on the eve of the decisive battle at Stalingrad. We made the first landing in Krasnovodsk, then in Baku, where Colonel Shtemenko, head of the Caucasian direction of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, reported on the situation. It was decided that our special unit would try to block the mountain roads and stop the advance of the enemy's elite alpine shooters. Immediately after us, a group of experienced partisan commanders and paratroopers arrived in Tbilisi, led by one of my deputies, Colonel

Mikhail Orlov. They prevented the Germans from invading Kabardino-Balkaria and inflicted heavy losses on them.



before the start of the offensive. At the same time, the climbers blew up oil tanks and destroyed the motorized units of the German infantry in the mountains. Our own losses were also great, because the

climbers were often not well trained militarily. Their advantage was in professionalism, knowledge of the mountainous area, as well as active support from the highlanders. Only in Chechnya the local population did not help them.

At the staff conferences in Tbilisi, chaired by Beria, the chief representative of the Stavka, I often experienced difficulties and was lost when it came to purely military matters. Once I tried to forward them to Shtemenko and said that I was incompetent in military strategy and tactics. Beria interrupted me: "We must seriously study military issues, Comrade Sudoplatov. You should not say that you are incompetent. You will be sent to study at the Military Academy after the war." After the war, I actually entered the Military Academy and in 1953, on the eve of my arrest,

graduated from it.

Very heavy fighting took place in the North Caucasus in August and September 1942, when I was there. Our special unit mined oil wells and drilling rigs in the Mozdok region and blew them up at the moment when German motorcyclists approached them. Merkulov and I made sure that the explosion occurred strictly on order, and joined our sabotage group, retreating to the mountains, at the last moment. Later, we received a message from our decryption group from Sweden: the Germans were unable to use the oil reserves and wells of the North Caucasus, which they counted on very much. However, the scolding we suffered for successful actions remained in my memory for a long time. When we returned to Tbilisi, Beria reported that Stalin had

reprimanded Merkulov, Beria's deputy, for taking an unjustified risk in carrying out a mining operation: he was putting his life in danger and could be captured by the German advance units. Beria attacked me for allowing this. During the German raids, several officers from the Headquarters, who were in the Caucasus, were killed. Politburo member Kaganovich was seriously wounded in the head during the bombing. Admiral Isakov was also wounded, and

one of our most experienced Georgian Chekists, Sajaya, was killed during this raid.”

Fears that Tbilisi and the entire Caucasus could be captured by the enemy, my father said, were real. His task at that most difficult time was to create an underground intelligence network in case Tbilisi was under the Germans. Professor Konstantin Gamsakhurdia (father of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) was one of the candidates for the post of head of the intelligence network in Georgia. He was the oldest informer of the NKVD. He was also attracted to cooperation by Beria after several arrests in connection with anti-Soviet statements and nationalist separatism that were incriminated to him. Ironically, before the war, he was known for his pro-German sentiments: he made it clear to everyone that the prosperity of Georgia would depend on cooperation with Germany. The father considered it his

duty to verify these rumors. Having secured the consent of Beria, together with Sajaya, he held a conversation with Professor Gamsakhurdia at the Intourist Hotel. The resident candidate seemed to him not a very reliable person. In addition, as it turned out, all his previous experience as an informant was to inform on people, and not to influence them. And one more thing: he was too busy with his work. (By the way, he wrote a biography of Stalin in Georgian.) In general, the father concluded, he was a man prone to intrigues and in every possible way tried to take advantage of Beria's location (both of them were Mingrelians).

After consulting with local workers, the father came to the conclusion that Gamsakhurdia would be better used in a different role. He reported this to Beria. The main role in this case was assigned to Machivariani, a playwright who enjoyed a reputation in Tbilisi as a respectable person. He was known as an impeccably honest person, he was then calmly entrusted with large sums of money, as well as gold and silver items, which, if necessary, could be used for the needs of the underground.

“Much later,” my father recalled, “one of my cellmates, Academician Sharia, Beria's assistant, who was in charge of party propaganda in Georgia, told me that Beria subsequently lost all interest in Gamsakhurdia. He, however, remained a very influential figure in Georgia - a kind of icon in the world of culture.

It is known that Stalin personally forbade his arrest. In 1954, when Beria had already been shot, the Georgian authorities wanted to get rid of Gamsakhurdia, and the local KGB turned to Moscow for permission to arrest him as an accomplice of Beria, who had made political capital for himself through personal connections with the "enemy of the people."

As the writer Kirill Stolyarov, who studied the events of 1953-1954, told his father, they wanted to accuse Gamsakhurdia of blackmailing representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia, forcing them to establish secret ties with the German special services on Beria's instructions. It was precisely for this, his accusers argued, that during the war years he received large sums of money from Beria and Mikoyan and the American "jeep".

In the end, Gamsakhurdia was left alone: as far as I know, he died a natural death in Tbilisi in the 70s. His son became the first president of independent Georgia, was overthrown in 1992 and reportedly committed suicide in late 1993.

In 1953, Beria was also accused of damaging our defenses during the battle for the Caucasus. At the same time, Shtemenko was dismissed from the army for his connection with Beria. But they did not begin to promote Shtemenko's guilt in the interests of the ruling elite. Marshal Grechko, then Deputy Minister of Defense, fought in the Caucasus under Beria during the war. It is clear that the accusations against Beria would have hit the top military leadership like a boomerang. That is why, in the press release, the sentence against Beria did not include charges of treason during the battle for the Caucasus.

Sajaya died during the bombing, and Shtemenko never mentioned a good relationship with his father. So the father was also not interrogated in connection with the defense of the Caucasus in the Beria case. Later, his investigators generally lost interest in this, although he had to hear remarks from them that, they say, he undeservedly received the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus", since, together with Beria, he was not engaged in strengthening the defense, but on the contrary - destroyed it. In a word, according to the investigators, it turned out that my father, together with Beria, deceived the Soviet

government. After the defeat of the Germans near Stalingrad, in early 1943, Moscow came to life. Theaters began to open one after another. This indicated that a turn for the better had taken place at the front. Our

my mother returned from Ufa with me and my brother (then still small children), where we were evacuated, and began to work as a teacher at the Higher School of the NKVD. We temporarily settled in the Moskva Hotel, since the heating in our house did not work; a few months later we moved into a small house with only nine apartments in a side street near the Lubyanka.

## **Chapter**

# **17 MILITARY RADIO GAMES OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE**

Talking about his father's activities during the war, one cannot fail to mention the powerful enemy he had to face - the German intelligence and counterintelligence services. First of all, we are talking about the famous Abwehr. What is this German secret service? I remember that once, upon my father's return home from Vladimírka, I asked

him: "What is the meaning of this semi-magical abbreviation - Abwehr?" He answered simply that in translation from German the words encrypted here lie in the literal sense such concepts as "reflection", "attack", "defense", "protection". A little later, my father gave me a small booklet, which described the history of this special service clearly enough for me.

The Abwehr arose at the very beginning of the existence of the Weimar Republic - in 1921. At first, it was a small counterintelligence organization, divided into two groups: "Ost" and "West". At the same time, the so-called "search bureau" was created, whose duties included collecting information about politically unreliable citizens of Germany. The Abwehr branches on the periphery were the so-called "Abverstelle", which operated under six army military districts and were built according to the geographical principle. From the very beginning, the functions of the Abwehr - intelligence were assigned to counterintelligence.

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The first leader of the Abwehr until 1927 was Major Gempp. In 1928 he was replaced by Colonel Schwantess, and the last in 1929 by General Ferdinand von Bredow. In 1933, the Abwehr was headed by a naval officer, Captain Patzig. He subsequently came into conflict with the Nazi security service, and as a result, in early 1935, the famous Admiral Canaris headed the Abwehr.

From the very beginning, the Abwehr actively cooperated with private intelligence services created by major German industrialists, such as the Nunzia or the German Overseas Service funded by Alfred Hugenberg. Throughout the existence of the Abwehr, its structure has undergone repeated changes, finally taking shape only in October 1939, after which it remained virtually unchanged until 1944.

During this period, the Abwehr consisted of three departments. The leading role among them was played by the Abwehr-I department (information service, or active intelligence). The duties of this department included the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information obtained by the Abwehr. The divisions of "Abwehr-1" were built according to the geographical and sectoral principle. It consisted of seven groups (subsections) and five subgroups, which, in turn, were subdivided into "abstracts". Group IX was engaged in the collection of intelligence information about the ground forces of foreign armies (the subgroup "Ost", which was part of it, was aimed at collecting information about the Red Army). The IM group collected information about the naval forces. Group IL is about the Air Force. Group I BI - about the economic potential of the countries of the world. Group I ILB - on the technical equipment and armament of aviation. There were also two support groups. One of them was engaged in the manufacture of false documents for the agents, and the

other provided communication with the agents. The main attention of "Abwehr-I" was focused on the study of land, naval and air forces of the armies of Poland, France, England, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and in the period 1936-1938 - also Spain. The main priorities were the organization, number and armament of the ground forces, the principles of their combat use, mobilization plans, command staff; the state of the naval forces, the prospects for their development, plans for use in case of war; the combat effectiveness of the air force, the proposed tactics of their use in combat conditions, the latest achievements in the field of aviation technology; the political and moral state of the troops; potential opportunities for the deployment of defense industries, the production of weapons and new types of military equipment.

To communicate with the German Foreign Ministry, Abwehr-I always had a referent in the rank of adviser. With its help, it was relatively easy to introduce intelligence agents into German foreign missions. So, only in the German embassies of six countries - Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey and China - 214 Abwehrs worked under the guise of diplomatic officials, of which 36 were in the higher, 32 - middle and 146 - as support staff. Abwehr-1 was aimed at obtaining not only military and military-industrial information. His interests also

extended into the political, economic and diplomatic spheres. In this regard, the Abwehrs had inevitable conflicts with the German foreign intelligence, to resolve which an agreement "On the division of spheres of influence" was concluded between the Abwehr and the SD (the so-called "ten commandments"). In accordance with them, the range of interests of the Abwehr was limited only to the military area, and the SD intelligence was obliged to transfer military data that fell into its hands to the Wehrmacht high command.

The period of 1942–1943 is characterized by the beginning of major radio games between the Soviet and German intelligence services. As is already widely known today, the Abwehr and the German security service used for these games mainly agents of the Soviet military and political intelligence that they exposed in Western Europe and in the occupied territory. As far as we know, the main omission in these games was the attempt to use old sources. On our part, however, the line was to introduce trusted agents directly into the enemy's special services, who could create additional sources of disinformation for the German command.

It should be recognized that the balance of power in radio games naturally developed in our favor. The fact is that, despite the retreats and defeats of 1941, the intelligence and accounting materials of the NKVD were evacuated in advance. We used the powerful Soviet state security, having, despite the war, the ability to quickly, promptly check Soviet citizens and immigrants from the Baltic states, as well as emigrants who were actively used by the Germans

in Vlasov and other pro-fascist and nationalist movements.

In 1935-1941, our agent in the Gestapo, Leman, passed on to us, as the reader already knows, the most important materials on the developments of the Gestapo to introduce its agents everywhere.

In 1942-1945, more than 90 radio games were played with the German special services through the NKVD, military intelligence and counterintelligence SMERSH. Some of them deserve special consideration, because they are often incompletely reflected in our and German literature. In addition to the well-known facts about the activities

of the residency of the Red Army Intelligence Department in Switzerland in 1941-1943, a number of circumstances should be added that characterize this heroic and tragic page in a new way. In 1943, at a meeting of the heads of intelligence agencies of the USSR, an analysis was carried out - a comparison of military intelligence materials from Switzerland on the actions of the German high command with information about the movements of Wehrmacht troops received from the Philby-Cairncross-Blunt group from London and sent by the NKGB to Stalin on May 7, 1943. Data on the plans of the German offensive and the grouping of troops on the Kursk Bulge, received from Switzerland from Rado, almost completely textually coincided with the text of the cipher radiograms of the German high command intercepted and deciphered by the British.

This was discussed at a meeting with Molotov, in which Ilyichev, Kuznetsov, Fitin and my father took part. At that time, the USSR did not know the details of the British achievements in the design of the Enigma decryption machine and were extremely concerned that the British could also intercept our cipher telegrams.

The distrust of the materials from Switzerland was also reinforced by the fact that Kent reported to the Center about the widespread failure of the network in France and that he was working under duress, participating in the Gestapo radio game. The head of the Intelligence Agency, Ilyichev, sent a special letter on this issue to the NKVD and the military counterintelligence SMERSH to Selivanovskiy, who was in charge of radio games in this special service. The conclusion of the INO NKVD in 1943 that the information from Switzerland was based not on information from German sources, but on



dosed information from London is also confirmed by the following circumstances. In November 1943, the flow of information from the Luci and Dora groups from Lausanne and Geneva ceased. But in the course of 1944, approximately similar, albeit fragmentary, data were received from our residency from London, which had occasional, irregular access to British radio intercepts. The British preferred to supply us with dosed information from Switzerland, revealing our agents there, partially penetrating it after Hitler's attack on the USSR. This was done for two reasons.

Firstly, W. Churchill did not want to report this data directly, since this meant recognition of the wide possibilities of deciphering the British or their access to the German military command. Secondly, the British shared information with us in this way only during that period of the war, when the course of hostilities was not in our favor, or at a time when the prospects for the entry of the Red Army into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Finland seemed unrealistic. This fact also speaks of the role that the British are hiding in the work of our intelligence in Switzerland. Realizing the inconsistency and imperfection of his actions in Switzerland, the illegal resident of our military intelligence in 1938-1944, Rado, tried to avoid returning to the Soviet Union in 1944, fleeing from Soviet representatives at the airfield in Cairo. After some time, however, he was handed over to us by the British. For them, Rado was of no operational interest. Facilitating his escape would cast an additional shadow on the infiltration by the British of their agents into our intelligence network in Switzerland.

In general, the intelligence activities of the Red Chapel groups are largely overestimated in our and German literature. The tragic mistakes of Rado and Trepper, the attempts to hide from the Soviet authorities in 1944-1945 called into question the heroic deeds of the anti-fascists who worked with them. Being under investigation, in custody and later after rehabilitation, at the insistence of the leadership of the Polish and Hungarian Communist Parties, in their memoirs and testimony, Rado and Trepper slandered another leader of illegal groups - Gurevich (Kent), who did not give a signal about the failure and the start of the radio game by the German special services With

our Center. Gurevich managed to deliver to Moscow the chief of the counterintelligence team of the Gestapo Pannwitz, thanks to which it was possible to establish the actual circumstances of the death of our people in Germany. However, being slandered by Rado and Trepper, on the initiative of the Intelligence Agency, Gurevich was arrested with them and achieved full rehabilitation only in 1991, after serving 15 years in camps under Stalin and Khrushchev.

In 1942–1943, the INO NKVD seized the initiative in radio games with German intelligence. This was due to the fact that the NKVD was able to infiltrate reliable agents into schools for sending Abwehr saboteurs into our rear near Smolensk, in Ukraine and Belarus. In the letter file “School”, a successful operation was recorded to intercept saboteurs sent to our rear. Having re-recruited the head of the passport bureau of the Abwehr training center in Katyn, the Soviet intelligence officers received installations on more than 200 German agents abandoned in our rear. All of them were either neutralized or forced to cooperate. My father, as is clear from many of the documents

already disclosed, was directly involved in the development and implementation of the so-called radio games carried out by Soviet intelligence during the war years. In his memoirs, he describes them in sufficient detail. The most significant radio games were, in his opinion, the operation “Berezino” and “Monastery”. Initially, the operation “Monastery”, for example, was developed by the Special Group led by him and the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, and then from July 1941 in close cooperation with the GRU. The purpose of the operation “Monastery” was to infiltrate the Abwehr intelligence network operating on the territory of the Soviet Union. To do this, a pro-German anti-Soviet organization was quickly created, which allegedly actively sought contacts with the German high command.

Despite the thorough “purges” of the 20s and 30s, many representatives of the Russian aristocracy still survived; however, they were all under surveillance, and some became important informants and agents.

“Analyzing the materials and composition of the agents put at our disposal by the counterintelligence of the NKVD,” says the father, “

we decided to use as bait a certain Glebov, the former leader of the noble assembly of Nizhny Novgorod. By that time, Glebov was already seventy. This man was famous in the circles of the former aristocracy: it was he who welcomed the royal family in Kostroma in 1915 on the occasion of the solemn celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Glebov's wife was her man at the court of the last Russian Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. In a word, of all the surviving representatives of the Russian nobility, Glebov seemed to us the best candidate. In July 1941, almost a beggar, he huddled in the Novodevichy Convent.

Of course, he did not know even the most elementary basics of intelligence work. Our plan was that Glebov and a second man, also of a noble family (he was our agent), would gain the confidence of the Germans. Our agent - Alexander Demyanov (Heine) and his wife, also an NKVD agent, visited the church of the Novodevichy Convent under the pretext of receiving a blessing before sending Alexander to the front in the cavalry unit. Most of the servants of the monastery were secret informers of the NKVD. During a visit to the church, Demyanov was introduced to Glebov. A cordial relationship developed between them; Demyanov showed an avid interest in the history of Russia, while Glebov had nostalgia for the past. Glebov valued the company of his new friend, and he began to bring to meetings with him other people who sympathized with Glebov and were eager to get to know him better. These were either trusted representatives of the NKVD, or operational officers. Each of these meetings was organized by Maklyarsky, who personally supervised the agent Demyanov. I will tell about Alexander Demyanov himself

from the words of his father, who knew him very well. Indeed, Demyanov belonged to a noble family: his great-grandfather Golovaty was the first chieftain of the Kuban Cossacks, and his father, an officer in the tsarist army, died a heroic death in 1915. Demyanov's uncle, his father's younger brother, was the head of counterintelligence for the White Guards in the North Caucasus. Captured by the Chekists, he died of typhus on his way to Moscow. Alexander's mother, a graduate of the Bestuzhev courses, a recognized beauty in St. Petersburg, was widely known in aristocratic

circles of the former capital. She received and turned down several invitations to emigrate to France. She was personally known by General Ulagai, one of the leaders of the White Guard emigration, who actively collaborated with the Germans from 1941 to 1945.

Alexander Demyanov's childhood was marred by images of terror - both white and red - that he had to watch during the Civil War, when his uncle fought under the command of Ulagai. After the mother refused to emigrate, they returned to Petrograd.

There he managed to get a job as an electrician. From the Polytechnic Institute, where he entered, having kept silent about his past (at that time it was impossible for him to get a higher technical education due to non-proletarian origin), he was expelled. In 1929, the GPU of Leningrad, on the denunciation of his friend Ternovsky, arrested Alexander for illegal possession of weapons and anti-Soviet propaganda. In fact, the gun was planted. As a result of the action, Alexander was forced into tacit cooperation with the GPU.

Due to his origin, he was aimed at developing connections between the nobles who remained in the USSR with foreign white emigration and suppressing terrorist attacks. By the way, in 1927, Alexander witnessed the explosion of the House of Political Education by white terrorists in Leningrad. Alexander began to work for the security agencies, using family

connections.

Soon he was transferred to Moscow, where he got a job as an electrical engineer at Mosfilm. At that time, the cultural life of the capital centered around the film studio. Pleasant appearance and noble manners allowed Demyanov to easily enter the company of film actors, writers, playwrights and poets. He shared his room in a communal apartment in the center of Moscow with an actor from the Moscow Art Theater. The security authorities managed to arrange for him a rather rare thing for those times - from now on he had his own horse in the Manege! Naturally, this circumstance expanded his contacts with

diplomats.

Alexander was friends with the famous Soviet director Mikhail Romm and other prominent cultural figures. The NKVD allowed an elite group of artistic intelligentsia and representatives

the former aristocracy to lead a secular lifestyle, in no way limiting them, but some of these people were recruited, and the rest were carefully monitored in order to be used in the future if necessary. Demyanov was "led" by Ilyin and

Maklyarsky. He was not used as a petty informant, his task was to expand the circle of acquaintances among foreign diplomats and journalists - regulars at the hippodrome and theatrical premieres. The appearance of Demyanov in the society of actors, writers and directors was so natural that he easily managed to make the necessary connections. He never concealed his origin, and this could be easily verified in the émigré circles of Paris, Berlin and Belgrade. In the end, Demyanov became seriously interested in the employees of the German embassy and the Abwehr. On the eve of the war, Alexander reported that

an employee of the German trade mission in Moscow, as if in passing, mentioned several names of people close to the Demyanov family before the revolution. Instructed accordingly by Ilyin, Demyanov did not show any interest in the words of the German: it was a clear attempt to start recruiting him, and in these cases one should not show excessive interest. Perhaps, from that moment on, he appeared in the operational records of German intelligence under some code name. Later, as can be seen from the memoirs of Gehlen, the chief of intelligence of the General Staff of the ground forces, he was given the name Max. The first contact with German intelligence in Moscow radically changed his fate:

from now on, a special mark appeared in his intelligence business, put by Maklyarsky. This meant that in the event of a war with the Germans, Demyanov could become one of the main figures that the German secret services would be interested in. By the beginning of the war, Alexander's agent experience totaled almost ten years. Moreover, it was already a question of serious counterintelligence operations, when he had to contact people who did not think to hide their anti-Soviet convictions. At the very beginning of the war, Alexander volunteered for the cavalry unit, but he was destined for a different fate: he became one of the most valuable agents placed at the disposal of his father to carry out special assignments.

“In July 1941, Gorlinsky, head of the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, and I,” says my father, “approached Beria for permission to use Demyanov, together with Glebov, to carry out Operation Monastery behind enemy lines. To give credibility to Operation Monastery, the poet Sadovsky and the sculptor Sidorov were involved in it, who at one time studied in Germany and were known to the German special services, their apartments in Moscow were used for secret communications.

As I have already mentioned, our plan was to create an active pro-German underground organization Throne, which could offer its assistance to the German High Command, provided that its leaders receive appropriate posts in the new anti-Bolshevik administration in the occupied territory. By creating mythical anti-Bolshevik organizations, giving them various powers,

the security agencies hoped in this way to identify German agents and infiltrate the German intelligence network in the Soviet Union. The undercover files of "Throne" and "Monastery" quickly swelled, turning into multi-volume ones. Despite the fact that these operations were initiated and approved by Beria, Merkulov, Bogdan Kobulov and others, subsequently repressed high-ranking officials of the state security agencies, they remain a classic example of a high level of professionalism, entered textbooks and are taught in special schools, of course, without reference to real names. agents and operational workers involved in this operation. This once again proves that, despite the repressions against the employees of the intelligence agencies of the NKVD, their devotion to their homeland and the cause to which they devoted themselves remained unchanged. The radio game, originally planned as a means of identifying individuals who collaborated with the Germans, actually grew into a

confrontation between the NKVD and the Abwehr. After careful preparation, Demyanov (Heine) crossed the front line in December 1941 as an emissary of the

anti-Soviet and pro-German Throne organization. The German front group of the Abwehr reacted to the defector with obvious distrust. Most of all, the Germans were interested in how he managed to ski on

mined field. Alexander himself was unaware of the danger and miraculously survived. He was interrogated for a long time, demanded to report on the deployment of troops on the front line, then they staged an execution in order to force him, under pain of death, to confess to collaborating with Soviet intelligence. Having achieved nothing, Alexander was transferred to Smolensk. There he was interrogated by Abwehr officers from the Valli headquarters. Distrust began to dissipate gradually. They believed Demyanov after they made inquiries about him among the Russian emigration and made sure that before the war he was not involved in intelligence operations conducted by the OGPU-NKVD through Russian emigrants.

The Germans knew that the Russian emigration was stuffed with NKVD agents, who acted very effectively: many emigrants willingly collaborated with the USSR out of patriotic considerations and a sense of guilt before their homeland. This made it possible to nullify all attempts by white emigration to carry out terrorist attacks and organize sabotage. In addition, it turned out that before the war, Abwehr agents made contact with Demyanov, developed him as a source, and in the Berlin dossier he appeared under the code name Max. Abwehr made a bet on Max.

Alexander completed a course of study at the

Abwehr school. The only difficulty for him was to hide that he knew how to work on the radio and knew the cipher business. The Germans were literally delighted that they had recruited such a capable agent. This also facilitated the work of the NKVD, since it could be thrown into the Russian rear without a radio operator.

Now the Germans set specific tasks for Demyanov (Max): he had to settle in Moscow and create, using his organization and connections, an agent network in order to infiltrate the headquarters of the Red Army. His tasks also included the organization of sabotage on the railways. In February 1942, the Germans parachuted Max

into our territory along with two assistants. They chose the wrong time for this: in a snowstorm, all three lost each other and traveled from Yaroslavl to Moscow one by one. Alexander contacted the Center and quickly got used to the duties of a resident of German intelligence. Both assistants were soon arrested. The Germans began to send couriers to contact Max. Most of these couriers were made double agents by the NKVD, and some

arrested. In total, more than fifty Abwehr agents were detained, sent for communication.

Alexander, as a scout, had the full support of his family, which was a great success for Moscow. The details of his intelligence activities were known to his wife and father-in-law. Breaking the rules, the NKVD did it for a simple reason: his wife, Tatyana Berezantsova, worked at Mosfilm as an assistant director and enjoyed great prestige among film and theater figures. Father-in-law, Professor Berezantsov, was considered a medical god in Moscow academic circles and was a leading consultant in the Kremlin clinics. He, one of the few specialists of this level, was allowed to practice privately. Berezantsov was also well known in the diplomatic corps, which was very important. At the time, he was in his fifties, highly educated, and spoke excellent German (he was educated in Germany), French, and English. His apartment was used as a safe house for the underground organization Throne, and later for contacts with the Germans.

The NKVD understood that the Germans could easily check who lived in this apartment, and it seemed natural that the whole family, whose roots went back to the past of Tsarist Russia, could be involved in an anti-Soviet conspiracy. At my

father's suggestion, the first group of German agents were to remain at large for ten days so that their appearances could be checked and whether they had any connection with anyone else besides Alexander (Max). Beria and Kobulov warned my father that if this group organized a sabotage or terrorist attack in Moscow, then he would not be able to take off his head.

Alexander's wife dissolved special pills in tea and vodka, treated the German agents in her apartment, and while they were asleep under the influence of sleeping pills, NKVD experts managed to neutralize their hand grenades, ammunition and poisons. True, part of the ammunition had a remote control, but experts believed that in general these agents were disarmed. Such operations at Alexander's apartment were a very risky business: the "guests", as a rule, were distinguished by excellent physical data and several times, despite the pills, unexpectedly woke up ahead of time.



Some German couriers, especially those from the Baltic states, were allowed to return to the Abwehr headquarters on the condition that they report on the successful activities of the German intelligence network in Moscow.

Father wrote that, in accordance with the legend developed by the NKVD, Demyanov was hired as a junior communications officer in the General Staff of

the Red Army: "As we developed fictitious sources of information for the Germans among the former officers of the tsarist army who served with Marshal Shaposhnikov, the whole operation turned into disinformation channel.

The radio game with the Abwehr became more and more intense. In the middle of 1942, its radio engineering support was entrusted to the same Fischer, who later became the famous Rudolf Abel. Meanwhile,

Demyanov managed to create the impression that his group had sabotaged the railway near Gorky. To confirm the act of sabotage and strengthen the reputation of Alexander, several press reports were organized about sabotage in railway transport.

The Soviet agent Heine - Alexander Demyanov, who became Max for the Abwehr, has become an important source of information for the Wehrmacht command. The Abwehr leadership believed that Max was relying on sources of information surrounded by Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov and General K. K. Rokossovsky. Heine by that time was our most trusted agent, who passed this test under the barrels of fascist machine guns. All the disinformation transmitted by him was prepared in the Operational Directorate of the General Staff with the participation of one of its leaders, S. M. Shtemenko, then it was approved by the Intelligence Directorate and transferred to the NKVD to legend the circumstances of its receipt.

According to the German historian Winfred Mayer, the Heine-Max data was highly valued by the Wehrmacht command. The chiefs of German intelligence Gehlen and Schellenberg wrote about this in enthusiastic tones in their memoirs. Copies of Heine's telegrams are stored in the archives of the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler under the letter "A". The disinformation passed on to Heine was of strategic importance.

So, on November 4, 1942, Heine "predicted" that the Red Army would strike the Germans on November 15 not near Stalingrad, but in the North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were waiting for a strike near Rzhev, repelled it, but the encirclement of the Paulus group near Stalingrad by Soviet troops was a complete surprise to them. According to Shtemenko's plan,

important operations of the Red Army were indeed carried out in 1942-1943 where Heine-Max "predicted" them, but all of them had only a distraction,

auxiliary value.

The misinformation of Heine-Max, as follows from the memoirs of Gehlen, also contributed to the fact that the Germans' decision on the timing of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge was repeatedly postponed, which also played into the hands of the Red Army command. It should be noted

that the radio game "Monastery" with the participation of Heine was conceived as a purely counterintelligence operation. Indeed, when Heine-Max returned to Moscow in 1942 as a resident of German intelligence, more than twenty enemy agents were captured with his help. However, the operation later took on the character of a strategic disinformation radio game.

In the German archives, Operation Monastery is known as the "Agent Max Affair". In his memoir Service, Gehlen praises the role of Agent Max, the main source of strategic military information about the plans of the Soviet Supreme High Command during the most difficult years of the war. He even reproaches the command of the Wehrmacht for ignoring the timely messages transmitted by Max via radio transmitter from Moscow about the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. We must pay tribute to the American intelligence services: they did not believe Gehlen and in a number of publications directly indicated that German intelligence fell into the trap of the NKVD. Gehlen, however, continued to adhere to his point of view, according to which Max's work was one of the most impressive examples of the success of the Abwehr during the war years. The head of intelligence of the German security service, Walter Schellenberg, in his memoirs, claims that valuable information came from a source close to Rokossovsky. At

that time, Max served in Rokossovsky's headquarters as a communications officer, and the marshal commanded the troops of the Belorussian Front. According to Schellenberg, an officer from

Rokossovsky's entourage was anti-Soviet and hated Stalin because he was repressed in the 30s and spent two years in prison. The prestige of Max in

the eyes of the leadership of the Abwehr was really high - he received the Iron Cross with swords from the Germans. The Soviet leadership, in turn, awarded him the Order of the Red Star. Alexandra's wife and her

father for the risk in performing the most important assignments were awarded medals "For Military Merit".

From the materials of the German archives it is known that the Wehrmacht command made several fatal mistakes, partly due to the fact that it completely relied on information from the Abwehr received from sources from the Soviet Supreme High Command.

Part of the information that went to Berlin returned to Moscow from the Germans. That's how it

was. In 1942-1943, for a short time, before his exposure, Colonel Schmit, one of the leaders of the Abwehr cipher service, collaborated with Soviet intelligence. He handed over to our people in France intelligence materials received by the Abwehr from Moscow. They were analyzed and found out that it was our own disinformation transmitted by Heine-Max. Father wrote about this: "We received one of the ciphers three times.

The first time - from France through Schmitt, in February 1943. The second time was in March 1943 from Anthony Blunt (Cambridge group), who served in British intelligence: he informed Gorsky, our resident in London, that the Germans in Moscow had an important source of information in military circles. For the third time, the British transmitted the same message in April 1943 through our intelligence communications mission in London, as if it had been intercepted by British intelligence in Germany. In fact, the British received this information with the help of the Enigma deciphering machine and presented it to us in a greatly truncated form, which they practiced in the future. The German high command used the information transmitted by Heine-Max to orient the officers of their combat units in the Balkans. British intelligence intercepted these messages sent from Berlin to the Balkans, so we ended up

our data came from Blunt, Cairncross, and Philby. This proved that our disinformation works. In Switzerland, the British intelligence service gave edited texts of intercepts, decrypted using Enigma, to their agent, who was in contact with Ressler, who, in turn, transmitted this information to the Red Chapel, from where it was sent to the Center. So, we had two versions, born initially of our disinformation transmitted by Max. In February 1943, we received from London a modified version of Demyanov's message to

Berlin, along with an indication that German intelligence had its own source of information in the military circles of Moscow.

Later, through our resident in London, Chichayev, the British intelligence service warned us: there is reason to believe that the Germans in Moscow have an important source through which military information leaks. We understood that we are talking about Alexander. It should be noted that the operation "Monastery" with the participation of Heine Max was conceived as a purely counterintelligence ... However, the strategic operation

later received character  
a disinformation radio game."

In addition to Operation Monastery, the Soviet intelligence services during the war conducted about eighty disinformation radio games with the Abwehr and the Gestapo. In 1942-1943, Moscow finally managed to seize the initiative in radio games with German intelligence.

My father had to witness the bureaucratic intrigues that subsequently began between the military counterintelligence SMERSH, the NKVD and the leadership of military intelligence: “Abakumov, who headed

SMERSH, unexpectedly appeared in my office and said that, at the direction of the Soviet Supreme High Command, I should give him the entire manual on radio games: by this the case should be handled by military counterintelligence, which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and not the NKVD. I agreed, but on the condition that there would be an order from the higher authorities. A day later, such an order appeared, two radio games were left behind us: the opera "Monastery" and "Novices" (another radio game

by disinformation of the Germans). Abakumov was extremely dissatisfied because he knew that the results of these operations were reported directly to Stalin. After

Abakumov failed to subdue radio games "Monastery" and "Novices", he warned me menacingly:

"Remember, I won't forget this. I have decided not to have anything to do with you in the future!.."

Operation Novices was carried out under the guise of an anti-Soviet religious underground, as it were, existing in Kuibyshev (now Samara), supported by the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. According to legend, this underground was headed by Bishop Ratmirov. He worked under the control of Zoya Rybkina in Kalinin (now Tver), when this city was in the hands of the Germans. With the assistance

of Bishop Ratmirov and Metropolitan Sergius, it was possible to introduce two young NKVD officers into the circle of churchmen who collaborated with the Germans in the occupied territory. After the release of Kalinin, Bishop Ratmirov moved to Kuibyshev. On his behalf, they were sent from Kuibyshev under the guise of novices to the Pskov Monastery with information to the abbot, who collaborated with the German invaders. Both novices were known to the

Germans. The Germans sent radio operators from among Russian prisoners of war to Kuibyshev, whom the NKVD quickly managed to recruit there. In the meantime, two "obedience" officers launched a vigorous activity in the monastery. Among the church ministers there were many NKVD agents, which made

their work easier. The Germans were sure that they had a strong spy base in Kuibyshev. Maintaining regular radio contact with their intelligence bureau near Pskov, they constantly received false information from us about the transfer of raw materials and ammunition from Siberia to the front. Having reliable information from our agents, we at the same time successfully resisted the attempts of the Pskov clergy, who collaborated with the Germans, to appropriate the authority to lead the parishes of the Orthodox Church in the occupied territory.

Materials prepared for the Soviet leadership on the patriotic position of the Russian Orthodox Church, its

consolidating role in the growing anti-fascist movement of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans and Roosevelt's unofficial probing requests to improve the political and legal position of the Orthodox Church, transmitted through Harriman to Stalin, obviously convinced him to meet the allies halfway and pursue a less harsh policy towards the Church. Stalin took an unexpected step: he allowed the elections of the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church to be held. The position of patriarch was abolished by Peter

the Great as soon as church hierarchs began to oppose his reforms. This situation continued for almost two hundred years, until 1917. After the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia, the Provisional Government allowed the Orthodox Church to hold elections for a patriarch. They became Tikhon. After his death, the Soviet government did not allow the election of a new patriarch, and only during the Great Patriotic War, when Stalin realized the importance of the Church for uniting the people, was the Patriarch of All Rus' elected in 1943. They became the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne, Metropolitan Sergius of Krutitsy and Kolomna (Stargorodsky). My parents attended the enthronement ceremony. By order of Stalin, Bishop Ratmirov was awarded a gold watch and a medal after the war. The confrontation between Abakumov and Beria was also difficult at that time.

Throughout the war, Stalin was the people's commissar for defense. Under him, military counterintelligence (SMERSH) was transferred from the NKVD to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and Abakumov was approved as the head of SMERSH, on the recommendation of Beria. Thus, while holding this position, Abakumov became Stalin's deputy as People's Commissar for Defense, which significantly increased his status and gave direct access to the Master.

Now he was virtually independent of Beria and turned from a subordinate into his rival. In 1943, without the sanction of Beria, Abakumov arrested Commissar of State Security Ilyin, an experienced head of the 3rd department of the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, who was in charge of working with the creative intelligentsia. Under rules only abolished under Gorbachev, no one had the right to arrest a high-ranking official without the consent of his superiors. There were, however, exceptions, but each time they were considered as an emergency. The arrest warrant was signed by the prosecutor, but

it in the lower left corner must have had the sanction of the immediate superior of the person who was being arrested: "Agreed" - and a signature. Beria's sanction in this case was absent. Father recalled that Ilyin enjoyed great

respect in the NKVD. For five years, before Operation Monastery began, he "led" Demyanov and also participated in this radio game with the Germans at its initial stage. In 1937-1938, he avoided arrest, although he was a senior operative, since at that time he was responsible for working with the Mensheviks, who were no longer of interest to Stalin. At the end of 1938, Beria sent him to Orel and Rostov to investigate the case of the so-called

Trotskyist sabotage on the railways. It was believed that the conspirators had infiltrated the ranks of the local leaders of the Soviet and party organs. He returned to Moscow, shocked by the primitiveness of the false accusations that he had to face, and reported to his superiors: the Oryol and Rostov NKVD simply fabricated cases in order to strengthen their own position and strengthen their reputation. After his presentation, the case was reviewed, and Ilyin was appointed to the post of head of the 3rd department of the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, which allowed him to arrest two important informants who provided us with deliberately false information about supposedly anti-Soviet sentiments among senior officials. Ilyin summoned informants to Moscow and ordered them to provide detailed information on the cases of the two suspects. Having received their information, he was convinced that during the years of

repression they had perfectly learned the art of slandering those whom they were developing. The falsifying informants were arrested and sentenced to ten years in the camps, and Ilyin received an award - the badge "Honorary Chekist". Given Ilyin's personal contacts with writers such as Alexei Tolstoy and renowned musicians and composers, Beria often hosted him. Ilyin was also on friendly terms with Merkulov. And in 1943, Ilyin's service in the authorities ended due to a conflict with Abakumov. Even during the Civil War, Ilyin

became friends with Teplinsky, with whom they served together in the cavalry unit. Later, Ilyin began working in the OGPU, and Teplinskiy switched to aviation and made a good career: in 1943 he was a major general and was appointed to the post of head of the inspectorate of the Air Force headquarters.

Unexpectedly, Teplinsky's promotion slowed down: it turned out that the authorities objected to his new appointment. Then he turned to Ilyin, trying to find out what was the matter. Tom managed to quickly find out: the only reason that forced the state security to refuse trust in Teplinsky was his presence at a party at the Military Academy in 1936, before Tukhachevsky's arrest, where he allegedly allowed himself to speak with praise about the officers and generals who soon fell victims of repression in army. Ilyin warned Teplinsky to be more careful in his statements, but made his warning over the phone.

Abakumov immediately found out about their conversation and, indignant, demanded from Beria that he remove Ilyin from work. Beria instead instructed Merkulov to confine himself to a simple suggestion, moreover, in a friendly tone. By that time, relations between Abakumov and Beria had deteriorated badly. Abakumov decided to take advantage of this story in order to compromise Beria and Merkulov. He reported to Stalin that Commissar of State Security Ilyin was disrupting the SMERSH operational check of the command staff of the Red Army Air Force in connection with new appointments. All this was of particular importance, since one of the reasons that prompted Stalin to transfer SMERSH under his personal control was that he wanted to exclude any interference of the Beria NKVD in matters of official movement in the army. Stalin ordered Abakumov to immediately arrest Teplinsky. Even during the war years, Stalin still strove to personally control the work of the departments he headed at all costs. In this case, it was about a particularly important department - the People's Commissariat of Defense. During the interrogation, conducted with prejudice (Abakumov knocked out two of his front teeth on the

very first night), Teplinskiy admitted that Ilyin advised him on how best to behave in order not to give grounds for accusations of sympathy for "enemies of the people." In addition, he also



admitted that he shared with Ilyin his sympathies for a number of senior officers who were arrested in 1938. A week later, Abakumov reported the confessions of the arrested person personally to Stalin and received from him a sanction for the arrest of Ilyin.

Appearing to Merkulov at the Lubyanka, Abakumov demanded that Ilyin be summoned - it was about the leading employee of the People's Commissariat, the Commissar of State Security. And this man is disarmed and put in the inner prison of Lubyanka. Although the prison belonged to the NKVD, the Chekists were deprived of the right to interrogate Ilyin, since he was under the jurisdiction of SMERSH. The next day, Abakumov arranged a confrontation between Teplinsky and Ilyin. Teplinskiy, beaten the day before, repeated his "confessions"; Ilyin, outraged, slapped him in the face, calling him a

woman. Having not found witnesses to corroborate Teplinsky's testimony, Abakumov found himself in a difficult position: after all, it was necessary to enlist the testimony of two witnesses. Since none of Teplinsky's entourage in the military elite even knew about the existence of Ilyin and could not testify against him, it seemed problematic to find a second witness for the prosecution, and without this it was impossible to transfer the case for hearing to the military collegium. Ilyin was beaten, deprived of sleep, but he not only refused to plead guilty, but did not even sign the interrogation protocols. To formalize the case, they had to be presented to Stalin so that he would decide the further fate of the person under investigation, and Abakumov was afraid to appear before Stalin without a convincing indictment. Although Abakumov could not prove Ilyin's guilt, he still remained in prison.

Ilyin was summoned for interrogation for four years, from 1943 to 1947. He was kept in solitary confinement and periodically beaten to extract confessions. Four years later, they gave up on him, but for another five years he remained in prison, where at various times his cellmates were the Minister of Aviation Industry Shakhurin, Air Marshal Novikov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. Ilyin did not tell anyone that he was a Chekist officer. According to him, he worked in the technical department of a documentary film studio. Realizing that he was a victim of a struggle for power, Ilyin vowed to himself not to admit to anything and it would be better to die than to tarnish

your honor. He even managed to keep a sense of humor. One day he asked his interrogator, who was conducting the interrogation:

- And what does the ribbon on your chest mean? -

That's what an honor has been done to me - the case is entrusted to a man, awarded the Order of Lenin. So my work is very important!

In July 1951, Ilyin was transferred to "Matrosskaya Tishina" and placed in a special block of the prison of the Central Committee of the Party. The Committee of Party Control, which investigated the cases of members of the Central Committee and state security officers, dealt with the persons under investigation there. The head of the prison warned him of serious consequences if he did not admit his guilt before the party. The new investigator, who appeared at the next interrogation in the uniform of a major general of justice, was the deputy military prosecutor of the Soviet Union, Kitaev. To Ilyin's immense surprise, Kitaev demanded that he testify about the traitorous activities of Abakumov, in response, Ilyin asked for evidence that this was not a provocation. The guard led him out into the corridor and pushed him to the peephole of the cell, where the sworn enemy of Ilyina

Abakumov was sitting. Nevertheless, Ilyin refused to testify against Abakumov, far-sightedly reasoning that Abakumov had once reported everything to Stalin, and if he, Ilyin, now tells about the cases fabricated by Abakumov, then he could be accused of facilitating these crimes. Ilyin testified that in his work after 1933 he had no contact with Abakumov, only occasionally met him at the Lubyanka, and also during an inspection trip to Rostov in 1938. Kitaev was dissatisfied with his statement and transferred Ilyin back to the Lubyanka, where interrogations immediately resumed. However, their tone became completely different. Now he was smelted that he misunderstood his call of duty, maintaining contacts and friendships with suspicious people. Six months later, the head of the commandant's office of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), Major General Blokhin, announced to him: for service omissions, the Special Meeting sentenced Ilyin to nine years in prison.

The term of imprisonment has expired - Ilyin served nine years. Before his release, he was offered to go to the office to complete the necessary documents. Ilyin later said that Blokhin

was not only the head of the commandant's office, but was also responsible for carrying out death sentences (in some cases he himself carried them out), therefore, when he was called to Blokhin, his whole life mentally scrolled in front of him in one or two seconds. He was sure that now, this very minute, he would be taken to the commandant's office to be shot. However, he was taken to a regular office, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement regarding the circumstances of the case and the conditions of detention. He received a certificate of release, a temporary passport, and his old uniform of the commissar of state security, now a major general, without epaulettes, which over the years has fallen into disrepair.

Released late in the evening, without money, Ilyin decided to take refuge in the reception of the MGB on Kuznetsky Most. He knew that the war was over, but did not know how it had changed people's lives: he did not know that a monetary reform had taken place in the country and completely different money was in circulation. He also didn't know where his family was or what happened to them. In the morning it turned out that his wife had divorced him, because she had no information about him and believed that he

was dead. She remarried and their daughter lived with her. Ilyin tried to contact Merkulov, who became Minister of State Control. He came to the ministry, the secretary reported to Merkulov, and then said that the name of Ilyin did not mean anything to the minister. He had nowhere to go. He again returned to the reception of the MGB and made an attempt to call Shubnyakov,

his former deputy. He didn't know his phone number, and he didn't have a coin to call from the machine, so he dialed his old number using the internal telephone in the MGB reception. The duty officer answered, who recognized him and spoke to him with obvious sympathy: Ilyin's reputation was still high among the veterans of the NKVD. It turned out that Shubnyakov was arrested in 1951, following Abakumov. An officer from the reception of the MGB lent Ilyin five hundred rubles (then it was quite a large amount) and advised him to immediately leave Moscow. Ilyin went to Ryazan, where his cousin lived.

There he got a job as a loader at the railway station. On his arrival in the city, he reported to the local state security office on the railway, and two months later they helped him get

foreman position. True, they demanded that he tell his workmates that he was convicted not under a political article, but for embezzlement and other official crimes, and they promised to make a corresponding entry in the work book. But Ilyin refused, fearing that he might be accused of hiding his past. So at the age of forty-eight he began a new life.

After Stalin's death, he applied for rehabilitation. The first petition was rejected, but he was allowed to return to Moscow. Ilyin got a job in the transport department of the Moscow City Council. He was rehabilitated in 1954 after the execution of Beria. For a year, he was denied the full pension due to state security officers. Serov opposed this, stating that Ilyin was compromised by his connection with Teplinsky, who was still serving his term as an "enemy of the people."

Father recalled how literally three days after his release from prison in 1968, Ilyin visited him:

"I learned that fate again smiled at him. In 1956, his former curator at the Central Committee became deputy head of the Department of Culture of the Party Central Committee. He needed an honest and experienced administrator for the post of organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union. Ilyin's previous work experience, a former commissar of state security for culture, made him a suitable candidate for the post. In addition, he was supported by such writers as Fedin and Simonov. The party leadership needed a person in the Writers' Union who would know everyone, including informers. Ilyin ideally matched his new position and worked in the Writers' Union until 1977. He died in 1990." In 1944, Operation Monastery began to develop in a new

direction. On the eve of the summer offensive of the Red Army in Belarus, Stalin called the head of the intelligence department Kuznetsov, the head of the military counterintelligence SMERSH Abakumov, the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov and his father. Father wrote about this: "My mood was

elated: our work

was going well, and a month ago Eitingon and I were awarded the Order of Suvorov for military operations in the German rear. Typically, this

a high award was given only to the commanders of front-line units for victorious battles, and the fact that this time it was awarded to state security officers spoke volumes. That is why I went to the meeting with a sense of confidence, and Merkulov was in excellent spirits, as one of the curators of Operation Monastery. However, Stalin

received us very coldly. He reproached for not understanding the realities of war and asked how, in our opinion, the "Monastery" and other radio games could be used to assist our army in offensive operations, and suggested expanding the scope of radio games, noting that the old techniques did not fit the new situation. Kuznetsov offered to plant new information through Heine-Max about an allegedly planned offensive in Ukraine. I was not prepared for this turn of the conversation and knew absolutely nothing about the plans of the Soviet Supreme High Command. In addition, I remembered the advice of Marshal Shaposhnikov never to get involved in matters that are outside your competence. That is why I was silent when Abakumov resumed his attempts to subordinate the operation "Monastery" to SMERSH, declaring that his apparatus had closer ties with the General Staff than the NKVD.

Stalin summoned General Shtemenko, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, who read out the order prepared before our conversation. In accordance with the order, we had to mislead the German command, creating the impression of active operations in the rear of the Red Army of the remnants of German troops who were surrounded during our offensive. Stalin's plan was to trick the Germans into using their resources to support these units and "help" them make a serious attempt to break through the encirclement. The scope and boldness of the proposed operation made a great impression on us. I experienced excitement and anxiety at the same time: the new task went beyond the scope of the previous radio games in order to misinform the enemy.

Speaking of Stalin. What we have not read about him in recent years. Naturally, I had the opportunity to learn about him, as they say, first-hand. Once I asked my father how Stalin spoke to him. Was there a case when he shouted at him or, even worse, pounded his fist, as all sorts of "democratic" authors write about it now?

The father did not remember such cases, although he had to see Stalin, as they say, both in spirit and out of spirit. My father, in general, always spoke respectfully of Stalin. I do not recall his bad words about Beria, Molotov, Malenkov either. He considered all of them talented statesmen who did not throw words into the wind. Stalin, according to his

father, always spoke quietly, calmly. He listened attentively to his father (their conversations, as a rule, took place one on one), if something did not work out for his father with the task (it should be noted that he did not have simple tasks), then Stalin always said: "Think about how parties could approach this case. There is no need to hurry in such matters. Consider another option and report your thoughts." And be sure Stalin at the end of the conversation wished good luck. By the way, I must say, my father never hid his miscalculations or shortcomings before him, spoke frankly and honestly about them, and this circumstance was noticed by Stalin, who, in turn, trusted him. On August 19, 1944, the General Staff of

the German Ground Forces received a message from Max sent by the Abwehr that a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scherhorn, numbering 2,500 people, was blocked by the Red Army in the area of the Berezina River. Thus began the operation "Berezino" - the continuation of the operation "Monastery". The operation "Berezino" was developed by the

head of the 3rd department of the Fourth Directorate, Colonel Maklyarsky, his father supported the idea of the operation. A tempting radio game was planned with the German high command. In pursuance of the instructions of the Stavka, its plan was reported personally to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria. The operation was approved. Eitingon, Maklyarsky, Fischer, Serebryansky

and Mordvinov left for Belorussia to direct this operation. In reality, the Sherhorn group did not exist in the rear of the Red Army. The German formation under the

command of this officer, numbering 1,500 people, defending the crossing on the Berezina River, was defeated by us and taken prisoner. Eitingon, Maklyarsky, Fischer, Mordvinov, Gudimovich and T. Ivanova

active participation of Heine-Max recruited Sherhorn and his radio operators. Soldiers and officers of a special-purpose brigade were sent to Belarus, along with them German anti-fascist Comintern members arrived. The game also involved German prisoners of war recruited by Soviet intelligence. Thus, the impression was created that there was a real German group in the rear of the Red Army. So, from August 19, 1944 to May 5, 1945, perhaps the most successful radio game was played with the German high command. However, the operational workers who participated in the Berezino operation were not awarded either then, or in subsequent years, or on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, although they were presented for the award. Unfortunately, this was not a rare occurrence in headquarters, when awards were issued not to those who got them with blood and

Then.

The German security service and the general staff of the German ground forces were seriously plotting to disrupt the rear communications of the Red Army using the Scherhorn compound. To this end, Sherhorn, in response to his requests for help, was sent sabotage specialists and equipment. At the same time, we managed to capture a group of SS militants sent to communicate with Sherhorn.

Sherhorn sent to Berlin reports on sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, written by Eitingon, Maklyarsky and Mordvinov. Max received an order from Berlin to verify the authenticity of Sherhorn's reports about actions in the rear of the Red Army - he fully confirmed them.

Hitler promoted Sherhorn to colonel and awarded him the Knight's Cross, while Guderian sent a personal congratulation. Sherhorn was ordered to break through the front lines and advance into Poland and then into East Prussia. Sherhorn demanded that Polish guides collaborating with the Germans be dropped by parachute to support this operation. Berlin agreed, and as a result, several Polish agents of German intelligence were captured. Hitler, for his part, planned to send the head of the special operations and sabotage service Skorzeny and his group, but the Germans had to abandon this plan due to the worsening military situation on the Soviet-German front in April 1945.

On May 5, 1945, shortly before the end of the war, the command of the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr in their last telegram recommended Sherhorn to act according to circumstances. Max was ordered to mothball sources of information and break off contacts with German officers and encircled soldiers who were threatened with capture, return to Moscow, hide and try to maintain their connections. We interned Sherhorn and his group near Moscow, where they were until they were released in the early 50s. And here is the description of the operation "Berezino", so to speak, "from the other side", given by the famous "saboteur No. 1" of the Third Reich Otto Skorzeny in his famous book "Secret Tasks of the RSHA":

"At about the same time, the intervention of my battalions was required on the Eastern Front. In the second half of August, I was ordered to urgently report to the Fuhrer's headquarters. Upon arrival, I was met by two officers from the headquarters of General Jodl and explained the reason call.

Soon after a sensitive defeat in the June 1944 campaign on the central sector of the Eastern Front, one "reserve agent" made itself felt, in other words, an employee of one of the counterintelligence units that exist in any army, a Russian agent who had infiltrated the rear of the Russians at the beginning of the war .

The soldiers, who wandered through the forests for weeks in the territories occupied by the Russians and managed to get through to their own through the front line, reported on entire detachments that were surrounded. Then our contact crossed the front line and handed over to the scout the order to "reopen" and the task itself. And finally, a radiogram: "Groups of survivors are flocking to the forest area north of Minsk. German soldiers."

About two thousand people under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn were in the area indicated very vaguely. The scout was immediately ordered to establish radio contact with the hidden detachment, reported the appropriate frequencies and code, but so far all attempts have remained in vain - apparently, Sherhorn did not have a transmitter. The commander-in-chief had already considered it impossible to find and return the detachment. He was advised to seek help from my "special units".



Are you able to complete such a task? - asked officers who met with me.

I gave an affirmative answer with good reason, knowing that these officers and their colleagues would be happy to return their friends lost in the whirlpools of the Russian tsunami. That same evening I returned by plane to Friedenthal and we set to work. In a matter of days, we developed a plan, codenamed "Poacher", and tackled the myriad technical problems involved in the operation. Our project provided for the creation of four groups, each of which consisted of two Germans and three Russians. The people were armed with Russian pistols and provided with food supplies for four weeks. In addition, each group took with them a tent and a portable radio station. Just in case, they were dressed in Russian military uniforms, provided with certificates, passes, etc. They were accustomed to Russian cigarettes, each in a duffel bag had several slices of "Russian" black bread and Soviet canned food. All passed through the hands of a hairdresser, who cut them almost bald in accordance with Russian military fashion, and in the last days before the flight they had to part with all hygiene items, including even razors. Two groups were to jump from planes east of Minsk, almost exactly in the middle between the cities of Borisov and Cherven, move west and explore the endless

forests in this area. If Sherhorn's detachment could not be found, it was necessary to independently get to the front line. According to the plan, the other two groups were supposed to land between Dzerzhinsk and Vitya, approach Minsk and search a vast sector up to the city itself. If the search remained fruitless, they too should have made their way to the front line. We have been aware that this plan is only a theoretical guide, and we have given all groups sufficient leeway; the initial uncertainty did not allow foreseeing all the details of the operation, and therefore they were given the right to

act at their own discretion in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. We could only rely on radio communications, which made it possible, if necessary, to transmit new

instructions. After the discovery of Sherhorn's detachment, an airstrip should have been built in the forest he occupied. Then it would be possible to gradually evacuate the soldiers by aircraft.

At the end of August, the first group - P. took to the air on the "Heinkel-111" from the 200th squadron. With feverish impatience we waited for the return of the plane - after all, we had to fly more than 500 kilometers over enemy territory (by that time the front line passed through Vis-tul). Since such a flight could only take place at night, the fighters could not escort the transport aircraft. On the same night, a radio communication session took place between the scout and the P group. "Bad landing," our paratroopers reported. —

Let's try to split up. We are under machine-gun fire."

The message ended there. Perhaps I had to retreat, leaving the transmitter. The nights passed one after another, and only the faint crackle of atmospheric static came from the radio. Nothing else, no news from P's group. Bad start! In early September, the

second group, C, set off to fly. Upon returning, the pilot reported that the paratroopers jumped exactly at the indicated place and reached the ground without incident. However, for the next four days and nights, the radio was silent. The only explanation left was another failure, another disaster. But on the fifth night, our radio, from which everyone tirelessly waited for the manifestation of at least some signs of life, caught the answer. First, a tuning signal went, then a special signal, which meant that our people got in touch without interference (an extra precaution: the absence of a signal would mean that the radio operator was captured and was forced to get in touch by force). And more great news: Sherhorn's detachment exists and it was discovered! The next night, Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn himself said a few words - simple words, but how much restrained feeling, deep gratitude were in them! Here is the finest of rewards for all our efforts and anxieties! A day after the second group, the third five flew out with non-commissioned officer M. at

the head. We never found out what happened to them. Time after time, our radio operators tuned in to their wave,

repeated callsigns... Long, agonizing weeks... There was no answer. M.'s group disappeared into the boundless Russian expanses.

Exactly twenty-four hours later, after the group M., the fourth group R went on a mission. For four days they were regularly in touch. After landing, they moved towards Minsk, but could not strictly adhere to this direction, as they constantly ran into Russian military patrols. Sometimes they met deserters who mistook them for comrades in misfortune. In general, the majority of the population in this part of Belarus was quite friendly. On the fifth day, the communication session was suddenly interrupted. We didn't even have time to tell them the coordinates of Sherhorn's detachment. The anxious, unbearably long wait stretched again. Every morning Volkersam sadly announced: "No news from groups R., M., and P.". Finally, three weeks later, we received a telephone message from somewhere in the Lithuanian border area: "R.'s group crossed the front line without loss." As expected, R.'s report is extremely interested in the intelligence services. After all, the cases of the return of German soldiers from the territories occupied by the Russians were extremely rare. R. especially emphasized the ruthlessness with which the Soviet commanders put into practice the principle of total war, mobilizing all forces, and, if necessary, using even women and children. If there were no free vehicles, the local civilian population had to roll barrels of fuel for many kilometers - sometimes almost to the line of fire - or pass shells in a chain directly to artillery positions. Undoubtedly, we had a lot to learn from the Russians.

Disguised as a lieutenant of the Red Army, Commander R. had the courage to sneak into the officers' canteen and get dinner. Thanks to his impeccable knowledge of the Russian language, he was beyond suspicion. A few days later, R. reached our forward units, completely saving his group.

Now we had to meet the most urgent needs of Sherhorn's detachment, which had been in complete isolation and deprived of literally everything for more than three months. Sherhorn asked first of all for more medicines, dressings and the doctor himself. The first doctor to jump with a parachute crashed on landing in the dark, broke both legs and after a few

days died. The next one got lucky and landed unharmed. Then we began to dump food and clothing for the small army. From the report of the doctor it followed that the condition of the wounded was deplorable, and Sherhorn was ordered to immediately begin preparations for the evacuation.

For two or three nights, 200 Squadron sent out several aircraft to supply the camp lost in the forest. Unfortunately, nocturnal drops of materials could not be accurate: parachuted containers often landed in inaccessible places or remained undetected in the forest thickets, although Sherhorn's soldiers conducted continuous searches. In the meantime, together with the squadron's specialists, we prepared an evacuation plan, deciding to use as an airfield a vast forest clearing, discovered not far from Sherhorn's camp. It was decided to carry out the operation in October, during the period of the darkest moonless nights, having planned first of all to take out the wounded and sick on planes, and only then the healthy ones. A specialist was sent to Sherhorn to quickly deploy runways in the

field. But as soon as the preparatory work began, the Russians made the chosen place unsuitable with a powerful air strike. I had to find another way. After negotiations with Sherhorn, it was decided that the detachment should leave the discovered camp and make a 250-kilometer march to the north. There, in the vicinity of Duvaburg, near the former Russian-Lithuanian border, there were several lakes that froze over in early December. When the ice is strong enough, the lakes will turn into suitable airfields for transport aircraft.

To make such a long journey behind enemy lines is not an easy task. Sherhorn suggested dividing the detachment into two marching columns. The first, under the command of my officer C, was to go straight north, acting as a reconnaissance vanguard. The second, under the command of Sherhorn, was supposed to follow a parallel course, but slightly behind. It was necessary to provide people with warm clothes and other necessary materials. For two thousand people, such an operation required a huge number of sorties. We sent them nine radio transmitters so that when the detachment was split up, each part would have contact with others and with us.

In the late autumn of 1944, the columns slowly moved north. There were few Russian carts; the sick and wounded could hardly fit on them. Who could, went on foot. The transition turned out to be much longer than we expected. On average, they covered 12 kilometers per day. Sherhorn was forced to stop the detachment every now and then to rest for a day or two, and then it was not possible to cover even forty kilometers in a week. On the other hand, there were bloody skirmishes with Russian military patrols, the number of dead and wounded grew every day, and the pace of advance, naturally, decreased. Little by little, all of us, who managed to get to know the Russians well, lost our last hopes. Scherhorn's chances of returning to Germany were terribly slim.

As the detachment moved towards the front line, the route of the supply aircraft was shortened, but it became more difficult to determine the place of the drop. By radio, we tried to clarify their coordinates on a map dotted with different icons. Despite the precautions, a myriad of bales and containers fell into the hands of the Russian militia, who, to their credit, coped with their task. But even that was not our main concern. Every week the amount of fuel allocated to 200 Squadron steadily decreased, while our needs for it did not decrease at all. From time to time I was able, as an exception, to snatch an additional 45 tons, but each new request ran into more and more difficulties. Despite Sherhorn's desperate entreaties, the number of resupply flights had to be reduced. I think neither Sherhorn nor his soldiers, who made their way through the Russian forests in incredibly difficult conditions, were not able to understand our problems. To support their spirit, their faith in our desire to help them with all the means at our disposal, I tried to show unchanging optimism in every radio session.

In February 1945, I myself had to command a division on the Eastern Front. While fighting off the fierce attacks of the enemy, I did not lose sight of our "special missions". The messages still coming regularly from Sherhorn were full of desperation: "Send planes... Help us... Don't forget us...". The only good news is that Sherhorn met the P. group, the first of four abandoned groups that were believed to have disappeared without a trace in August.

1944. In the future, the content of the radio messages became a complete torture for me. We were no longer able to send more than one plane a week. The round-trip flight exceeded 800 kilometers. Yes, and the amount of goods sent was melting before our eyes. Day and night I racked my brains, looking for ways to help people who did not break down, did not lay down their arms. But what was to be done?

By the end of February, they stopped allocating fuel to us. At the mere thought of its huge reserves captured by the enemy during the offensive, I was seized by rage. At each of the Warthegau airfields occupied by the Russians, there were several hundred tons of aviation fuel. On February 27, the commander of group S.

sent us the following message: "The detachment has arrived in the designated area near the lakes. Without immediate support, we will starve to death. Can you pick us up?" As the transmitter batteries were used up, the calls for help became more and more insistent, and we were no longer able to help. At the end, S. asked for at least batteries to be delivered: "We are not asking for anything else ... just to talk to you ... only

hear you."

The collapse and incredible chaos that struck many services finally finished us off. There could be no question of a plane taking off with help for the unfortunate, much less their evacuation. And all the

same, our radio operators did not take off their headphones all night long. Sometimes they managed to detect the negotiations of Scherhorn's groups among themselves, sometimes their desperate pleas reached us. Then, after May 8, nothing else broke the silence on the air. Scherhorn did not answer. Operation "Poacher" ended in vain"[3]1 . It is

noteworthy that Gehlen, who headed the German military intelligence after Canaris, in an effort to gain the confidence of the Americans, offered Max as a reliable source after the war. However, US intelligence was distrustful of Gehlen's proposal.

A great merit in carrying out operations "Monastyr" and "Berezino" belongs to the head of the department, Massya, who in 1945-1950 actively participated in intelligence work on the atomic problem in the United States. A plan was ripened to use Scherhorn to recruit the German Admiral Raeder, commander of the naval forces, suspended by Hitler from fulfilling his

duties in 1943. While in captivity, Raeder was in Moscow. Later, at his request, his wife came to Moscow. He seemed set to cooperate with Moscow in exchange for a promise not to charge him as a war criminal at the Nuremberg trials, although the British side insisted on bringing him to trial for operations by German submarines against the British fleet and unarmed merchant ships. My father settled him and his wife in our dacha, but soon became convinced that the plan to influence the admiral through Sherhorn was unrealistic,

since they turned out to be incompatible with each other. He had a more beneficial effect on Admiral Serebryansky, who was at our dacha "under house arrest as a prisoner of war" (he played the role of a German businessman). Serebryansky managed to convince the admiral to renew his acquaintances and connections in Germany. Raeder, as his father recalled, really liked walking along the Moskva River in a captured Horch limousine - that's exactly what he had in Germany. At the end of 1945, the NKVD sent Raeder to Germany. The British side continued to insist on bringing him to trial as a war criminal. As my father used to say, we have reached an agreement with the British and Americans on this matter.

Raeder, several other senior officers of the German Navy and another group of officers were transferred to the allies in exchange for the former tsarist general Krasnov, who commanded the Cossack army in the Civil War, and served in the Wehrmacht headquarters in World War II, and Soviet officers who fought in Vlasov's army. Sherhorn was also returned to Germany, and ties with these people were cut off.

After the war, the Soviet intelligence services made an attempt to engage Alexander Demyanov (Heine-Max) again, this time in Paris, but it soon became clear that the emigrant circles there showed no interest in him, and he and his wife returned to Moscow. Neither he nor his wife participated in any other intelligence operations. Demyanov later worked as an electrical engineer in a research institute. He

died in 1975 from a heart attack while boating on the Moscow River. He was sixty four

Both military and political intelligence played a big role in the preparation and holding of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, meetings and meetings of the foreign ministers of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1943-1945. On the eve of the Tehran Conference, the government of the USSR adopted a special decision obliging all institutions and departments of the Soviet Union to provide all possible assistance to the operational activities of the intelligence agencies of the People's Commissariat of Defense and

the NKVD. The meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Tehran and Yalta was preceded by informal conversations in which Fitin and my father took part, on the one hand, and the head of the American military mission in Moscow, General Dean, US Ambassador Harriman, adviser to the British Embassy, Roberts, on the other. They discussed possible approaches to resolving contentious issues: the exchange of intelligence information, the mutual extradition of failed agents and captured German military specialists, the delicate problems of a possible post-war settlement in the countries of Eastern Europe. Harriman, in particular, did not object to the idea of a coalition government in post-war Poland proposed by Stalin and Molotov.

These last meetings with representatives of the American and British intelligence services, as it were, summed up the results of cooperation between the Allied intelligence services during the war years. It turned out to be most effective in Afghanistan, where Alakhverdov, a resident of Soviet intelligence, managed to paralyze the actions of German agents in the border areas. Together with the British, the agent-sabotage network of German and Japanese intelligence in India and Burma was defeated. Highly appreciating our support for British intelligence operations in India and Burma, the British, in turn, handed over to Moscow many pro-German agents in Afghanistan and Central Asia, recruited by

the Germans for operations in the Soviet rear. Things did not go further than general discussions about joint sabotage operations against the Germans in Western Europe with the British and American special services. However, illegal Soviet intelligence officers established business contacts with British intelligence officers operating under the headquarters of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. Lieutenant Colonel Kvashnin establishe



relations with Churchill's son Randolph and provided great assistance to British officers in getting out of the German encirclement. The information received from Kvashnin was of great importance in assessing the intentions of the British ruling circles and in their post-war policy in Yugoslavia.

Recalling my conversations with my father about cooperation during the war years with Allied intelligence, I must say that, noting, perhaps, even the natural trait of the British to intrigues, he always emphasized that they could not be denied high professionalism. As for cooperation, he recalled a number of episodes with great warmth, each time emphasizing that, for example, there were still a lot of blank spots in our relations with British intelligence, and he was upset that the issues of cooperation were not studied, no one said anything about it. writes. But this is so, by the way.

American business circles showed interest in possible forms of solving the Jewish question, offering financial assistance in restoring the areas of Gomel in the so-called "Jewish Settlement" and the Crimea, where it was supposed to create a Jewish republic. In informal conversations between my father and Harriman, which took place at the Aragvi restaurant and were recorded on a tape recorder, our agent of influence, Prince Janusz Radziwill, the Harriman family's partner in financial transactions in Poland and Eastern Europe, acted as an interpreter. He was again arrested by the NKVD in Poland in January 1945. On the eve of the Yalta

Conference, chaired first by Golikov and then by Beria, the longest meeting of the heads of intelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Navy and the NKVD-NKGB took place in the entire war. The main issue - the assessment of the potential capabilities of the German armed forces to further resistance to the allies - was considered within two days. The forecasts of Soviet intelligence that the war in Europe would last no more than three months due to the lack of fuel and ammunition among the Germans turned out to be correct. The last, third day of the meeting was devoted

to comparing the available materials on the political goals and intentions of the Americans and the British at the Yalta Conference. Everyone agreed. that both Roosevelt and Churchill could not

counteract the line of the Soviet delegation to strengthen the positions of the USSR in Eastern Europe.

The meeting participants proceeded from reliable information that the Americans and the British would take a flexible position and make concessions in view of the interest of the Soviet Union's speedy entry into the war with Japan. The forecast of the NKVD and military intelligence about the low ability of the Japanese to withstand powerful attacks by Soviet mobile formations bypassing the fortified areas built by the Japanese along the Soviet border was confirmed in August 1945. However, no one then foresaw, despite the detailed data on the completion of work on the atomic bomb, that the Americans would use nuclear weapons against Japan.

On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, the assessments were even more optimistic. Beria and Golikov did not mention at all the prospects for the socialist development of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The socialist choice as a reality in the countries of Europe was more or less clear only for Yugoslavia. Moscow proceeded from the fact that Tito, as the leader of the state and the Communist Party, relied on real military force. In other countries, the situation was different. At the same time, everyone agreed that the Soviet military presence and the sympathy of the broad masses of the population for the Soviet Union would ensure a stable stay in power in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary of governments that would be guided by a close alliance and cooperation with the USSR.

The military-political recommendations of the Soviet intelligence services on Germany were also far from the guidelines for building socialism in the zone occupied by Soviet troops. Rather, it was a matter of creating a powerful, stable, Russia-oriented, progressive group in the German leadership in a future neutral, permanently disarmed Germany.

The practical result of the decision of the meeting was also an instruction to the Deputy Head of the First (Intelligence) Directorate of the NKGB Korotkov to agree with representatives of the intelligence services of the United States and England on the extradition of the command staff of the Vlasov army, in particular Zhilenkov, in exchange for the transfer to the British and Americans of German generals and admirals of interest to them: it was and about Grand Admiral Reder, who was in captivity in Moscow.

I focused only on the key points of the materials available in my father's archive and directly related to his work during the war years - on the main intelligence operations of the German-Soviet war, questions of assessing intelligence activities by the military-political leadership of the Soviet Union. It must be admitted that systematic attention to intelligence work began to be paid under the influence of our serious setbacks at the beginning of the war. Before the war, Stalin, evaluating the materials that came to him, relied more on his own vision of the development of events and his own intuition. In retrospect, it is obvious that the

most significant results were achieved not on the basis of the implementation of pre-war agent positions in Western Europe and Germany, but as a result of actions prepared and carried out already during the war. At the same time, the key to success in operations for strategic disinformation of the enemy was the close interaction of military intelligence and the NKVD and the involvement of qualified top-level specialists from the General Staff. All this contributed to the fact that materials about such operations, for example, about the radio game "Monastery", are now used by the American and our special services as educational materials.

Of course, it would be wrong to imagine that Soviet intelligence had solid achievements. The Abwehr and the Gestapo inflicted serious damage on the intelligence agencies of the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of Defense. In addition to the death of valuable agents and operatives in Western Europe in 1941-1943, the Soviet state security agencies lost a number of heads of residencies as a result of the actions of German counterintelligence. Among the dead were prominent members of Soviet intelligence: Kaminsky (he shot himself while trying to arrest) - one of the founders of the "Red Chapel" in Germany. In 1942, Friedtud, the famous recruiter of Grigulevich, died in Afghanistan. Together with Alakhverdov, he carried out an operation to neutralize German agents. Viktor Lyagin (resident in Kherson and Nikolaev, on the eve of the war, deputy head of the NKVD Intelligence Directorate), abandoned behind enemy lines, was captured by the Germans and shot: without betraying anyone, he refused to run, as he would have to leave his wounded radio operator. Ivan Kudrya (resident in Smolensk

my mother trained him) penetrated the Abwehr intelligence network and passed important information to Moscow before he was betrayed. Vladimir Molodtsov (resident in Odessa, was captured by the Romanians). The trial of him and his group received much publicity. The entire Romanian press wrote about this process. When he and the members of the group were sentenced to death, the chairman of the court suggested that they appeal to the King of Romania for a pardon. Molodtsov replied \* he would never ask for mercy from the enemy and would not turn with a similar request to the head of a foreign state, whose soldiers trample our land. Lyagin, Molodtsov, Kuznetsov after the war was

posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Partisan officers Morozov, Kolesnikov, underground

fighters Geft, Gordienko and many others were presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Yu. Kolesnikov received the title of Hero of the Russian Federation only 50 years later in connection with the half-century anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany. As I noted above, the participants in Operation Berezino and the fallen heroes of the Norwegian Resistance did not receive their awards. But it is our sacred duty to pay tribute to all the dead intelligence officers, partisans and anti-fascists, those who were not properly marked during the war and the post-war years.

Being already a very old man (he lived for almost ninety years), my father always proudly recalled the years of the Great Patriotic War, believing that they manifested the great spirit of all our people, all his great will to freedom. He did not speak about his Omsbonites in any other way than in superlatives, calling them all Heroes, Well Done, People of Duty and Honor. He highly appreciated the contribution to the victory of partisans and underground fighters, especially Belarusians. And he was very sad for those who did not happen to live to see the Victory. The

end of the war still lives in memory as a grandiose event, which at once washed away all doubts from many about the wisdom of the country's leadership. The heroic and tragic events of the past, human losses and even mass repressions - all this seemed justified in the face of the Great Victory over Hitler.

My father, recalling those days, described, in particular, a great reception in the Georgievsky Hall of the Kremlin:

“I had the honor of sitting at the same table with General Shtemenko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Fitin, Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD, General Ilyichev, Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, and Colonel General Kuznetsov, Chief of Army Intelligence. I remember how Stalin came up to our table, greeting Isakov, who lost his leg during the German bombing in 1942 in the Caucasus, and made a toast in his honor. Isakov could not go out in front of such an audience on crutches, and we were all touched to the core by Stalin's gesture. We felt like his children and heirs. Stalin's emphasized attention to young generals and admirals showed that he connected the future of the country with our generation. The lessons of the war show that Soviet

intelligence never played the role of an independent instrument of both military and peaceful big politics. Only by implementing the instructions of the leadership of the state during the last war, she played a significant role in the withdrawal of Finland and Romania from the war, the strategic misinformation of the German command. Undoubtedly, her great help in the development of the partisan movement, the initiative raising of the question of the development of work on atomic energy in the Soviet Union is also undoubted.

## Chapter

# 18 ATOMIC ESPIONAGE

The museum of the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics in the former secret Arzamas-16, now Sarov, has a unique exhibit - the case of the first Soviet atomic bomb, which was detonated at the Semipalatinsk test site on August 29, 1949. The project to create the first bomb in the conditions of complete secrecy was called "Special Jet Engines". Atomic scientists themselves dubbed this project in a different way - "Stalin's jet engines." But something else has taken root - "Russia does it itself." The history of the creation of the

Soviet atomic bomb still has many "blank spots". There have been discussions in the press about who made the greatest contribution to the development of the domestic nuclear bomb - nuclear scientists or intelligence officers. Since there are ambiguities, then, apparently, there will be a lot of talk about this in the future.

Today there are two diametrically opposed points of view on the problem of Soviet atomic espionage. Supporters of the first believe that Western and US scientists involved in the creation of the American atomic bomb can be accused of spying for the Soviet Union. Supporters of the second point of view argue that such statements are lies and slander. But at the same time, either due to ignorance, or for some other reason, they completely ignore the main thing - the presence in the Soviet archives of hundreds of works by Western scientists, such as R. Oppenheimer, E. Fermi, L. Szilard and others devoted to the atomic problem. These documents were presented at the Scientific and Technical Council of the Special Committee of the USSR Government on the Atomic Problem.

It should be clear to any person connected with intelligence that without the help of special services it is simply impossible to obtain secret documents, which are the works of Western scientists. Having understood this, we can safely say that when creating the atomic bomb in the USSR, all the scientific potential that had already been accumulated in the West was used. And the dispute over who contributed more

contribution to the development of a domestic nuclear bomb, in this case, is not carried out from adequate positions. There is no need to accuse someone of espionage, but it is necessary, apparently, to say that Soviet intelligence used the opportunities that opened up in connection with the release of people close to it, its

agents, to the leading scientific circles of the West. My father spoke in his memoirs about the decisive role of Soviet intelligence in obtaining atomic secrets. Moreover, he claims that she received them from such famous scientists as R. Oppenheimer, E. Fermi, L. Szilard. However, this view has been challenged. In particular, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, represented by its press bureau, said that this was not true.

Nevertheless, the materials, information about which is now becoming known, increasingly confirm the fact that eminent physicists of the world helped the USSR in the creation of atomic weapons, believing that the concealment of these secrets could lead to nuclear war, to the world dictate of one country.

The more publications about the atomic bomb appear in the press, the more clearly questions arise, the answers to which can clarify a lot. How did it happen that from the holy of holies of the laboratory at Los Alamos, where work was carried out on the American atomic bomb, top secret information floated away? How did it happen? The appearance of new evidence, for example, by Colonel Vladimir Barkovsky, who was involved in obtaining atomic secrets, that foreign scientists transmitted secret information completely disinterestedly, leads to another question: why did they do this? Was there some kind of informal agreement among the scientists of the world regarding the exchange of information regarding the atomic bomb? Or maybe the scientific community had a super idea - to use the atomic bomb, atomic energy to create an international government, and scientists should play the leading role in it? Illusion? Who knows ... At least it's too early to put an end to the history of the creation of the atomic bomb. But before answering these questions, it makes sense to clarify what the American

nuclear program was and who implemented it. Today, almost everything about this is known to the details. Prosperous and remote from the theater of operations

The American continent then gathered many famous scientists. Figuratively speaking, as a result of the emigration of European scientists to the United States, a scientific "critical mass" was achieved, which is so necessary for a nuclear explosion. During the Second World War, A. Einstein, E. Fermi, L. Szilard, E. Teller, X. Bethe, Dm. Frank, J. Wigner, W. Weisskopf, P. Debye and other prominent scientists, one way or another involved in solving this problem. Niels Bohr arrived in America in 1943 and advised the Americans on the uranium problem. On August 13, 1942, the US administration approved the "Manhattan Project" as an organization and plan for the development and production of the atomic bomb. The project is a colossal organizational, research, design, industrial and technological work aimed at creating the first samples of

atomic weapons. Generous funding allowed for a large-scale and comprehensive development of the business. More people were involved in its implementation than in the ranks of the Eisenhower Expeditionary Force during the landing of allied troops in northern France in 1944. complex

The Americans spent a thousand times more on this project than German had received for nuclear research in their time. The security service of the project scientists was headed by Boris Pash, the son of the Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USA, known for his intransigence towards Soviet Russia. R. Oppenheimer was entrusted with developing the design of the atomic bomb. Together with a small group of theoretical physicists, he worked at the University of California at Berkeley. He was also appointed director of one of the projects, the so-called "Y". The War Policy Committee was far from unanimous in its support for Oppenheimer's candidacy. The head of the security service of the project, B. Pash, was also an irreconcilable opponent of his appointment. According to intelligence

officials, Oppenheimer had too many "dark spots" in his past. It was about his connection with the "left" organizations. Oppenheimer was close for a long time to Jane Tailock, the daughter of a professor of English literature at the University of

California, who was a political communist. This relationship continued even after he married.



on Catherine Garrison - the widow, again, of a communist - and began working in the "Y" zone. Oppenheimer also became the head of the now world-famous Los Alamos National Laboratory, where an atomic bomb was created behind barbed wire. The security

service literally raged in the laboratory. Each department of the research team worked without knowing what the others were doing. The secrecy strategy, according to the head of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves, boiled down to three main tasks: "to prevent information about our program from falling into the hands of the Germans; do everything possible to ensure that the use of a bomb in a war is completely unexpected for the enemy, and, as far as possible, keep our discoveries and details of our projects and factories secret from the Russians. As you know, the Americans failed to solve the third problem.

At the end of 1941 or at the beginning of 1942, the Enormas case was launched - the development of the scientific and technical intelligence department of the USSR state security agencies. "Enormas" in English means "huge". This word meant a device of unthinkable power. So the development concerning nuclear weapons was coded. The implementation

of this case had several stages. At the first, not only we, but also the Americans and the British did not really believe in the practical possibility of solving the problem of creating a uranium bomb. The Enormas materials contain many doubts of the participants in this project - the Americans and the British.

The leaders of the Soviet Union also mistrustfully perceived intelligence information on this problem. In particular, on one of the reports to the then head of the department of scientific and technical intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR L. Kvasnikov, Lavrenty Beria wrote: "I do not believe your Anton. In my opinion; Otherwise, he tells us ... The political aspects of the atomic bomb, set out in the sh / t (cipher telegram), I ask you to double-check through Washington.

The initial conclusions of our experts on the Enormas project were negative. And not because the scientific significance of this problem was not recognized, but because the practical possibility of solving it was denied. And only in 1944 the development

Enormas became a priority in Soviet intelligence. By this time, reliable information had already appeared, assessed by I. Kurchatov, that the Americans were conducting systematic and most serious work not in the field of theoretical research on the atomic bomb, but in the engineering solution of this problem.

The Enormas case conceals secrets that could shed light on how we managed to reach out to such scientists as R. Oppenheimer and E. Fermi, how our intelligence officers infiltrated the scientific circles of the West, how the Comintern connections and contacts were used in this with Jewish scientists. But it is known that it was under this sauce that they managed to create a general background of a favorable attitude of Western scientists and specialists to issues related to the development of nuclear research in the Soviet Union. It

is no secret that the first information about a nuclear reaction, which was carried out in Chicago by the Italian physicist E. Fermi in 1942, was obtained from scientific circles close to Oppenheimer. And it was obtained by a former worker of the Comintern and former secretary N. Krupskaya, our resident in California G. Kheifets. At one time, he informed Moscow that the development of atomic weapons had moved into practice. By that time, he had already established contact with Oppenheimer and his entourage. The fact is that the Oppenheimer family, in particular his brother, was closely associated with an illegal group of the US Communist Party on the West Coast.

One of the places of illegal contacts and meetings was Madame Bramson's salon in San Francisco. For our intelligence, sympathetic communists were one of the sources of acquiring valuable people and acquaintances. It was in Madame Bramson's salon that Heifetz met Oppenheimer. During her scientist said that Germany can get ahead of the Allies in creating an atomic bomb. He also said that back in 1939, Albert Einstein turned to US President Roosevelt with a secret letter, in which he drew his attention to the need to study the possibilities of atomic energy to create powerful weapons. Oppenheimer was upset that there was no quick response to this letter.

Madame Bramson's salon existed from 1936 to 1942. Our country supported him. Heifetz transferred money to his

financing. But Madame Bramson was not poor, but on the contrary, a very wealthy lady. The merit of our intelligence

officer Semyon Markovich Semenov, who at one time obtained the secrets of the production of penicillin, is also of great merit in the supply of atomic information. The journalists are looking for him and they can't find him! Semenov used emigrant and Jewish circles in the USA in his work. It was he who recruited Maurice Cohen, who is better known to the general public under the name of Peter Kroger. Sergei Nikolaevich Kurnakov played a special role in obtaining atomic secrets. A former officer of the White Army, a prominent figure in the Russian emigration to the United States, he went to work in the OGPU. In 1946 he returned to his homeland. It was Kurnakov who entered the scientific circles, which were also related to the development of the atomic bomb. Sergei Nikolaevich, although he knew that he was in the sphere of attention of American counterintelligence, almost openly fell for an appointment with leading American physicists and established appropriate relations with them. In the Enormas case,

there is also such a secret as the disappearance of several dozen pages from it. Why did they disappear? Who took them away? What are these documents?

The first information about the participation of Soviet intelligence in the creation of nuclear weapons began to seep into the press in weak streams. Only recently has information been flooding in. One sensation overwhelmed another. Either it turns out that our scientists simply copied the American bomb based on the materials obtained with the help of our intelligence officers, or it is argued that not only schemes fell into their hands, but also a finished American-made "product" that did not explode in Japan in 1945. With all the variety of versions put forward, one conclusion is drawn - we have nothing of our own in atomic weapons. And in this case, it is pointless to look for the true creators of the nuclear bomb.

Such a conclusion arose, I think, not by chance. In conditions when information about nuclear weapons - the history of their birth, centers and people who created them, stages of development - were top-secret, the majority of our fellow citizens had the idea that someone was doing something, somewhere, as a result

which the country's defense capability is ensured. But who, where exactly and at what cost - almost no one knew

about this. The most famous atomic espionage case is that of Klaus Fuchs, one of the developers of the Manhattan Project. Fuchs was born in Germany to a Lutheran priest. Having brilliantly graduated from the gymnasium, he entered the University of Leipzig (mathematics and theoretical physics). His teachers were Nobel laureates Heisenberg and Frenkel. In Leipzig, Fuchs became a member of the Social Democratic Party. In 1933, after the Nazis came to power, he emigrated first to France, then to England. In 1941, he was admitted to top-secret work related

to the creation of atomic weapons. In December 1943, at the invitation of R. Oppenheimer, an active supporter of the wide involvement of nuclear specialists working in England, in the implementation of the American atomic project, Fuchs came to New York as part of a British scientific mission and from January 1944 was included in the number of developers of the Manhattan project". From August 1944 to June 1946 he worked at the American nuclear center at Los Alamos.

At the end of 1949, the secret services of England received evidence of contacts between K. Fuchs and representatives of Soviet intelligence. On February 2, 1950, he was arrested. The indictment against him stated that between 1943 and 1947, at least four times, he passed information about secret atomic research to an unknown person. The Attorney General of England, the chief prosecutor in the Shawcross trial, revealed this unknown person, saying that Fuchs had passed on atomic secrets to "agents of the Soviet government." Fuchs gave us material on the explosive device of the atomic bomb, on which he worked as one of the designers. On March 1, 1950, he was sentenced to 14 years. Who

was the "agent of the Soviet government" to whom Fuchs passed on atomic secrets? Fuchs first contacted the most prominent figure in the international communist movement, J. Kuczyński, who was well known to the British authorities and worked in one of the British secret services - assessed the military and economic potential of Nazi Germany. About his meeting with Fuchs Kuczyński

informed the Soviet ambassador in England I. Maisky, who, in turn, decided not to entrust communications with Fuchs to the NKVD - he was on bad terms with the NKVD resident in England A. Gorsky, and turned to the military attache Kremer. So a permanent connection with Fuchs was established. It

is known that Fuchs met with Sonya Kuchinsky, a relative of Kuchinsky, who was an agent of Soviet military intelligence. And this happened at a time when Sonya was in the field of view of the British special services, they knew about her that she was a Soviet intelligence officer, she was in the Soviet residency in Switzerland, from where she moved to

England. The British managed to introduce their top agent Jim Hanburn into the Soviet intelligence network in Switzerland, who managed to almost completely neutralize and fail our entire "Red Chapel" in Switzerland.

Today one can argue and argue about whether the British intelligence knew about the meeting between Fuchs and Kuczynski or not. It is possible that her contacts were carefully analyzed. Her association with Fuchs may have been recorded. But what if British intelligence was interested in the fact that the Soviet Union became aware of the work on the atomic bomb

in the United States? Curious in this regard for analysis and such details. The trial of Fuks was of a super-sprint nature of the proceedings. The trial took place on March 1, 1950 and lasted only an hour and a half. The punishment was also unexpected for such a case. The court did not succumb to the temptation to punish Fuchs under the article "treason". It is interesting to recall that the British side rejected the Americans' claims to bring the Fuchs case to the US court, as well as the offer of FBI Director Hoover to assist in the proceedings. How to explain such a position? Is it not because the Americans almost completely closed information about nuclear developments to the British? The episode with Fuchs

dictates the need for a completely new look at everything that happened. The story of the English agent Jim Hanburn, Fuchs's attack on Sonya Kuczynski, who was under the hood of British counterintelligence, the lightning trial of Fuchs - for some reason, intelligence historians do not want all this

notice. Without an analysis of these facts and events, without a search for new evidence and evidence, it is difficult to sweep the wheat from the chaff, to determine the motives that pushed Western scientists to transfer atomic secrets to Moscow. And in this regard, some light is shed by the cipher telegrams of the Soviet intelligence station, which were sent from the United States to Moscow with information about the atomic bomb, and directives from Moscow to their agents.

The messages of our intelligence officers, who actively mined atomic secrets in the 40s, were deciphered by the Americans in 1952-1953. We have not published them. Their content has become known only recently. They confirm the very important role of the Russian emigration, true patriots of Russia, in obtaining highly secret documents about the atomic bomb. These documents also trace the connection of Soviet intelligence agents with prominent figures in Western science, in particular with R. Oppenheimer. One can apparently argue about how adequately the documents were deciphered, but the fact that they accurately indicate the connection of the people around Oppenheimer and his connection with Soviet intelligence agents is indisputable. Here is a

directive from Moscow. It is dated February 17, 1945. In it, agent Huron is ordered to immediately establish contact with agent Veksel and with the leadership of the American atomic project.

Another telegram dated March 21, 1945. It is addressed to Anton, a resident of scientific and technical intelligence in New York, L. Kvasnikov. According to this document, Oppenheimer passes as the director of the "Indian Reservation", that is, the Los Alamos Laboratory, and as Veksel, that is, not as an agent, but as a source of information on the atomic bomb. Moreover, several times he is named as the director of the atomic project.

And here is the text of the decrypted telegram sent from the USA to Moscow on January 29, 1945 to Viktor, that is, the head of Soviet intelligence P. M. Fitin. The document contains information that through the channels of the American Communist Party, as well as through the communication channels of the Bureau of Compatriots of the American Organization for Assistance to Russia, during the war years, there is an active check of major scientists involved in the implementation of the American atomic

This extremely important information was received from the agent, who was given the pseudonym Young - Mlad. Later Mlad will

appear as a source of information about the first test explosion of an atomic bomb. His diary entries are kept in the Enormas letter file in the archives of Soviet intelligence. In cipher

telegrams, there is an agent under the nicknames Beck and Cavalier. His real name is Sergey Nikolaevich Kurnakov. This is the same Kurnakov who created an agent network among emigrants in the United States. For example, a cipher telegram dated November 12, 1944, sent to Moscow, indicates Beck's contacts with Harvard University scientists T. Hall and his son, where theoretical research and development related to the atomic bomb was carried out, and how he managed to attract obtaining secret materials of activists of the Russian aid movement during the war years.

The ciphered correspondence contains the solution of the Rosenberg spouses. In the documents, they appear as agents of Soviet intelligence. Yes, indeed, they maintained relations with those who were close to us. However, they were not any "atomic spies". They didn't do these things at all. They reported on work in the field of radar. And only through their relative David Gringlas did they learn about the secrecy regime at the Los Alamos Laboratory, about the participants in the atomic project, and the scale of the work being done.

Nevertheless, the American intelligence services presented the Rosenberg spouses as the biggest spies of the 20th century. In fact, they made them scapegoats. And they did this most likely because other people who worked closely with Soviet intelligence and actively passed on atomic secrets failed to capture, arrest and bring to justice. And here the US intelligence services had, albeit indirect, but still a clue to justify themselves for their failures in front of the American public. It is known that the US government several times gave them the task to check and prove the involvement of specific individuals in the transfer of atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. But every time the investigation ended unsuccessfully. American intelligence agencies were furious that information was being leaked, but no one was being caught. And the leak was initiated by Oppenheimer. He gave access to classified materials to people whose sympathies were on the side of the Soviet Union. This is how, in my opinion, the widely publicized "Case" of the

Rosenberg spouses arose. However, it played a fatal role in their fate, as

recalls a veteran of Soviet intelligence P. Massya, a major mistake of the heads of scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR Ministry of State Security Kvasnikov, Barkovsky and Rain - to send operative I. Kamenev to communicate with the Rosenberg courier Harry Gold, who was already interrogated by

American counterintelligence at that time. Why did the American intelligence agencies fail to find the source of the information leak? Most likely because they relied only on technical listening and interception techniques and did not have reliable agents among scientists at all. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the scientific team was too heterogeneous, there were many foreigners in it. It also had an effect that at first the special services went on the wrong path - they concentrated their efforts on finding German spies and only in 1943-1944 began to seriously find out who had what sympathies. First of all, those who were loyal to the communists fell under suspicion. And time was lost. In 1945-1946, our active operations began to wane. True, American counterintelligence officers managed to find some of our connections. And they even tried to run disinformation through them. However, this achieved almost nothing. The train, as they say,

has already left. For example, one of the employees of the Soviet residency in New York, who oversaw Lend-Lease deliveries, A. Rain (in 1947-1949 he headed the scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR Ministry of State Security) received more than 50 secret documents on the development of atomic weapons from FBI agents substituted for him. These documents contained intricate misinformation. But the scientific level of their compilers was low. Giving them a correct description of the work on the atomic bomb, they entered incorrect formulas and calculations about the experiments carried out. The examination carried out by Academicians A. Ioffe and I. Kurchatov made it possible to establish the nature of the transferred documents and to reveal the misinformation contained in them. All these documents are in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The question arises: is this the reason the FBI stubbornly refuses to make public their materi



Meanwhile, as a result of the investigation, it was revealed that the secrecy regime was grossly violated at the Los Alamos laboratory. Was it done consciously or unconsciously? Apparently deliberately. Otherwise, why would it be that the documents of this investigation are still hidden from journalists. It seems that, as I said above, shame literally haunts the American intelligence services because they failed to prevent the leakage of critical information. Of course,

the American intelligence services in every possible way denied and continue to deny the version that prominent Western scientists who were involved in the atomic project shared secret information with the Soviet Union. This point of view is shared by some of our publicists and even historians of Soviet intelligence. In particular, Vladimir Barkovsky, colonel of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, who is currently writing the history of intelligence, in one of his interviews given to Komsomolskaya Pravda (September 19, 1995), claims that great scientists such as R. Oppenheimer and N. Bohr, did not give us atomic secrets. But then what about the most obvious facts?

For example, in a cipher telegram dated November 13, 1945, it is directly indicated that our residency is sending documents that were later omitted in the official publication of the Smith Atomic Energy Commission. The cipher telegram contains the names of Oppenheimer and his brother Frank, with whose help it was possible to fill the gap in report.

This report contained a section on the nuclear reactor. Oppenheimer strongly objected to the publication of the report in a truncated form. He believed that in this way the world community and, in particular, scientists working on the atomic bomb were disoriented. A colleague of V. Barkovsky, Colonel of Foreign Intelligence A. Feklisov, who kept in touch with K. Fuchs in 1945-1949 in England, wrote about this in his memoirs in 1991.

And here is another case. He is already well known. Employees of the Soviet intelligence - Y. Terletsky and Vasilevsky - went to N. Bor. Their task was - now it is already known for sure - to try to establish the authenticity of some scientific reports on the atomic problem, which they managed to get with the help of undercover connections. By that time, to Moscow through A. Rain, more on this above

mentioned, there was a large flow of misinformation. Terletsky and Vasilevsky arrived in Denmark, where N. Bor was. Terletsky met the scientist at an official reception at the embassy. Bor soon received Terletsky twice. He gave him Smith's open report. But what was especially important, he commented on it and answered more than twenty questions. Moreover, all his answers went beyond the scope of the official report of the Smith Commission. Some of them touched upon the most important points. In particular, the types of nuclear reactors. Bohr was able to obtain confirmation that reactors can be of two types - heavy water and graphite. This information was extremely important. In 1993, Terletsky, in an interview with English

television, described a meeting with Niels Bohr. He cited the words of the scientist that were said to him then that in order to balance forces in the world, the Russians should create their own atomic bomb as soon as possible.

Bohr was never coerced, nobody recruited, nobody ever considered him to be some kind of agent of influence or anything like that. But he showed that he was concerned about the fate of the future world, and he understood perfectly well what could happen if the atomic bomb ended up in someone's hands alone. It is these and not some other motives that can explain the desire of the great scientist to help the Soviet Union.

By the way, an independent examination of the questions (asked to Bor Terletsky and contained in the transcript, which recently became public), conducted by the physicist D. Sarfatti, a student of one of the creators of the atomic bomb, the famous physicist H. Bethe, revealed that the questions indicated a high level of awareness of Soviet specialists about the nature of the problems that need to be solved when creating an atomic bomb. Bohr did not inform

either the British or the American intelligence services about the nature of the questions asked, and thereby concealed the fact that the USSR was on the way to building an atomic bomb. He led his own line, he ensured the interests of scientific exchange. And it was precisely this circumstance that Soviet intelligence took advantage

of. We must pay tribute to the people working in it, and their ingenuity. Under the guise of scientists, they received valuable information. Moreover, this was not done at the last stage of obtaining materials on the creation of atomic weapons, but immediately: the intelligence officers

- go to the scientific circles related to the creation of atomic weapons. Such actions of our intelligence created the illusion among prominent Western scientists that they were dealing with representatives of the Soviet scientific community, but not intelligence officers, and even more so.

illegal immigrants.

Of course, the American intelligence services would like to refute all these facts that have now become known. And indeed, so far not a single major American newspaper has written a single line about Veksel-R. Oppenheimer, or about N. Bohr and their attitude to nuclear secrets. Today we are raising these layers not so that a "witch hunt" begins in America, but in order to better understand what the scientists involved in the creation of nuclear weapons were thinking about and how they acted, knowing full well how things could end if nuclear the bomb will be in someone's hands alone. Of course, the information obtained by Soviet intelligence officers, as my father

claimed, contributed to the accelerated creation of nuclear weapons in our country. Personally, I have no doubts here. I must note that the authority of the father, who for us, the Sudoplatov brothers, was always high in the family and, one might even say, indisputable, does not put pressure on me at all. It would be naive to reject the formula "information contributed" at all levels. Yes, it really contributed to the fact that we had our own atomic bomb.

So, was there a conspiracy of scientists at the end of the 30s, when science came close to the practical implementation of the project for obtaining atomic energy? Or was there an informal agreement among nuclear physicists to share information among themselves? There are no documents for this. But the scandalous stories of atomic espionage, which are interpreted by everyone in their own way, stubbornly hush up one very serious fact. It is also hushed up by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia. Maybe because you do not want to belittle your merits?

The fact is that there is accurate information that, in addition to the Soviet Union, Swedish scientists also received exhaustive materials on the creation of the atomic bomb, including its engineering solution. Moreover, it was precisely in the same period as the Soviet ones. Based on these facts, one can more or less safely speak of

that there was an informal agreement among scientists that nuclear weapons should never be the monopoly of any particular political group. Niels Bohr, Igor Kurchatov, Sonya Kuczynski, Lev

Landau, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Enrico Fermi, Klaus Fuchs, Anatoly Yatskov and Pavel Sudoplatov... These names mean nothing to some, but for some they still are something like a signal: attention is an atomic bomb. It is these and many, many other persons who in one way or another are involved in the atomic bomb created in our country. Some of them, like, say, Niels Bohr or Igor Kurchatov, have long been known to the whole world. The names of others are just flaring up in the sky of fame. These are our scouts, some of whom, risking their lives, obtained the secrets of atomic weapons. Whose names do we not yet know? Soviet intelligence really worked very actively in the post-war years, especially during

the period of the Cold War aggravation. It was necessary not to overlook the preparations for a surprise atomic attack on the USSR, to monitor the improvement of strategic offensive weapons, to reveal the plans and intentions of Western countries on key international problems. Separately, it is necessary to dwell on intelligence in the field of science, technology and economics. A typical example is the extraction of secrets on atomic weapons. Now there are many open publications on this issue. There are different versions of why the Soviet Union managed to create its own atomic bomb in a relatively short time, thereby depriving the Americans of the opportunity to blackmail the USSR, or even deliver an atomic strike with impunity, which the Pentagon had specific plans for. By 1939, scientists from Germany, England, the USA and France came close to the problem of splitting the atom and obtaining a new source of energy.

Research in this direction before the start of the Great Patriotic War was carried out in the USSR. Ya. Zeldovich, I. Khariton and others managed to achieve certain successes. Through foreign intelligence, information was received that in Germany, Great Britain and the United States, intensive research was underway to create new super-powerful weapons, which forced the Soviet leadership to take this problem with the utmost seriousness.

Initially, research on the uranium problem was carried out separately, in various laboratories and institutes. Only in April 1943 was the Central Laboratory No. 2 for the atomic problem under the Academy of Sciences of the USSR headed by Professor I. V. Kurchatov formed. All work on atomic research began to come to him, including secret intelligence information from the United States and Great Britain, obtained through intelligence from the intelligence services of the General Staff of the Red Army and the NKVD-NKGB.

On July 3, 1943, the GKO considered the issue of the state of intelligence work. It was decided to separate the functions and activities of the GRU and the First Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. In particular, the foreign intelligence service of the People's Commissariat of State Security was assigned the leading role in obtaining information on the creation of atomic weapons (the Enormas project). In accordance with the decree of the GKO, military intelligence was obliged to transfer to the NKGB all information, as well as agents on the atomic project. In turn, the department of scientific and technical progress of the First Directorate received the status of an independent department.

Before the foreign intelligence agencies on the atomic problem were specific tasks were set:

- determine the circle of countries conducting practical work on the creation of atomic weapons; promptly inform the Center about the content of these works; through their own intelligence capabilities, to acquire the necessary scientific and technical information that contributes to the creation of such weapons in the USSR.

In February 1944, a special group "C" (Sudoplatov) was created as part of the NKVD to translate and process information on the atomic project, obtained through operational intelligence. So my father was closely tied to our nuclear project.

On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb in history exploded over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The presence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a new potential adversary posed a task of paramount importance for the Soviet government - to create their own atomic weapons as soon as possible.

On August 20, 1945, to coordinate efforts to solve this problem, a Special Committee on Problem No. 1 was formed under

GKO, and then under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria. The working apparatus of the Special Committee was the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, headed by the People's Commissar of

Ammunition of the USSR B. L. Vannikov. The work of the Special Committee went in two directions - scientific, led by Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR I.V. Kurchatov, and intelligence, which was directly supervised by the former head of the NKVD. On September 27, 1945, on the basis of group "C" in the system of the NKVD of the USSR, an independent department "C" was created, which was engaged in the translation, processing and generalization of intelligence on nuclear topics received from foreign intelligence. On January 10, 1946, the department was transferred to the NKGB, and then to the USSR Ministry of State Security. Reporting directly to the Minister of State Security, the head of department "C" was also the head of the 2nd (information) bureau of the Special Committee. On May 30, 1947, department "C" was withdrawn from the MGB of the USSR.

During their activity, the organizers of the "atomic intelligence" P. M. Fitin, my father - P. A. Sudoplatov L. P. Vasilevsky, V. M. Zarubin, E. Yu. Zarubina, G. B. Ovakimyan, L. R. Kvasnikov, S. M. Semenov, A. S. Feklisov, V. G. Fisher (R. I. Abel), G. M. Kheifets, A. A. Yatskov, Soviet intelligence assistants Klaus Fuchs, Donald McLane, Morris and Leontina Cohen, Harry Gold, David Gringlas, as well as many and many others, rendered Soviet science, as I. V. Kurchatov later wrote, "invaluable assistance", allowing scientists to test the first domestic plutonium bomb on August 29, 1949, and in 1953 to create the world's first thermonuclear bomb, overtaking the United States in the next round of the arms race.

In 1996, A.S. Feklisov, L.R. Kvasnikov, A.A. Yatskov, and L. Cohen were awarded the title Hero of Russia for their outstanding contribution to ensuring the nuclear security of the state.

The appearance of the atomic bomb in our country in 1949 kept American reaction, led by President Truman, from the temptation to use nuclear weapons against us, and therefore saved us from disaster, American leaders from crime, American

people from shame. The fact that everything ended so happily is a great merit of the intelligence agencies of state security. My

father described this area of activity of the Soviet intelligence services in sufficient detail in his memoirs: "In 1943,

the world-famous physicist Niels Bohr, who fled from Denmark occupied by the Germans to Sweden, asked prominent scientists Elizaveta Meitner and Alfven who were there to inform Soviet representatives and scientists, in particular Kapitsa, that the German physicist Heisenberg visited him and said: in Germany, the issue of creating atomic weapons is being discussed. Heisenberg invited the international scientific community to abandon the creation of these weapons, despite pressure from governments. I do not remember whether Meitner or Alfven met in Gothenburg with a TASS correspondent and our intelligence officer Kosy and told him that Bohr was concerned about the possible creation of atomic weapons in Nazi Germany. Similar information from Bohr, even before his flight from Denmark, was received by British intelligence. Western scientists highly appreciated the scientific potential

of Soviet physicists, they were well aware of such prominent scientists as Ioffe, Kapitsa, and they sincerely believed that by providing information to the Soviet Union about atomic secrets and by joining forces, they could overtake the Germans in creating an atomic bomb.

Back in 1940, Soviet scientists, having learned about rumors circulating in Western Europe about working on super-powerful weapons, took the first steps to identify the possibility of creating an atomic bomb. However, they believed that the creation of such weapons was theoretically possible, but hardly feasible in practice in the near future. The Commission of the Academy of Sciences for the Study of the Problems of Atomic Energy, chaired by Academician Khlopin, a specialist in radiochemistry, nonetheless recommended that the government and scientific institutions follow the scientific publications of Western experts on this problem.

"Although the government did not allocate funds for atomic research," my father recalled, "Kvasnikov, head of the scientific and technical intelligence department of the NKVD, sent an orientation to residencies in Scandinavia, Germany, England and the United States, obliging

collect all the information on the development of a "superweapon" - a uranium bomb. This initiative of Kvasnikov is connected with other dramatic events, when physicists in Germany, the USA and England began to study the possibilities of creating nuclear weapons long before the organization by the American government of a special center for the creation of an atomic bomb in Los Alamos. In the autumn of 1939, leading

German physicists led by E. Schumann (a close relative of the famous composer) were united in the "Uranium Society" under the control of army weapons, which, in particular, included Werner Heisenberg, Karl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Paul Gratek, Otto Hahn, Wilhelm Groth and others. The Berlin Physics Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society became the scientific center for atomic research, and Professor Heisenberg was appointed its rector. Physicochemical institutions of Hamburg, Greifswald, Leipzig, institutes of Heidelberg and Rostock universities were involved in scientific developments.

Within two years, the Heisenberg group carried out the initial theoretical studies and experiments necessary to create an atomic reactor using uranium and heavy water. It was also found that an isotope of uranium-238 - uranium-235, contained in ordinary uranium ore, can serve as an explosive. The planned research in Germany

required sufficient supplies of uranium, the production of heavy water or pure graphite. For laboratory development, there was enough ore supplied from the Jáchymov deposit from Czechoslovakia, but in the future much more uranium was required. Even more difficult was the situation with heavy water. However, the problem was soon resolved. After the occupation of Belgium in the spring of 1940, the Germans seized about 1200 tons of uranium concentrate at the Union Minier enrichment plant, which amounted to almost half of the world's available uranium reserves. Another part of the stock in September of the same year was smuggled from the Congo to New York. With the occupation of Norway, the Norsk-Hydro plant in Rjukan, at that time the only one in the world, was in the hands of the German leaders of the nuclear project.



manufacturer and supplier of heavy water. On the eve of the occupation, 185 kilograms of heavy water were exported at the request of Joliot-Curie to Paris, the same products then end up in

the United States. In December 1940, under the leadership of Heisenberg, the construction of the first experimental reactor was completed, and the Auergesellschaft company mastered the production of metallic uranium in Oranienburg. Simultaneously, in the secret laboratories of Siemens, a search began for ways to industrially purify graphite to use it as a neutron moderator in a reactor in the absence of heavy water, and the design of the electric power supply for the project was also launched. It

is significant that almost at the same time, by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD in April 1940, the famous German physicist F. Houtermans was expelled from the USSR. He worked for a long time at the Physico-Technical Institute in Kharkov, in particular, with the famous physicist Landau, and dealt with issues of nuclear physics. Houtermans was arrested in December 1937 "as a suspicious foreigner pretending to be an anti-fascist refugee." The greatest physicists of the world spoke in defense of Houtermans: Bohr, Einstein, Joliot-Curie. While imprisoned, Houtermans agreed to cooperate with the NKVD after his return to Germany. This circumstance was purely formal. Houtermans, as a communist sympathizer, was immediately arrested by the Gestapo. Nevertheless, at the request of German physicists, he was soon released from prison and engaged in scientific work in Germany.

A turn in the fate of Houtermans, however, led to a sharp intensification of all research on the possibilities of creating atomic weapons in the USA and England in 1941. Houtermans instructed his confidant, the German physicist F. Reich, who left Germany in 1941, to inform physicists about the actual start of work in Nazi Germany on the creation of atomic weapons.

Hovakimyan, our intelligence resident in New York, informed the intelligence leadership in April 1941 about a meeting between a refugee from Nazi Germany and the most prominent physicists of the Western world who were in the United States, during which the enormous potential military significance of the uranium problem was discussed. However

on the eve of the war, these materials were not given significant values.

My father noted that "great success in this priority area of our intelligence activities was achieved after we sent Zarubin (Cooper) to Washington as a resident - under the cover of the post of secretary of the embassy Zubilin - along with his wife Lisa, an intelligence veteran.

Stalin received Zarubin on October 12, 1941, on the eve of his departure for Washington. Then the Germans were near Moscow. Stalin told Zarubin that his main task next year was our political influence on the United States through agents of influence.

Until that time, intelligence work to collect political information in America was minimal, since the USSR had no conflicting interests with the United States in the geopolitical sphere. But at the beginning of the war, the Kremlin was very concerned about the data from the United States that American government circles were considering the possibility of recognizing the Kerensky government as the legitimate power in Russia in the event of the defeat of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany, and the Soviet leadership realized the importance and necessity of obtaining information about the intentions American government, as the US participation in the war against Hitler was of great importance.

"Zarubin had to create a large-scale and effective undercover intelligence system not only to track events, but also to influence them," my father recalled on this occasion. "However, intelligence materials from England, the USA, Scandinavia and Germany on the development of atomic weapons that arrived at the Center over the course of a year and a half radically changed the direction of our efforts. Less

than a month before Zarubin's departure, the British diplomat MacLean, our trusted agent from the Cambridge group, then working under the pseudonym List, reported documented evidence that the British government was paying serious attention to the development of a bomb of incredible destructive power based on the action of atomic energy.

Since 1939 I have been in charge of intelligence operations involving the use of the famous Cambridge group, including the developments on Philby and McLean. In July 1939 I received

the decision to renew ties with McLean, Philby, Burges, Cairncross and Blunt, although they may have been exposed by Alexander Orlov, who had fled to the West. When France

was defeated in June 1940, MacLean, who worked at the British Embassy in France, returned to London to work at the Foreign Office. In London, he acted under the operational leadership of the resident Gorsky (one of his pseudonyms Vadim). On September 16, 1941, the British War Cabinet (as the Cabinet

of Ministers was called during the war) considered a special report on the creation of a uranium bomb within two years. The uranium bomb project was called "Pipe Alloy". Enormous funds were allocated to the large British concern Imperial Chemical Industries for these works. McLean handed over to Soviet intelligence a sixty-page report from the British War Cabinet discussing the project. Further, the father elaborated: "Our other source, an agent from Imperial Chemical Industries, said that the management of the concern is considering the issue of an atomic bomb

only in theoretical

terms. At the same time, we learned that the British Chiefs of Staff also decided to build an atomic bomb plant. Our resident in London, Gorsky, urgently asked the Center to conduct an examination of the materials sent to us." Initially, scientists gave a negative conclusion on these materials. Since Soviet scientists considered the issue of atomic weapons only as a theoretical possibility, the intelligence authorities were not surprised that the information on the uranium bomb was contradictory. Our intelligence activities in the

United States at that time were aimed at countering Germany and Japan. Heifetz, a resident in San Francisco, tried to recruit agents in the United States for later use in Germany, but did not achieve significant results, since he had connections mainly in the Jewish communities of the American Pacific coast.

The tasks of Kheyfets and Zarubin included the neutralization of the anti-Soviet activities of the white emigration in the United States, represented by

such figures as Kerensky, the former prime minister of the Provisional Government, and Chernov, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, expelled from Russia by Lenin's

decree in 1922. The fact is that the USSR began to receive aid under Lend-Lease, and it was extremely important to create the most favorable impression of our country in the eyes of the Americans, especially since the Roosevelt government reacted very painfully to criticism of its ties with the Soviet Union, heard in Congress and on the pages of newspapers. In Moscow, they tried to reveal to what extent this criticism was inspired by white emigration. Father clarified:

“However, all

this faded into the background when Kheifets and our operative Semyonov reported that the American authorities intended to involve outstanding scientists, including Nobel Prize winners, in the development of a top secret problem, and for this purpose the government allocates twenty percent of the total amount of expenses for military-technical research. Heifetz also said that the prominent physicist Oppenheimer and his colleagues, connected with the illegal network of the US Communist Party, were leaving California and leaving for a new place to carry out work on the creation of an atomic bomb.

Until February 1942, I served as deputy head of foreign intelligence and remember these reports. They contained exceptionally important information that contributed to changing our skeptical attitude towards the atomic problem. The decision of the Americans to allocate such large sums to the atomic project during this dangerous

period of the war for the Allies convinced us that it was of vital importance and could actually

completed.

Heifetz and Oppenheimer first met in December 1941 in San Francisco at a fundraising meeting to help refugees and veterans of the Spanish Civil War. Kheifetz attended this meeting in his capacity as Soviet vice-consul. He spoke English, German and French well and was an outstanding personality. As early as the 1930s, as a deputy resident in Italy, he noticed and began the primary development of Fermi and his young student Pontecorvo, who stood out for their

anti-fascist views and could become sources of scientific and technical information.

My father told me that he met Kheifets in the 1930s, when he came to Moscow, and immediately fell under his charm, which was combined with the high professionalism of a scout. Kheifets worked for some time as Krupskaya's secretary. His father was one of the founders of the US Communist Party when he worked in the Comintern. While illegal in Germany, Heifetz graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Jena and received an engineering degree. Heifetz, as a Jew, risked his head in Germany, but his dark skin allowed him to use false papers from an Indian refugee student studying in Germany. Heifetz moved in various circles in San Francisco, was highly

respected by the communists and the "left" (they called him "Mr. Brown"). Mrs. Bramson's secular salon patronized by him was often visited by Robert Oppenheimer and his brother Frank, who were illegal members of the US Communist Party. Heifetz told my father that he met Oppenheimer and his wife twice for a cocktail party. By that time, Heifetz had already heard rumors about the start of work on a superbomb, but Moscow still doubted the importance and urgency of the atomic problem.

At the same time, Heifetz reported that Oppenheimer mentioned a secret letter from Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt in 1939, in which he drew his attention to the need for research to create new weapons in connection with the threat of fascism.

Oppenheimer was disappointed that there was no quick response from the authorities to Einstein's letter and that the work was progressing slowly. An experienced

professional, Heifetz knew perfectly well how to win over Oppenheimer. There was no question of offering him money, resorting to threats or blackmail using compromising materials. Through personal charm, he established a trusting relationship with Oppenheimer through his brother Frank, discussing the difficult situation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the threat of fascism hanging over the world. In the traditional sense of the word, Oppenheimer,

Fermi and Szilard were never Soviet agents. This was also stated by Kvasnikov,

who headed the Soviet scientific and technical intelligence in 1947-1960: "The scientists who worked with our intelligence could not be called agents."

Heifetz's information was extremely important. The Center instructed Semyonov (code name Twain) to check the messages received from Heifetz. Semyonov had to identify the main scientists involved in the work on the top-secret project, and determine the specific role of each. Semyonov came to the state security

agencies in 1937. He was one of the few who had a higher technical education, and he was sent to study in the USA, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in order to be later used in the line of scientific and technical intelligence. He operated effectively as an operative under the direct supervision of Ovakimyan, who worked under the guise of the Soviet foreign trade firm Amtorg in New York. It was Semenov and his assistant Kurnakov who managed to establish strong contacts with physicists close to Oppenheimer from Los Alamos who worked in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s and had connections in Russian and anti-fascist emigration in the United States. Thus, the main channel for information on the atomic bomb began to operate regularly. It was Semyonov who attracted the Cohens, who acted as couriers, to cooperate. Lona Cohen handed over to the USSR in 1945 the most important scientific materials on the design of the atomic bomb.

Semyonov, using his connections at MIT, identified which of the prominent scientists were involved in the so-called "Manhattan Project" to build the atomic bomb, and independently of Heifetz reported in the spring of 1942 that not only scientists, but also the American government was showing serious interest to this problem. Semyonov also reported that a well-known expert in explosives, Kistiakovsky, a Ukrainian by nationality, was participating in the project. An order was immediately given to use agents among Russian

emigrants to ensure approaches to Kistyakovsky. However, two important agents in the United States are the former general of the tsarist army, Yakhontov, who is married to the sister of the wife of the Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov, who emigrated to the United States after the Civil War, and

Sergei Kurnakov, a veteran of the GPU's emigration operations in the United States, failed to attract Kistyakovsky.

For some time, Semyonov was in touch with the spouses Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, attracted to cooperation with our intelligence service by Hovakimyan in the 30s. The scientific and technical information of the Rosenbergs was not significant - they and their relatives were a safety net, far from the main operations. Later, their arrest and trial attracted worldwide attention. Semenov probably played the main role in creating a channel for the receipt of

intelligence information on the atomic bomb, through which in 1941-1945 the SSR received, as Terletsky writes in his memoirs, American secret reports, as well as English materials describing the main experiments to determine the parameters nuclear reactions, reactors, various types of uranium boilers, diffusion separation plants, diary entries on atomic bomb tests, etc.

In March 1942, McLean provided the Soviet intelligence services with documentary data on intensive work on the atomic problem in England. In the same year, Fuchs was recruited by Soviet military intelligence to cooperate. Important events have

also taken place in our country. In May 1942, Stalin received a letter from a young physicist, a specialist in nuclear reactions, the future academician Flerov, who drew attention to the suspicious absence of open scientific publications on the uranium problem in the foreign press since 1940, and this, in his opinion, testified to the beginning of work on the creation of atomic weapons in Germany and other countries. Flerov warned that the Germans might be the first to create an atomic bomb.

The receipt of this letter coincided in time with the information of the Soviet residency from Kharkov occupied by the Germans. In particular, it was reported that F. Houtermans, a former political emigrant in the USSR, arrived in Kharkov on a special mission sent by the German military command to obtain additional data from the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology on the use of Soviet research on the uranium problem for military purposes. Houtermans during the period of the German occupation of Kharkov actually became one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Physics and

technical institute. Agents reported that Houtermans arrived in Kharkov "in SS uniform." Academician Kapitsa was immediately

informed about the appearance of Houtermans in Kharkov and Kiev as part of the German commission for the dismantling of scientific equipment, and he attached great importance to this fact, indicating that this confirms the development of work in Germany on the creation of a uranium bomb. My father was assigned

to find out everything about atomic developments in Germany, who at that time was organizing the partisan movement and collecting intelligence information on Germany and Japan. About this new task for him, his father spoke

as follows: "Information from agents received in business and manifested circles in Sweden was contradictory. In Germany and Scandinavia, rumors stubbornly circulated about the work of the Germans on the "superweapon", but we did not know any details about these works. Only after the war did it become clear that "superweapon" meant a two-stage missile based on the V-2 model, which could reach the coast of the United States. Information on the atomic bomb, received from the United States and

England, coincided. It was confirmed when we received a message about the possibility of creating an atomic bomb from the words of the prominent nuclear physicist Elisabeth Meitner. Meitner has been on the radar of our intelligence ever since the question arose in 1938 of the possibility of her coming to the Soviet Union to work. Then she had to flee Nazi Germany to Sweden, where Niels Bohr helped her get a job at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences. The female agents who came out to Meitner were instructed by the deputy resident of the NKVD in Stockholm, Zoya Rybkina, at the direction of Beria.

In March 1942, Beria sent Stalin all the information received from the United States, England, Scandinavia and occupied Kharkov. In the letter, he indicated that scientific work was underway in America and England to create atomic weapons.

In February 1943, when the British secret services conducted a sabotage operation in the Norwegian Vemork, where there was a heavy water plant needed for an atomic reactor, Stalin believed that the atomic project was gaining real content. ABOUT



details of the sabotage were given to us by our sources in Norway, Philby and the Cambridge group from London. I did not attach much importance to these reports, because the damage from it seemed to me insignificant, and I was surprised when Beria ordered me to take note of this operation. Naturally, he was alarmed that, despite the agreement with the British on the joint use of our agent groups in Scandinavia, Western Europe and Afghanistan for major sabotage and sabotage operations, the British did not ask us to support their raid in Vemork. This indicated that the British attached special importance to the sabotage operation in Norway. Until the beginning of 1943, we did not carry out any practical work in the field of creating an atomic bomb. Even before the

German attack, the State Commission for Military-Industrial Research rejected the proposals of young nuclear physicists from the Institute of Physical and Technical Research in Kharkov and the German emigre scientist Lange to begin work on the creation of a super-powerful explosive device. The proposal was sent to the department of inventions of the People's Commissariat of Defense, but it was considered premature and was not supported. In March 1942, Beria suggested to Stalin that a scientific advisory group of prominent scientists and senior officials be created under the State Defense Committee to coordinate the work of scientific organizations for the study of atomic energy. He also asked Stalin for permission to acquaint our prominent scientists with information on the atomic problem, obtained through secret agents, in order to evaluate it. Stalin gave his consent and proposed that several scholars, independently of each other, give an opinion on this issue.

On the problem of creating an atomic bomb in the near future, on the one hand, Academician Ioffe and his young student Professor Kurchatov, who were acquainted with intelligence materials, spoke out, on the other hand, Academician Kapitsa (he was informed orally about the work on the atomic bomb in the USA, England and Germany).

Ioffe was involved in research on atomic energy on the advice of Academician Vernadsky. He was known to Western scientists because in the 1920s and 1930s he made study trips to the laboratories of Western Europe and the USA. In 1934, while in Belgium, Ioffe turned down an offer to go to work in the United States, although at that time

contradictions in our scientific circles between physicists sharply escalated. Moscow and Leningrad scientists clashed especially sharply. An irreconcilable position towards the Ioffe school was taken, in particular, by some influential professors of Moscow University. This went on for over a year. My father recalled, in particular, how a Moscow professor said to him: "Pavel Anatolyevich, why are you consulting with these figures from the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology? It's a gang!"

Ioffe appreciated the enormous importance of information about atomic research in America and supported the need to start work on the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb. Subsequently, Ioffe played a prominent role in settling conflicts between scientists at Moscow University and the Academy of Sciences, and he was one of the initiators of the creation, shortly after the war, of the three main qualifications for atomic research. Kapitsa believed that the problem

of creating an atomic bomb posed a challenge to modern physics and its solution was possible only through the joint efforts of our scientists and scientists from the USA and England, where fundamental research on atomic energy is being carried out.

My father said that in October 1942, at his dacha in Kuntsevo, Stalin received only Vernadsky and Ioffe. Vernadsky, referring to an informal agreement between the world's leading physicists on joint work, suggested that Stalin turn to Niels Bohr and other scientists who emigrated to the United States, as well as to the American and British governments, with a request to share information with us and work together on atomic energy. To this, Stalin replied that scientists are politically naive if they think that Western governments will provide us with information on weapons that will make it possible in the future to dominate the world. However, Stalin agreed that the official probing approach to Western specialists on behalf of our scientists could turn out to be

useful.

After this meeting, as Vannikov, People's Commissar of Ammunition, one of the leaders of the atomic program, later testified, for the first time the country's leadership was finally convinced of the real possibility of creating atomic weapons, and Stalin was so fascinated by the powerful destructive potential of the atomic bomb that in the end

In October 1942, he proposed giving a code name to the plan of our counteroffensive near Stalingrad - Operation Uranus.

On the basis of information from London from a source in the Imperial Chemical Industries concern, which played an important role in the English Pipe Alloy project, Stalin ordered Pervukhin, the People's Commissar for the chemical industry, to give the most serious support to scientists in the work on creating atomic weapons.

A year has passed. Kapitsa, informed by the NKVD in 1942-1943 about the Houtermans mission in occupied Kharkov and the beginning of work in the USA and Germany on atomic weapons, several times turned to Stalin and Beria with proposals to invite Bohr to head our atomic program. In agreement with Molotov, he wrote a letter to Bohr, in which he asked him to come to the Soviet Union, where he was guaranteed the best conditions for work. When Bohr was in England, he was invited to the Soviet embassy, where he met Gorsky, a resident of the NKVD, who acted under the guise of an adviser to the embassy, but during the conversation Bohr avoided discussing issues of atomic research. At the end of January 1943, information was received from

Semenov (Twain) that in December 1942 in Chicago, Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction. A source who collaborated with the NKVD, the young Pontecorvo, reported Fermi's phenomenal success with the conditional phrase: "The Italian navigator reached the New World." However, this information was of the most general nature, and a few months later Kurchatov requested additional materials on the first nuclear reaction. At the same time, Barkovsky handed over from London closed scientific works of

Western scientists on atomic energy for 1940-1942. These first scientific materials confirmed that Western scientists had made great progress in building the atomic bomb.

Thus, the Soviet intelligence services had not only verbal reports, but also minutes of discussions at meetings of the British War Cabinet on the prospects for using atomic energy to create super-powerful weapons.

In 1943, Vasilevsky was appointed resident in Mexico City. He was quite suitable for this job: he had experience of the war in Spain, where he commanded a subversive partisan detachment; he successfully

performed undercover operations in 1939–1941 in Paris; he adapted to life in the West, was always well dressed, smart, spoke French and Spanish, had an extraordinary ability to win over people and attract cooperation under a convenient pretext. Vasilevsky managed to restore ties with agents in the United States and

Mexico, attracted by Eitingon and Grigulevich to carry out the operation to eliminate Trotsky.

In 1939-1941, during his stay in the United States, Eitingon was granted the emergency right to recruit and involve people for cooperation without the sanction of the Center, using family ties. Vasilevsky and the agents were known, since he was one of the active participants in the operation in Mexico. Before leaving for Mexico, he received special permission to use these people. Through such channels, mothballed for some time, Vasilevsky established contact with Pontecorvo in Canada and some specialists from the Chicago Fermi Laboratory, bypassing the Soviet residency in New York. Pontecorvo told Vasilevsky that Fermi was positive about the idea of sharing information on atomic energy with scientists from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

On February 11, 1943, Stalin signed a government decree on the organization of work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Molotov headed this business. At the same time, it was decided, in view of the importance of the atomic problem, to make it a priority in the activities of the NKVD intelligence. Beria initially acted as Molotov's deputy and was responsible for providing the military and scientists with intelligence information. My father recalled how Beria ordered him to acquaint Ioffe, Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov with scientific materials obtained through undercover means, without disclosing the sources of information: "Kikoin, having read the report on the first nuclear chain reaction, was

unusually excited and, although I did not tell him whoever carried it out reacted immediately: "This is Fermi's work. He is the only scientist in the world who can create such a miracle." I had to show them some of the original materials in English. In order not to disclose specific sources of information, I have closed

with the palm of the hand that part of the document where the signatures were and the sources were listed. The scientists said excitedly: "Listen, Pavel Anatolyevich, you are too naive. We know who in the world of physics is capable of what. You give us your materials, and we will tell you who the authors are." Ioffe immediately named the author Frisch based on other materials. I immediately reported this to Beria and received permission to disclose sources of information to Ioffe, Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov.

In April 1943, a special laboratory No. 2 on the atomic problem was created at the USSR Academy of Sciences, with Kurchatov appointed its head. He was barely forty years old. It was a bold decision. But the American atomic project was led by the forty-four-year-old Oppenheimer, who did not have the title of Nobel laureate. Soviet physicists of the older generation could not believe that Bohr and Fermi were working under Oppenheimer. Already in December 1943, on the direct orders of Stalin, Kurchatov was elected a full member of the Academy of Sciences.

Having received from the NKVD a report on the first nuclear chain reaction carried out by Fermi, Kurchatov turned to Pervukhin with a request to instruct the intelligence agencies to clarify a number of important questions about the state of atomic research in the United States. In this regard, as mentioned above, the reorganization of the activities of the intelligence services of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the NKVD was carried out. For five years, in 1940-1945, scientific and technical intelligence was carried out by special units and departments of the Red Army Intelligence Department and the First Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB, of which my father was deputy

head until February 1942. In 1944, it was decided that the NKVD would coordinate the activities of intelligence on the atomic problem. In addition to coordinating the activities of the Intelligence Agency and the NKVD in collecting information on the atomic problem, the group, and later the department, were entrusted with the functions of implementing the data received within the country. A lot of work on processing the incoming scientific and technical information on the atomic bomb was carried out by the employees of the department "C" Zoya Zarubina, Zemskov, Massya, Groznova, Pokrovsky. Zarubina and Zemskov, under the leadership of Terletsky, translated the most important materials on the design of nuclear reactors and

Zoya Zarubina had extensive experience in operational and translation work, participated in the events of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the allies in 1945. Qualified specialists and

scientists who worked in the "C" department regularly reported on the received intelligence materials at the meetings of the committee and the scientific and technical council.

Kurchatov and the scientists of his group often visited Beria, discussing the organization of work in accordance with the information received from the NKVD. In fact, Kurchatov and Ioffe put before Stalin the question of replacing Molotov Beria as the head of all work on the atomic problem.

Soviet scientists, in order to speed up scientific work on atomic energy, were very interested in regularly getting acquainted with the progress of these works in the USA. In a letter dated March 7, 1943, to Pervukhin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR,

Kurchatov wrote: "Obtaining this material is of tremendous, invaluable importance for our state and science. Now we have important guidelines for subsequent scientific research, they enable us to bypass many, very laborious phases of the development of the uranium problem and learn about new scientific and technical ways to solve it.

Kurchatov emphasized that "the totality of information ... indicates the technical possibility of solving the entire problem in a much shorter time than our scientists think, who are still unfamiliar with the progress of work on this problem abroad."

In another letter, dated March 22, 1943, Kurchatov reported that he had carefully considered the latest work of the Americans on transuranium elements and had established a new direction in solving the entire uranium problem. "Until now," writes Kurchatov, "no work on transuranium elements has been carried out in our country. In this regard, I appeal to you with a request to instruct the intelligence agencies to find out what has been done in the direction in question in America.

Sources of information and agents in England and the United States, working for the Soviet Union, obtained 286 secret scientific documents and classified publications on atomic energy. In his notes in March—

In April 1943, Kurchatov named the seven most important scientific centers and 26 specialists in the United States, receiving information from which was of great importance. From the point of view of intelligence activities, this meant the operational development of American scientists as sources of important information.

In February 1944, the first meeting of the leaders of military intelligence and the NKVD on the atomic problem took place in Beria's office on the Lubyanka. Ilyichev and Milstein were present from the military, Fitin and Ovakimyan were from the NKVD. The father also participated in this meeting and was officially introduced as the leader of the "C" group, coordinating efforts in this area. The group, as we already know, was entrusted with the task of collecting all the information on the

atomic problem. In this regard, my father said that he was not

pleased with Beria's order: "Heading the work of Group C to coordinate the extraction and implementation of intelligence on the atomic bomb, I experienced difficulties, because I had no technical education, not to mention knowledge in the field of physics. At the same time, I led the actions of sabotage partisan detachments in the rear of the German armies, and this was my main responsibility.

In 1944, Kheifetz returned to Moscow and reported his impressions of his meetings with Oppenheimer and other famous scientists involved in the atomic project. He said that Oppenheimer and those around him were deeply concerned that the Germans might get ahead of America in building the atomic bomb. After

listening to Heifetz's report, Beria noted that the time had come for closer cooperation between the security agencies and scientists. In order to improve relations, remove the suspicion and critical attitude of specialists towards the NKVD bodies, Beria suggested establishing more trusting, personal relations with Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov. My father invited scientists to his house for dinner:

"However, this was not only a hospitable gesture: on the orders of Beria, I and my deputies - Generals Eitingon and Sazykin - as operational workers had to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Kurchatov, Alikhanov and Kikoin. We treated them like

friends, confidants, to whom they could turn with their daily worries and requests. One evening, after working

on the next material, we had dinner in the recreation room. There was a bottle of the best Armenian cognac on the table. I can't stand alcohol at all, even a small dose always gave me a severe headache, and it seemed to me that our leading scientists, by their temperament and hard mental work, also do not drink alcoholic beverages. So I offered them a teaspoon of brandy in their tea. They looked at me in amazement, laughed and poured themselves full glasses, drinking to the success of our common cause. At the beginning of 1944, Beria ordered

me to send all intelligence materials, developments and signals that affected people involved in the atomic problem, and their relatives. Soon I received a special message that Kikoin's younger brother naively shared his doubts about the wisdom of leadership with a colleague, and he immediately informed the operative worker who was in touch. When I informed Beria about this, he ordered me to call Kikoin and tell him to influence his brother. I decided not to call Kikoin,

went to his laboratory and told him about the "pranks" of his younger brother. Kikoin promised to talk to him. Their explanation was recorded by operational eavesdropping equipment installed in the apartments of leading nuclear scientists.

I was surprised that the next day Beria showed up at Kikoin's laboratory to finally dispel his fears about his brother. He gathered the whole trio - Kurchatov, Alikhanov, Kikoin - and said in my presence that General Sudoplatov had been attached to them in order to provide full assistance and assistance in the work; that they enjoy the absolute trust of Comrade Stalin and his personal. All the information that is provided to them should help in fulfilling the task of the Soviet government. Beria repeated: there is no reason to worry about the fate of their relatives or people they trust - they are guaranteed absolute security. Scientists will be created such living conditions that will enable them to concentrate



only on solving issues of strategic importance for the state”.

On Beria's instructions, all scientists involved in the Soviet atomic project were provided with decent housing, dachas, used special shops where they could buy goods on a par with government leaders using special cards; All personnel of the nuclear project were provided with special nutrition and highly qualified medical care. At the same time, all the personal files of scientists, specialists and operational workers who were directly involved in the project or in obtaining intelligence information on the atomic problem were transferred from the personnel department to Beria's secretariat. At the same time, the most important operational materials on atomic energy

obtained by intelligence were transferred to the secretariat of Beria from the American department. About two hundred pages were withdrawn from the Enormas operational development file on the atomic bomb, which is still kept in the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service. In order to strengthen the security regime, no one had access to these materials without Beria's sanction. “I remember a conflict with Beria's

deputy, Zavenyagin, who demanded to familiarize him with the documents,” my father wrote. - I refused him, and we had a strong quarrel; he gained access to intelligence materials only after Beria's permission. The great administrative abilities of Beria

in solving the atomic problem are also recognized by the participants in our atomic program, for example, Academician Khariton in his interview about the creation of the atomic bomb in the Ogonyok magazine (1993). When we received

information that the American authorities were paying special attention to the secrecy of their nuclear project, Eitingon and I suggested using groups of illegal immigrants as couriers and to work with sources of information: we understood that American counterintelligence would pay attention to Heifetz's connections with pro-communist circles, having access to the specialists of the Manhattan Project. Having received the appropriate directive from Moscow, Zarubin ordered Kheifetz to immediately stop intelligence operations using Communist Party activists.

However, some activists of the US Communist Party continued to act on their own initiative. In 1943, violating the instructions received from Zarubin, they, not knowing about the exits of the Soviet intelligence services to the Oppenheimer family, turned to him with a request to provide information to the Soviet Union about the work in Los Alamos. Oppenheimer, who was afraid of revealing ties through his wife and brother with the "Moscow people", was forced to inform the American intelligence services about this request of an acquaintance of a physicist associated with the Communist Party. This led to the fact that all communications with prominent physicists involved in the work on the atomic bomb were switched to an illegal intelligence channel and the use of special couriers who had impeccable cover in the eyes of American counterintelligence.

In 1943-1944, the NKVD used various channels to approach American atomic secrets. The main targets were the Los Alamos Laboratories, the Oak Ridge Plants, and the Berkeley Nuclear Research Laboratories. Soviet intelligence services also tried to infiltrate industrial firms that carried out orders related to the creation of atomic weapons. In 1943, the famous actor, head of the

Moscow Jewish Theater Mikhoels, together with the Jewish poet, our trusted agent Fefer, made a long trip to the United States as the head of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Mikhoels's visit and the development of his connections in the Jewish communities were carried out by Kheifets. Beria received Mikhoels and Fefer on the eve of his departure and instructed them to carry out

in the United States a wide propaganda of the great significance of the contribution of the Jewish people to the development of science and culture of the Soviet Union and to convince American public opinion that anti-Semitism in the USSR was completely eliminated as a result of Stalin's national policy.

Zarubin and Kheifets informed Oppenheimer and Einstein about the situation of Jews in the USSR through proxies. According to them, Oppenheimer and Einstein were deeply moved by the fact that in the USSR Jews were guaranteed a safe and happy life. At the same time, Oppenheimer and Einstein heard rumors of a plan

Stalin to create a Jewish Autonomous Republic in the Crimea after the victory in the

war against fascism. Oppenheimer and Fermi did not know that already at that time they appeared in the operational materials of the NKVD as sources of information under the code names Director of the Reservation, Veksel, Ernst. The pseudonym Veksel was sometimes used as a source of generalized materials coming from

physicists who participated in the American atomic project. "As far as I remember," my father clarified, "Oppenheimer and Fermi sometimes appeared under the common pseudonym Star. I

repeat once again - none of them has ever been our recruited intelligence agent. The wife of the famous sculptor Konenkov, our trusted agent, acting under the direction of Liza Zarubina, became close to the great physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein at Princeton. She managed to charm Oppenheimer's inner circle. After Oppenheimer cut off ties with the American Communist Party, Konenkova, under the leadership of Lisa Zarubina and Pastelnyak (Luka), a member of our residency in New York, constantly influenced Oppenheimer and even earlier persuaded him to hire

specialists known for their "leftist" beliefs to develop which our illegals and Semyonov's agents were already targeting. Liza Zarubina, wife of Vasily Zarubin, a US resident, was an outstanding personality. Charming and sociable, she easily established friendships in the widest circles. An elegant woman with features of classical beauty, a refined nature, she attracted people like a magnet. Lisa was one of the most highly skilled recruiters of agents. She recruited refugees from Poland and one of Szilard's assistants. She found a way to Szilard through one of his relatives in Moscow, who worked in a special NKVD laboratory for aviation technology. Lisa was fluent in English, German, French and Romanian. She looked like a typical representative of Central Europe, but could unrecognizably change her appearance and demeanor. Lisa was related

led the militant organization of the Romanian communists, and when he was tried by a military tribunal, he managed to escape from the courtroom twice. In 1922 he

died in a shootout. Elizaveta Zarubina became an intelligence officer in 1919. At one time she worked in the secretariat of Dzerzhinsky. Her first, let's say, common-law husband was Yakov Blumkin, who shot the German ambassador Count Mirbach in Moscow in 1918. Blumkin was a key figure in the SR conspiracy against Lenin in July 1918. When the Social Revolutionary rebellion failed, Blumkin turned himself in, was forgiven and continued to work in the Cheka-GPU, carrying out the tasks of Dzerzhinsky and sometimes Trotsky, with whom he also knew. In 1929, Yakov Blumkin

established an illegal residency in Turkey under the guise of a trading company, using funds received from the sale of Hasidic Hebrew manuscripts, transferred to him from the special collections of the State Library. This money was intended to create a military sabotage organization against the British in Turkey and the Middle East. However, Blumkin transferred part of the funds to Trotsky, who, after being expelled from the USSR, lived in Turkey. In addition, he brought to Moscow a letter from Trotsky addressed to Radek.

Elizabeth was shocked by this. She reported everything leadership. Blumkin was arrested and later shot.

A few years later, she married Vasily Zarubin, who returned from China. They were sent to illegal work in Europe on false documents - a married couple of businessmen from Czechoslovakia. For seven years, the Zarubins were in various countries of Western Europe, successfully carried out a number of important intelligence operations, including the recruitment of a Gestapo officer Lehmann (Breitenbach) and the wife of the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany (Juna), with whom Zarubina kept in touch until May 1941. In 1941, Elizabeth Zarubina was awarded the rank of

captain of state security. In the US, she often traveled to California, where Heifetz introduced her to the circle of people close to the Oppenheimer family. Thanks to Kheifetz's connections, Zarubina received all the installation data on Oppenheimer's family members and relatives,

with "leftist" views. Kheifetz organized a meeting between Elizabeth and Oppenheimer's wife Katherine, who sympathized with the Soviet Union and communist ideals.

CIA veterans working in Moscow in the spring of 1992 on the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU came across materials from the Comintern about Oppenheimer's connections with members of a secret cell of the US Communist Party. They also found a request from our intelligence to Dimitrov, the chairman of the Comintern, in June 1943 with a request to provide data for

the use of these contacts. Zarubina and Kheyfets, through Oppenheimer's wife Katherine, persuaded Oppenheimer to refrain from openly expressing views in support of the communists and "left" circles, so as not to attract the attention of American intelligence agencies. They also persuaded Oppenheimer to share information with scientists fleeing Nazi persecution. Oppenheimer agreed to do this, as well as to admit these people to scientific work in the atomic project, if he received confirmation of their anti-fascist views. In this way,

Oppenheimer, Fermi, and Szilard helped Soviet intelligence plant reliable intelligence sources at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and the Chicago Lab.

My father elaborated on this: "As far as I remember, there were four important sources of information in the United States that transmitted data about the work of the laboratory to our residencies in New York and Washington. They also kept in touch with our illegal residency, which used a pharmacy in Santa Fe as a front. The materials that Semyonov and later Yatskov received in New York came from Fuchs and one of our deep cover agents through couriers.

One of these couriers was Lona Cohen. Her husband, Maurice Cohen, was recruited by Semyonov. In 1939, Maurice married Lona and also involved her in intelligence work. At first, Lona refused to cooperate, seeing it as treason, but Maurice convinced her that they were acting in the name of higher justice and that this kind of cooperation was not betrayal at all. The center agreed to her work, bearing in mind that in illegal operations, married couples are most effective.

When Maurice was called up for military service in July 1942, it was decided to use his wife as a courier. Yatskov (Johnny), an employee of the Soviet consulate in New York, received Lona Cohen for communication from Semenov. To cover her trips to New Mexico, Lona attended a tuberculosis sanitarium under the pretense of prevention. In 1992, Yatskov remembered her as a beautiful young woman. Shortly after the atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities in August 1945, Lona made a perilous trip to the small town of Albuquerque and met agents Mlad and Ernst there. Mlad, also known as the young physicist T. Hall, whose father worked as a furrier at a factory of Eitingon's relatives in the United States, was brought to cooperation by a major agent of the NKVD of white emigration S. Kurnakov (pseudonyms Beck, Cavalryman). There, she was supposed to be handed over extremely important documents for the Moscow Center. Having received the documents, Lona arrived at the station just before the train left with a small

suitcase, a bag and a purse. Under the conditions of the special regime introduced in this town, the security service checked the documents and luggage of all passengers. And here Lona showed a high level of professional training. She placed her suitcase in front of the checkers and nervously sorted through the contents of her bag in search of a lost ticket. "She passed the reticule, where under the napkins lay a bundle with drawings and a detailed description of the world's first atomic bomb, to the carriage conductor, who held it while she was looking for a ticket. Lona boarded the train, confident that the conductor would definitely return her reticule. And so it happened. When Yatskov met her in New York, she told him

that everything is in order, but the police almost had these materials in their hands. This episode was first told by intelligence historian Chikov.

After the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1950, the Coens managed to elude the American authorities. In Moscow, they received special training as illegal agents. After receiving New Zealand passports in the names of Peter and Helen Kroger from our service, the Coens settled in London. They owned a second-hand bookshop and, in their small house on the outskirts of London, provided considerable assistance in radio communication to the KGB resident Conon the Young, acting under the name of Gordon Lonsdale.

The Cohens were arrested with him in 1961 and sentenced by an English court to twenty years in prison. They spent six years in prison, then they were exchanged. After their release, they lived in Moscow. Lona died in 1992, Maurice outlived her by three years."

Among the most prominent scientists who were actively developed in Moscow, using their family ties and anti-fascist sentiments, was Georgy Gamow, a Russian physicist who fled to the United States in 1933 from Brussels, where an international congress of physicists was held. About the possible use of Gamow and approaches to him through his relatives in the USSR, who were actually hostages of the NKVD, academician Ioffe oriented. Gamow had extensive connections with American physicists and maintained friendly relations with Niels Bohr. Group "C" instructed Liza Zarubina to achieve his cooperation with us. Lisa found Gamow through his wife, also a physicist. Gamow taught at Georgetown University in Washington and, most importantly, led the annual seminars on theoretical physics in Washington. Thus, he could discuss with the leading physicists of the world the latest, most promising developments. The NKVD managed to take advantage of the wide acquaintances that Gamov

had. Lisa Zarubina forced Gamow's wife to cooperate in exchange for guarantees that relatives in the Union would be supported during the difficult war years. "I remember," my father wrote, "that in some cases American specialists violated the rules for

working with secret documents and showed Gamow reports on experiments and consulted with him. Violation of the mode of work with documents was done by common agreement of scientists. However, Gamow managed to get general characteristics of scientists orally, to find out their moods, assessments of the real possibility of creating an atomic bomb. It seems to me that there was an informal agreement between Bohr, Fermi, Oppenheimer and Szilard to share secret developments on atomic weapons with a circle of "left" anti-fascist scientists. Another source of information in Tennessee, who received information from Fermi and Pontecorvo, was associated with an illegal group, also

used as a front a pharmacy in Santa Fe, from where materials were sent by courier to Mexico. As far as I remember, three people - researchers and clerks - copied the most important documents, getting access to them "from Oppenheimer, Fermi and Weiskopf." The pharmacy in

Santa Fe (New Mexico) was for the illegal station created in the USA by Eitingon and Grigulevich in the operation against Trotsky, an emergency turnout in 1940. Eitingon and Grigulevich then received wide powers from Beria to recruit agents without the sanction of the Center. By 1940, Grigulevich had extensive experience in intelligence work behind him. In the 1930s, in Lithuania, he took part in the liquidation of secret police provocateurs who had infiltrated the Lithuanian Komsomol, then participated in operations against Trotskyists abroad, and fought in Spain. For actions in Latin America, Grigulevich had a reliable cover - a network of pharmacies in Argentina, which was owned by his father. Eitingon

and Grigulevich created a parallel illegal network that could be used in the United States and Mexico outside of contacts with Spanish emigration in these countries. Leaving America in 1941, Eitingon and Grigulevich registered a pharmacy for one of the agents of their group. Now this network has helped to reach the sources of information on the atomic problem that are of interest to the "C" group.

Oppenheimer suggested to the director of the project, General Groves, to invite the most prominent European scientists to work in America. Among them was Niels Bohr. Bohr, I want to emphasize once again, was by no means a Soviet agent, but he rendered the USSR invaluable services. After speaking with Meitner in 1943 in Sweden, he actively advocated sharing atomic secrets with the international anti-fascist community of scientists. The well-known Finnish writer Vuolijoki, a prominent agent of Soviet intelligence, played a huge role in shaping the position of Bohr and Meitner.

Vuolijoki was sentenced to death in Finland for spying for the USSR, but she was released under public pressure (one of her sons-in-law was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, the other was one of the leaders of the Communist Party of England - Palm Dutt), and she ended up in Sweden.



Subsequently, Group C managed to find approaches to Bohr through Vuolijoki and Meitner and arranged a meeting with him for our employees Vasilevsky and Terletsky in November 1945 in Copenhagen.

In 1943, as Feklisov, one of the participants in the Soviet intelligence operation on the atomic problem, writes in the essay "The Heroic Feat of Klaus Fuchs" (Military History Journal. 1990. No. 12; 1991. No. 1), Oppenheimer proposed including Klaus Fuchs in the group of English specialists who arrived in Los Alamos to participate in the work on the atomic bomb. In 1933, the German communist Fuchs was forced to

seek refuge in England. After graduating from the University of Bristol, he continued to work there as a physicist. In 1941, Fuchs reported his participation in atomic research to a prominent figure in the communist and labor movement, Jürgen Kuczynski. Kuchinsky informed the Soviet ambassador to England Maisky. Maisky was at odds with Gorsky, the NKVD resident in London, and therefore instructed military attache Kremer to get in touch with Fuchs. Fuchs first met with Ursula Kuczynski (Sonya), a military intelligence agent, one of the organizers of the Red

chapel."

Fuchs, before leaving for the United States, was instructed on the conditions for resuming communication with him. In the USA, Fuchs had to emphasize in his communication with his American colleagues that he was the only person in the group of British specialists who was threatened by a German concentration camp. For this reason, Fuchs enjoyed the absolute confidence of Oppenheimer and, on his instructions, received access to materials with which he had no formal connection. Oppenheimer had to enter into a sharp conflict with General Groves, who categorically objected to the generalized information on the results of research and experiments being brought to the attention of British scientists.

By the way, the British authorities and intelligence also set their specialists the task of collecting all the information on the atomic bomb, since the Americans were not going to share atomic secrets with them. Perhaps there was another reason

why Oppenheimer invited Fuchs to Los Alamos, and later to the center of scientific research.

research at Princeton. Maybe Oppenheimer knew that Fuchs would not stay in America after the war. His words are recorded in intelligence materials: "Information should be transmitted by those who, for personal reasons, will leave Los Alamos and the country after the completion of work on the atomic bomb." In addition, Oppenheimer had reason to believe that Fuchs was connected with the Communists, and this, too, could play a role.

E. Zarubina re-established contact with two deep-covered agents, Polish Jews, on the West Coast. They were legalized by Eitingon in the early 1930s during his brief illegal business trip to the United States. It was originally planned that these agents would settle in California in order to organize sabotage on transport ships exporting strategic raw materials (coal, oil, metal) to Japan in the event of a military conflict between the USSR and Japan. For more than ten years, these agents have not been involved in active operations.

One of them was a dentist (code name Chess Player) who received a French medical diploma in the late 1920s. His education was paid by the GPU. The dentist's wife managed to establish friendly relations with the Oppenheimer family. Thus, a secret connection was created with the Oppenheimer family and his inner circle, which fell out of the field of view of American counterintelligence.

The FBI did not know about Zarubina's secret contacts either. Only in 1946, in connection with other revelations, did the FBI firmly establish that Zarubina was an employee of Soviet intelligence, but she was already in Moscow.

Thus, Semenov and Zarubina created a system of reliable communications, and Kvasnikov and Yatskov, under the leadership of Ovakimyan, ensured the uninterrupted transmission of information on atomic weapons at the final stage of work at Los Alamos in 1945.

It should be noted that familiarization of Soviet scientists with the scientific works of the developers of American atomic weapons - Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard - was important for the wide development of work on the atomic bomb in the USSR. This information came secretly with their knowledge.

"As far as I remember," my father wrote, "through Robert and the Director of the Reservation, as Los

Alamos, we've received five classified summary progress reports on the development of the atomic bomb. Similar material was sent not only to us, but also to Swedish scientists. According to our intelligence, the Swedish government had detailed information on the atomic bomb in 1945-1946. The Swedes refused to create their own nuclear weapons because of the enormous costs. But the fact that they had enough data to make a decision on this issue allows us to conclude that the Swedes received, like us, information on the atomic bomb, in particular, from Bohr after he left Los Alamos.

The USSR Defense Committee, by its Decree No. 7357, set the deadline for completing the construction of the cyclotron laboratory at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology - by January 1, 1946. Responsibility for the task was assigned to two academicians - A. Ioffe, director of the institute, and A. Alikhanov, head of the facility. A month later, on February 21, Stalin signed GKO Decree No. 7572 "On the training of specialists in atomic nuclear physics" for Laboratory No. 2 and related institutions.

The resolution contained 16 clauses outlining detailed responsibilities for the arrangement and financing of the educational material base, the allocation of laboratory facilities, the provision of maintenance personnel and the construction of a cyclotron for Moscow University. The increase in the number of trainees was envisaged by the additional staffing of senior courses in the specialty "Physics of the Atomic Nucleus" by transferring excellent students from other universities. Planned tasks for the

training of specialists in the field of chemistry radioactive and rare elements, compressor machines and molecular physics were determined for the Leningrad University and the Polytechnic Institute, the Moscow Institute of Fine Chemical Technology. In addition, the Central Statistical Office, within a month, carried out a record and registration of physicists who worked in all sectors of the national economy, research and other institutions, after which Kurchatov was offered to select the specialists he needed.

Group C knew that military and explosives experts were playing a leading role in the development of atomic bomb work in America. In turn, the Soviet government also decided, taking into account the American experience, to appoint a prominent specialist in the production of explosives, a prominent organizer of the military industry, Vannikov, responsible for the engineering and administrative support of our atomic project. Vannikov played the same role in the work on the atomic bomb in the USSR that General Groves played in the USA.

The NKVD was not only informed about the technical developments of the American atomic program, but they also knew about internal purely human conflicts and rivalry between scientists and specialists working in Los Alamos, about the tense relations between scientists and General Groves, the director of the project. In particular, they noted the information about serious disagreements between General Groves and Szilard. Groves was furious at Szilard's

academic style of scientific work and his refusal to submit to the regime of secrecy and military discipline. The fight with the general became a kind of hobby for Szilard. Groves did not trust him and considered his participation in the project risky. He even tried to remove him from work, despite Szilard's enormous contribution to the implementation of the world's first uranium nuclear chain reaction.

Oppenheimer, according to Heifetz, was a broad-minded man who foresaw both the enormous possibilities and dangers of the use of atomic energy for peaceful and military purposes. Moscow knew that he would remain an influential figure in America after the war, and therefore it was necessary to carefully hide contacts with him and his inner circle. Group C understood that the approach to Oppenheimer and other prominent scientists should be based on the establishment of friendly relations, and not on undercover cooperation, and it was necessary to use the fact that Oppenheimer, Bohr and Fermi were staunch opponents of violence. They believed that a nuclear war could be prevented by creating a balance of power in the world based on equal access of the parties to the secrets of atomic energy, which, in their opinion, could fundamentally affect world politics and change the course of history.

In intelligence work, as my father used to say, the distinction between useful connections, acquaintances, and trusting relationships is very arbitrary. Official documents use a special term - undercover intelligence, which means obtaining materials based on the work of agents and intelligence officers acting under the guise of some official position. However, the most valuable information often comes from a source that is not an agent who has assumed formal obligations to cooperate with intelligence and receives money for this. In operational documents, this source of information is still considered as an undercover source, since access to it is based on contacts and connections with agents or trusted persons from an environment close to him.

My father recalled: "I was amazed that the worldview of many of the most prominent Western physicists and our scientists coincides. Vernadsky, in 1943, quite sincerely suggested to Stalin that he ask the American and British governments to share information about atomic research with us and to work together with Western scientists on the creation of an atomic bomb. Ioffe, Kapitsa, Niels Bohr adhered to the same views. Bohr,

who apparently knew from his conversations with Oppenheimer about the leakage of information to Soviet and Swedish scientists, met with President Roosevelt and tried to convince him of the need to share the secrets of the "Manhattan Project" with the Russians in order to speed up work on building a bomb. Our sources in England reported that Bohr not only made this proposal to President Roosevelt, but allegedly returned to England on his behalf and tried to convince the British government of the need for such a step. Churchill was horrified by this proposal and ordered that steps be taken to prevent Bohr from contacting the Russians.

Spouses Zarubina, despite the results achieved in the work, did not live long in Washington. And it happened not through their fault and not because of the activity of the FBI. One of Zarubin's subordinates, an employee of the NKVD residency at the embassy, Lieutenant Colonel Mironov, sent a letter to Stalin, in which he accused Zarubin of collaborating with American intelligence services. Mironov in the letter indicated - he followed Zarubin - the dates and hours of Zarubin's meetings with agen

sources of information, calling them contacts with representatives of the FBI.

The Zarubins were recalled to Moscow to verify the charges against them. The review took almost six months. It was established that all meetings were authorized by the Center and the valuable information received by Zarubin did not cast a shadow of suspicion on him in cooperation with the FBI. Mironov was recalled from Washington and arrested on charges of defamation. However, when he appeared before the court, it turned out that he had schizophrenia. He was fired from the service and placed in the hospital.

In 1943, the Center decided to build contacts with atomic scientists using illegal channels. The direct management of the actions of illegal immigrants was entrusted to the Soviet resident in Mexico, Vasilevsky. After the departure of the Zarubins, Vasilevsky led a network of agents from Mexico City, sometimes visiting Washington, but did not stay there for a long time so as not to attract the attention of American counterintelligence. It was decided to minimize the use of station strongholds in Washington.

"I remember," my father wrote, "that Vasilevsky told me how in 1944 he arrived in Washington and, in particular, had to transfer the materials received from Fermi to the Center, but, to his horror, found out that the cipher was missing. The next day, the American police brought the cryptographer to the embassy, picking him up in one of the bars, where he drank himself unconscious. Vasilevsky immediately decided not to use the embassy in Washington to convey particularly important messages. In 1945, for his successful work

in the development of the Fermi line in the USA, Vasilevsky was appointed my deputy in department "C". For almost two years he headed the department of scientific and technical intelligence in the NKVD, and then in the Committee of Information - our central intelligence agency, which existed from 1947 to 1951. Vasilevsky was dismissed from the security forces in 1948, becoming one of the first victims of the anti-Jewish campaign that began. In April-June 1953, he began to work again in the apparatus, but he was fired again - now on a reduction in staff as a "suspicious" person. Vasilevsky died in 1979.

The description of the design of the first atomic bomb became known in the USSR in January 1945. The Soviet residency in the United States reported that it would take the Americans a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years to develop a substantial arsenal of atomic weapons. This message also said that the first two bombs might be detonated in two or three months. At that

time, Moscow's exploration noticeably intensified in this direction, and the USSR received significant information about the "Manhattan Project" and about plans to use uranium ore deposits in the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovakia, Australia and the island of Madagascar. Military intelligence agents managed to infiltrate a Canadian firm that had created a special corporation for the development of uranium ore. The resident of military intelligence, Molière, who is also vice-consul in New York Mikhailov, reported on the work of the laboratory in Berkeley, near San Francisco, for the analysis of uranium ores. Around the same time, Moravec, the head of intelligence of the Czechoslovak government in London, who was collaborating with Moscow, informed that the British and American intelligence services had shown great interest in developing uranium deposits in the Sudetenland. He got access to the materials of the Anglo-Czech negotiations on the exploitation of uranium deposits in the post-war period.

As the end of the war approached, the first steps in the geological search for uranium ore began to be taken in the Soviet Union. In February 1945,

information was received and German documents were captured about high-quality uranium reserves in the Bukhovo region - in the Rhodope Mountains. The Soviet leadership turned to Dimitrov, at that time already the head of the Bulgarian government, and the Bulgarian authorities assisted us in the development of uranium deposits. On January 27, 1945,

Stalin signed GKO Decree No. 7408, addressed only to Molotov and Beria: "Top secret, of special importance. 1.

Organize in Bulgaria the prospecting, exploration and mining of uranium ores at the uranium deposit Goten and in its region, as well as the geological study of other known or potential discoveries of deposits of uranium ores and minerals.

2. To instruct the NKID of the USSR (comrade Molotov) to negotiate with the government of Bulgaria on the creation of a mixed Bulgarian Soviet joint-stock company with a predominance of Soviet capital for the prospecting, exploration and production of uranium ores at the Goten uranium deposit and in its area, as well as the production of geological study of others deposits of uranium ores and minerals known or likely to be discovered in Bulgaria. Negotiations with the Bulgarian authorities

and all documentation on the creation and registration of a joint-stock company should be carried out, calling the deposit radium. A Soviet-Bulgarian mining

society was created, in which Shchors, an employee of our intelligence, a mining engineer by education, played a prominent role. In this regard,

my father recalled: "Uranium

ore from Bukhovo was used by us during the launch of the first nuclear reactor. In the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, uranium ore was of lower quality, but it was also used by us. We hid these works from the Americans and the British. To coordinate our intelligence and counterintelligence activities, an experienced intelligence worker, a former resident in Italy, Rogatnev, was sent to Czechoslovakia.

The supply of Bulgarian uranium, in view of its higher quality, was given exceptional attention. Dimitrov personally oversaw uranium developments. We sent more than three hundred mining engineers to Bulgaria, urgently recalling them from the army; Bukhovo area was guarded by internal troops of the NKVD. However, it soon became known through agents that the American intelligence services were preparing acts of sabotage in order to disrupt the supply of uranium to the Soviet Union and at the same time reveal the true scope of work in order to determine the timing of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR. The Americans even tried to organize the kidnapping of Shchors. We took countermeasures: Eitingon engaged in the recruitment of American intelligence officers and their wives, detained with the assistance of our agents from local Turks near uranium

deposits, but did not achieve success. About one and a half tons of uranium ore per week came from Bukhovo. Our intelligence provided those working



American instructions and methodology for the technique of uranium mining and its

accounting. In 1946, large deposits of higher quality uranium were discovered in the USSR and immediately began to be developed. However, intensive work at Bukhovo continued: we wanted to give the Americans the impression that we urgently needed Bulgarian uranium. Signed by Zavenyagin, Beria's deputy, an agreement with the Bulgarian government on the development and supply of uranium, disinformation activities organized by Eitingon and a group of officers confirmed the importance of these uranium developments for us. In March 1945, Group C sent a generalized report on the successful

development of work in the United States to create an atomic bomb to Beria. This report described in detail the American centers, in particular the laboratory at Los Alamos, the factories in Oak Ridge, gave a detailed description of the activities of the American company Kelex, a subsidiary of Kellogg in New York, noted the work on the atomic bomb carried out by the largest US firms Jones Construction, DuPont, Union Carbide, Chemical Company and others. The report indicated that the US government had spent \$2 billion on the development and production of atomic weapons and that the project employed more than 130,000 people in total. In addition, the agents reported on a strictly limited circle of people who knew the purpose of the work being carried out; on admission to such data of government officials only with the personal permission of the President of

the United States; on the creation within the framework of the project of its own counterintelligence, police and other services; on the removal from US libraries of all previously open publications on research in the field of atomic energy; on the replacement of the real names of scientists and specialists who were directly related to work in such atomic centers as Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Hanford, with pseudonyms; on the physical protection of responsible persons, as well as on other similar measures.

In April 1945, Kurchatov received from the intelligence services of the NKVD very valuable material on the characteristics of a nuclear explosive device, the method of activating an atomic bomb and the electromagnetic method.

separation of uranium isotopes. This material was so important that the intelligence agencies received its assessment the very next day.

Kurchatov sent a report to Stalin, built on the basis of intelligence, on the prospects for the use of atomic energy and the need for extensive measures to create an atomic bomb.

12 days after the assembly of the first atomic bomb at Los Alamos, Moscow received a description of its device from Washington and New York. The first telegram arrived at the Center on June 13, the second on July 4, 1945. By the way, five years later, these telegrams may have been deciphered by the Americans and served as the basis for pressure on Fuchs to confess to espionage.

The father, describing this fact, stated: "I, however, cannot fully believe this, although I confirm that the sources indicated in the telegrams, Charles and Mlad, are Fuchs and Pontecorvo.

We reported to Beria that two sources not related to each other another, reported on the upcoming test of a nuclear device.

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, work on the creation of an atomic bomb in the USSR acquired a wide scope. At this time, the NKVD received particularly valuable materials from the United States.

A detailed report by Fuchs (Charles) was delivered by diplomatic post after he met on 19 September with his courier Harry Gold. The report contained thirty-three pages of text describing the design of the atomic bomb. Later, an additional message on the device of the atomic bomb was received through the communication channels from Hall (Mlad), which was transmitted by Lona Cohen. I don't remember whose description of the bomb was more detailed. But the resemblance was striking. It seems to me that the materials contained a detailed exposition of the chapter of the report to the government and the US Congress on the construction of the atomic bomb, which, for reasons of secrecy, was omitted from the official publication - the report of the Smith Commission, published on August 12, 1945. We knew that Oppenheimer and General Groves edited this report. Fuchs reported that Oppenheimer refused to sign the report released by the commission because he believed it contained misinformation intended to delay atomic research in other countries.

Among the materials that we received in September-October 1945, there were some sections of the report that were not included in the report of the Smith Commission, and photographs of the premises of factories in Oak Ridge. They were especially valuable, since we also started building enterprises and accelerated work on the creation of the first nuclear reactor. I recall that the twelve-page report compiled by Semyonov on the construction of the atomic bomb was signed by Vasilevsky and sent to Beria and Stalin. This document actually formed the basis of the program of all work for the next three to four years. The quality and volume of information received from sources in the US and England

was very important for the organization and development of our atomic program. Detailed reports containing data on the operation of the first nuclear reactors, specifications for the production of uranium and plutonium bombs played an important role in accelerating the work. Valuable were the data on the design of the system of focusing explosive lenses and the size of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium for the explosion of a nuclear device; about the principle of implosion formulated by Fuchs - a focused explosion inwards; data on plutonium-240, the detonator device, the time and sequence of operations for the production and assembly of the bomb and the method of actuating the initiator contained in it. Data were obtained on the construction of plants for the purification and separation of uranium isotopes, which significantly reduced the time for processing uranium ore, as well as diary entries about the first test explosion of an atomic bomb in the United States in July 1945.

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans, the Politburo and the State Defense Committee on August 20, 1945 decided to radically reorganize the work on atomic energy - the number one problem. For this purpose, a Special Committee of the government with emergency powers was created. Beria, as a member of the Politburo and deputy chairman of the GKO, was appointed its chairman, Pervukhin - deputy, General Makhnev - secretary.

The committee included members of the Politburo: Malenkov, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for personnel, Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR; Academicians Kurchatov and Kapitsa; People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov,

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Zavenyagin. The working apparatus of the committee was the specially created First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Vannikov was appointed head of the department, Zavenyagin became his first deputy. The Special Committee had a scientific and technical council, its chairman was Vannikov, and its deputy chairman was Ioffe. Department "C", which was headed by my father in the NKVD-NKGB, was the working apparatus of the so-called 2nd bureau of the committee.

Stalin proposed that Ioffe and Kapitsa become members of the Special Committee on Problem Number One. However, Ioffe refused, citing his venerable v-paste. He said that he would be more useful in the scientific and technical council. It was Ioffe who recommended the appointment of Professor Kurchatov to the post of scientific director of the atomic program. "Participating in the

meetings of the Special Committee," my father recalled, "for the first time I realized how important the personal relationships of government members were, their ambitions in making important government decisions. The people's commissars, members of this committee, strove to establish their position and positions at all costs. Very often there were heated arguments and hard-hitting explanations. Beria acted as an arbitrator and sought the unconditional strict implementation of all directives

guides.

I maintained friendly relations with both Ioffe and Kapitsa. At Beria's suggestion, I presented Kapitsa with a hunting rifle. Kapitsa once complained that he had only one copy of a book about Russian engineers written by his father-in-law, Academician Krylov, a major shipbuilding engineer, that had survived in poor condition. I resorted to the services of a special government printing house - the book was printed in two copies on excellent paper. Kapitsa sent one copy to Stalin, hoping to get an appointment with him.

I had to observe the growing rivalry between Kapitsa and Kurchatov at meetings of the Special Committee. Kapitsa was an outstanding personality, an excellent tactician and strategist, and a major organizer of science. Often he commented on scientific speeches with a great sense of humor. I remember that one meeting of the Special Committee in 1945 took place during broadcast hours from

London football match between our team and the English. Members of the Politburo and the government were shocked when Kapitsa suggested that they stop the meeting and listen to the match. There was an awkward pause, but Beria, who appreciated humor, to everyone's amazement, announced a break. The tension subsided. And then the mood of those present rose, because our team won.

Kapitsa, who played an important role in initiating our work on the atomic problem and establishing contacts with Western scientists, in particular Terletsky and Bor, naturally claimed an independent, leading position in the implementation of the atomic project. But soon relations between Kapitsa, Beria and Voznesensky deteriorated. Kapitsa suggested that Kurchatov consult with him on evaluating the results of the work and conclusions before reporting to the meetings of the Special Committee. Pervukhin supported Kapitsa, but Beria and Voznesensky did not agree. Beria demanded that Kapitsa and Kurchatov submit alternative proposals to the government. Moreover, Beria suggested to Kapitsa on the basis of his institute that he duplicate a number of Kurchatov's experiments. Kapitsa was indignant and argued that such a reorientation of his institute would mean the actual curtailment of work in theoretical physics in the Soviet Union. I don't remember exactly, but, in my

opinion, a month later, in October 1945, Kapitsa turned to Beria and Voznesensky for an explanation why they had not consulted him when they decided to create new educational institutes for training specialists in the field of nuclear physics outside the Academy Sciences - Engineering and Physical (MEPhI) and Physical and Technical (MIPT). Kapitsa wrote to Stalin that Beria and

Voznesensky did not listen to the opinions of scientists, that only scientists could be entrusted with the leadership of the atomic project. After unsuccessful attempts to get support from Stalin in this conflict, Kapitsa was soon removed from the Special Committee. He was left alone, but deprived of access to atomic development.

The Special Committee on the Atomic Problem had emergency powers to mobilize forces, any resources and reserves for the creation of an atomic bomb. In practice, this meant that when

In Siberia, uranium ore processing plants began to be built, and a number of enterprises had to be severely limited in power supply.

My father recalled the furious arguments and swearing of committee members Pervukhin and Voznesensky when the question of which enterprises should retain full electricity consumption was discussed. It turned out to be completely unexpected for him that Pervukhin, defending the enterprises of the chemical industry supervised by him, attacked Voznesensky, a member of the Politburo, senior in position. In the first post-war year, reconnaissance

operations on the atomic problem enjoyed special priority. In December 1945, Beria left the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and moved from Lubyanka to the Kremlin, to the office of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Meetings of the Special Committee on the Atomic Problem also began to be held in the Kremlin, and not in the NKVD. My father, as the head of the 2nd bureau of the committee, an employee of the government apparatus, received a permanent pass to enter the Kremlin at any

time. "Meetings of the Special Committee usually took place in Beria's office. These were heated discussions. In addition to heated disputes over the distribution of electricity, Pervukhin continued his attacks on Voznesensky, demanding an increase in the funds of non-ferrous metals for the needs of the chemical industry, engaged in the production of nuclear fuel. I was surprised by the mutual claims of members of the government. Beria intervened in these disputes, calling Pervukhin and Voznesensky to order. And for the first time I saw that everyone in this special government body considered themselves equal in official position, regardless of which of them was a member of the Central

Committee or the Politburo. Right up to my arrest, I maintained good relations with Vannikov and the secretary of the committee, General Makhnev. They were brilliant connoisseurs of our industry, they could accurately indicate which plant could be entrusted with the execution of

orders for the atomic project. I often went to Makhnev's office. For some reason, he is considered an NKVD general, but this is not so. An excellent organizer of the production of ammunition and work on the atomic bomb, he never served in the state security agencies. Makhnev was very inte

the work of American industrial enterprises and firms participating in the atomic program. Often we received this information from open sources, through TASS, and regularly compiled reviews of economic performance and technological potential, gleaned from scientific and technical journals about American firms engaged in individual government orders in connection with the creation of the atomic bomb.

Only then did I realize what great interest and attention to economic issues and the development of industry Beria showed. I learned that Beria, as deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee during the war years, was responsible not only for the activities of the special services, but also for the production of weapons and ammunition, and the operation of the fuel and energy complex. In particular, he was interested in the issues of oil production and refining. In Beria's office there were models of oil refineries. On his initiative, Vannikov, Ustinov and Baibakov (they were not yet 40 years old) were nominated to the high posts of people's commissars for the production of ammunition, weapons and the oil industry.

Participation in meetings chaired by Beria opened up a new world unknown to me. I knew that intelligence was of great importance in foreign policy, in ensuring the security of the country, but the restoration of the national economy and the creation of the atomic bomb were no less important. Until now, I remember our talented industrial organizers and plant directors who participated in solving the most complex organizational and technical issues. The development of these decisions turned out to be much more interesting than the management of the agent network in peacetime. Economic activity allowed people to show talents and abilities in solving such problems as overcoming the lack of resources, disruptions in the supply of equipment and materials. To organize the coordinated work of many industrial branches of industry for the implementation of the atomic program was no less difficult than the successful conduct of reconnaissance and sabotage operations during the war years.

Beria, rude and cruel in dealing with subordinates, could be attentive, courteous and provide daily support to people engaged in important work, he protected these people from all sorts of intrigues of the NKVD or party authorities.

He always alerted plant managers to their personal responsibility for doing the job right, and he had a unique ability to inspire people both in awe and inspire them to work. Naturally, for the directors of industrial enterprises, his personality was largely identified with the power of the state security agencies. It seems to me that in the beginning fear prevailed among people. But gradually, those who worked with him for several years, the feeling of fear disappeared and confidence came that Beria would support them if they successfully completed the most important national economic tasks. Beria often encouraged, in the interests of business, the freedom of action of large business executives in resolving complex issues. It seems to me that he took these qualities from Stalin - tight control, exceptionally high demands and, at the same time, the ability to create an atmosphere of confidence in the leader that, if the task was successfully completed, he would be supported. In the autumn of 1945, a critical moment came in the Soviet atomic bomb program. It was

necessary to start building the first Soviet nuclear reactor. However, scientists were not unanimous in assessing the materials presented by intelligence, as the information was contradictory. The Americans used two types of reactors: graphite and heavy water. There was a huge risk in the use of samples of uranium-235 obtained by military intelligence. It was necessary to make a decision which way to go in the construction of the first reactor. How to solve a problem? A fantastic idea was put forward - to send a group of scientists to the USA for a secret meeting with Oppenheimer, but Oppenheimer's position in society changed dramatically. An attempt to restore the interrupted direct contacts with him through mutual acquaintances in Chicago in 1945 was unsuccessful. Another proposal was put forward - to send Kapitsa to Niels Bohr. Kapitsa was well known in the West and enjoyed great prestige in the scientific world. There is no doubt that his letter to Bohr in 1943 contributed to the establishment, through the mediation of intelligence, informal contact with Western scientists working in the field of atomic research. However, Kapitsa behaved independently, and the leadership did not like it, but



the hostile attitude of Beria and Voznesensky towards him ruled out the possibility of his trip abroad.

Kurchatov and Kikoin proposed that a highly qualified specialist, Professor Zel'dovich, who went V Kurchatov, be sent to Denmark worked for with officers accompanied by intelligence. But Zeldovich was not suitable for this role, since he was not an intelligence officer and the NKVD could not reveal to him, if necessary, during a business trip, agent ties abroad. These circumstances made us rely on those scientists who worked in the apparatus of intelligence agencies. The choice was small. The staff of department "C" had two officers - research assistants, physicists by education, who spoke English to some extent. After they were hired by the NKVD, both attended the seminar of Kapitza and Landau. One of them, Rylov, being a scientist, showed a great inclination towards analytical and intelligence work. The other, Terletsky, who had just defended his Ph.D. thesis and subsequently was a State Prize winner, was not connected by his scientific interests with the group of Kurchatov, Ioffe, Alikhanov and Kikoin and could give his own assessment of scientific materials. In 1943, he turned down Kurchatov's offer to work for him. Terletsky and Rylov translated and edited materials on atomic work that came to Department C, and reported at meetings of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Special Committee. My father said that "while working in intelligence, Terletsky continued to be a creative person. Along with the evaluation and processing of information on the American atomic bomb, he often proposed his own conclusions to the scientific and technical council, this created problems because we had to submit all the information received to the top management twice a day, and Terletsky was sometimes late with the assessment, and I've heard unpleasant remarks from management. However, we decided to opt for Terletsky - he could have made the right impression on Niels Bohr with his wide erudition and awareness.

Beria approved my proposal to send Terletsky to Copenhagen. It was out of the question to send Terletsky to a meeting alone to carry out such an important task. He didn't have

no idea at all about operational work, so it was decided that Colonel Vasilevsky, who was directly in charge of the Fermi line, should leave with him. It was assumed that Vasilevsky would start a conversation with Bohr, and Terletsky would move on to a discussion of technical issues. They also had an interpreter with them, our employee, unfortunately, I do not remember his last name. Vasilevsky left for Denmark under the surname Grebetsky, Terletsky - under his own. In his memoirs, Terletsky writes that on the eve of his trip to Copenhagen,

he was received by Kapitsa and advised not to ask Bohr a lot of questions, "but simply to introduce himself, hand over a letter and gifts from him, talk about Soviet physicists, and Bohr himself will tell about many things that interest us". A preliminary arrangement for a meeting with Bohr was

reached thanks to the Finnish writer Vuolijoki and the Danish writer Martin Andersen Nekse. Nekse was not an agent of the NKVD, but in the 40s he provided great assistance to Rybkina in establishing useful contacts and acquaintances with influential people in the Scandinavian countries.

In July 1993, during a conversation with Terletsky, we recalled some of the details of this story. On the eve of the meeting, Bohr informed the Soviet embassy that he would receive our delegation. At the beginning of the meeting, Bor was nervous, recalled Terletsky, and his hands trembled slightly. Apparently, Bohr realized that for the first time he was dealing directly with representatives of the Soviet government, and the time had come to fulfill the decision he and other physicists made to share the secrets of the atomic bomb with the international community of scientists and Soviet physicists. After the first meeting with Vasilevsky at a reception at our embassy on November 6, 1945, Bohr preferred to talk on scientific issues only with Terletsky. There was no choice, and a private meeting between Terletsky and Bor, with the participation of an interpreter, had to be sanctioned. The questions for the conversation with Bor were prepared in advance by Kurchatov and Kikoin.

Terletsky told Bor that he was warmly remembered at Moscow University, gave him a letter of recommendation and gifts from Kapitsa, greetings from Ioffe and other Soviet scientists, thanked him for

willingness to advise Soviet experts on the atomic program. Bohr answered

questions about the methods of obtaining uranium in the USA, diffusion and mass spectrography, about the combination of these methods, how high productivity is achieved with the mass spectrographic method. He said that in the US all boilers work with graphite moderators, since the production of heavy water requires an enormous amount of electricity. Terletsky received answers to a number of fundamentally important questions, including about plutonium-240; there was not a word about him in Smith's official report, which we received from Bohr and from the USA. The meeting, according to Kurchatov, was important for the verification by our specialists of the several hundred reports and works of Fermi, Szilard, Bethe, Oppenheimer and other foreign scientists that were available to intelligence. It was considered, as Kvasnikov recalls, 690 scientific materials. According to John Hassard, a well-known British nuclear physicist at London's Imperial College, Bohr verbally gave the Russians essential information about the design of the American atomic bomb. Jack Sarfatti, a theoretical physicist student of one of the creators of the atomic bomb X. Bethe, also believes that Bohr's answers contained important strategic information on the creation of nuclear weapons. It is significant that Bohr formally informed the British secret services about

the meeting and conversation with Soviet experts on the atomic program, about the transfer of the report of the Smith Commission to the Russians, but at the same time he kept silent about the nature of the questions put to him. Thus, before the arrest of Fuchs, the Western intelligence services had no idea that the fundamentally important issues of creating atomic weapons in Moscow were already known. By the way, immediately after the atomic explosions in

Japan, Szilard predicted that the Soviet Union would create its own nuclear weapons in two or three years. And Bohr at the same time advocated the establishment of international control over the use of atomic energy.

"After Terletsky's successful trip," my father recalled, "I developed friendly relations with Kurchatov, Alikhanov and Kikoin. My wife and I spent several weekends with them and their

wives in a government rest home. In our apartment not far from the Lubyanka, we arranged several dinners for scientists.

Together with Vasilevsky, I had to select nuclear physicists for trips to the USA, England and Canada in order to attract Western specialists from nuclear centers to work in the Soviet Union.

During the same period, Vasilevsky traveled several times to Switzerland and Italy to meet with Bruno Pontecorvo. To cover these trips, he used the visits of the Soviet delegation of cultural figures, headed by the famous film director Grigory Alexandrov and movie star Lyubov Orlova. The operational support of his meetings with Pontecorvo was carried out by Gorshkov and Yatskov, who at various times worked in Italy and the USA. Vasilevsky also met with

Joliot-Curie. However, Beria and Stalin decided not to involve Joliot-Curie in nuclear development in the USSR, although he wanted to come to Moscow. Staying in the West, Joliot-Curie was more useful because he influenced the formation of the pacifist position of prominent atomic scientists that was beneficial for the Soviet Union. For successful actions in Denmark,

Switzerland and Italy, Vasilevsky was rewarded with a solid cash prize of a thousand dollars at that time and a separate apartment in the center of Moscow, which was then a rarity.

Active Soviet intelligence operations in Western Europe coincided with the start of the Cold War. Moscow was aware that American counterintelligence had gotten pretty close to Russian sources of information and agents serving them. The operational situation has deteriorated dramatically. When the first Soviet reactor was launched in 1946, Beria ordered that all contact with American sources be cut off. He suggested that we consider how to use the authority of Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard and other scientists close to them in the anti-war movement. In the USSR, they believed that the anti-war campaign and the struggle for nuclear disarmament could prevent the Americans from blackmailing the Russians with an atomic bomb, and began a large-scale political campaign against the US nuclear superiority. The Soviet leadership wanted to bind the American ruling circles with political restrictions.

in the use of nuclear weapons - we have not yet had an atomic bomb. Beria categorically ordered that prominent Western scientists not be compromised by ties with our intelligence: it was important that Western scientists represent an independent, authoritative and influential political force friendly to the Soviet Union.

Through Fuchs, the idea of the role and political responsibility of scientists in the nuclear age was carried to Fermi, Oppenheimer, and Szilard, who strongly opposed the creation of the hydrogen bomb. In their arguments, they were completely sincere and did not suspect that Fuchs, under the influence of Russian intelligence services, logically led them to this decision. Acting as anti-fascists, they objectively turned into political allies of the USSR.

Beria's directive was based on information received from Fuchs in 1946 about serious disagreements between American physicists on the improvement of atomic weapons and the creation of a hydrogen bomb. At a meeting held in late 1945 or early 1946, scientists, along with Fuchs, opposed the development of a "superbomb" and were met with strong objections from Teller. Klaus Fuchs declined Oppenheimer's offer to continue

working with him at Princeton, returned to England, and continued to supply Section C with vital information. From the autumn of 1947 to May 1949, Fuchs handed over to our operative Feklisov the main theoretical developments on the creation of a hydrogen bomb and plans for the start of work, which began to be implemented in the USA and England in 1948. The information received from Fuchs about the results of tests of plutonium and uranium atomic bombs

on the Eniwetok Atoll was especially valuable. Fuchs met with Feklisov in London once every three or four months. Each meeting was carefully prepared and lasted no more than forty minutes. Feklisov was accompanied by three operatives in order to exclude the possibility of fixing the meeting by the surveillance service of the British counterintelligence. Fuchs and Feklisov were never recorded by British counterintelligence.

Fuchs himself unwittingly contributed to his failure by informing the British atomic security service that his father had secured a position as a theology lecturer at the University of Leipzig in East Germany. At this time, the American secret services exposed our agent, Fuchs' courier, Gold, he identified Fuchs in the photograph, and the Americans reported this to the British counterintelligence. Fuchs was arrested in 1950. After intense interrogation, Fuchs admitted that he had passed secret information to the Soviet Union. He was tried, and the indictment in his case mentioned only one meeting with a Soviet agent in 1947, and that entirely on the basis of his personal confession.

Feklisov spoke about Fuks' cooperation with Soviet intelligence and the circumstances of his arrest in the essay "The Heroic Feat of Klaus Fuks" and in his book "Across the Ocean

and on the Island." Information about the development of atomic research in England and the real stocks of nuclear weapons in the United States, transmitted by Fuchs in 1948, coincided with extremely important information from Washington received from McLean, who since 1944 served as secretary of the British Embassy in the United States and controlled the entire office of this department. . He said that the potential of US nuclear weapons is insufficient to wage war with the Soviet Union.

In the scientific circles of the USA and the USSR, prominent scientists with independent political convictions played an important role. My father

remarked on this: "Thus, for example, Oppenheimer reminds me to a large extent of our scholars of the academic type—Vernadsky, Kapitsa, and others. They have always sought to preserve their own face, sought to live in a world created by their imagination, with the illusion of independence. But the independence of a scientist involved in works of great national importance always remains an illusion. And for Kurchatov, the interests of the state have always been the main thing in scientific work. He was less stubborn and more dependent on the authorities than Kapitsa and Ioffe. Beria, Pervukhin and Stalin immediately grasped that he represented a new generation of Soviet scientific intelligentsia, less associated with the old traditions of Russian scientists. They correctly understood that he was ambitious and determined to subdue

all scientific work in the interests of the state. The government sought to speed up the testing of the first atomic bomb at any cost, and Kurchatov took the path of copying the American nuclear device. At the same time, parallel work on the creation of a Soviet-designed bomb did not stop. It was blown up in 1951. In the United States, Teller took a similar position, seeking to establish a US monopoly on nuclear weapons.

Being real scientists, Kurchatov and Oppenheimer at the same time were the administrative heads of the most important projects that were of crucial importance for the world. The conflict of personal beliefs, scientific interests and administrative duties in this case is inevitable. We cannot be their judges, the work of these people on the bomb opened a new era in science. However, it is not only a matter of discovery, the essence of the problem is that for the first time the largest scientists of the world acted not only as carriers of scientific ideas, but also as statesmen. It should be noted that initially neither Kurchatov nor Oppenheimer were surrounded by the so-called "scientific bureaucracy", officials from science, which appeared on a significant scale in the second half of the 50s. In the 1940s, no government in the world could control scientific and technological progress effectively enough. The paradox was that both the American and the Soviet governments were forced, in

the interests of a successful solution of the atomic problem, to rely on joint work with scientists of various worldviews, perhaps even hostile to the authorities, and to adapt to their requests, needs, extravagant behavior. The most prominent scientists of the world, sharing anti-fascist and pacifist views, full of illusions about the possible leading role of scientists in the world government after the discovery of atomic energy, were inclined to share achievements in this area with like-minded scientists from other friendly countries. With the onset of the Cold War, the mood of scientists changed dramatically. That is why American physicists rejected in 1948 an attempt by our illegal Fischer (Abel) to resume cooperation with them. They realized that this is not cooperation, but

Intelligence materials on the atomic bomb played an invaluable role not only in military policy, but also in the diplomatic sphere. When Fuchs reported to Moscow data on the design of the atomic bomb, which were not published in the report of the Smith Commission, he also provided extremely valuable information about the scale of production of uranium-235. This Fuchs information made it possible to calculate how much uranium and plutonium the Americans were producing each month, and helped determine the actual number of atomic bombs they had. The information

received from Fuchs and McLean made it possible to conclude that the American side was not ready to wage a nuclear war in the late 1940s and even in the early 1950s. In terms of value, this information can be equated with Penkovsky's information about the real Soviet nuclear missile potential, which he handed over to the Americans in the early 60s. Like Fuchs, Penkovsky reported that Khrushchev was bluffing and not ready for a confrontation with the US, just as the Americans were not ready for a full-scale nuclear war with the USSR in the late 1940s.

When the Cold War began, Stalin firmly pursued a line of confrontation with the United States. He knew that the threat of an American nuclear attack before the end of the 1940s was unlikely. According to Soviet intelligence services, it was not until 1955 that the United States and Britain were to build up stockpiles of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy

the Soviet Union. Fuchs and McLean's information played a large role in the strategic decision of the Soviet leadership to support the Chinese Communists in the civil war in 1947-1948. The USSR had information that President Truman was considering the use of atomic weapons to prevent the victory of the Communists in China. Then Stalin deliberately went to aggravate the situation in Germany, and in 1948 the Berlin crisis arose. Reports appeared in the Western press that President Truman and British Prime Minister Atlee were ready to use atomic weapons to prevent West Berlin from falling under our control. However, Moscow knew that the Americans did not have the necessary number of atomic bombs to confront the Soviet Union simultaneously in Germany and in the Far East, where the fate of



civil war in China. The American leadership overestimated the Soviet threat in Germany and missed the opportunity to use its nuclear arsenal to support the Chinese nationalists.

In 1951, when, as my father recalled, a plan was being developed for military sabotage operations against American bases, "Molotov, commenting on our proposals, noted that such operations should be carried out in accordance not only with military considerations, but above all with political decisions. He said that our position and resolute action on the blockade of Berlin helped the Chinese Communists to a great extent. For Stalin, the victory of the Communists in China meant enormous support for his line in the confrontation with the United States. I remember very well that Stalin's strategy was to create a supporting "axis" of the USSR-China in opposition to the Western world. In August 1949, the USSR

tested its first atomic bomb. This event summed up the incredible intense seven years of work. There was no report of this in our press - they feared a preventive nuclear strike by the United States. At least that's what Beria's assistant on atomic

issues, General Sazykin, told me. Therefore, the announcement of this in the American press on September 25, 1949, shocked Stalin, the leadership of the atomic project, and especially those responsible for ensuring the secrecy of atomic developments. Our first reaction is that American agents managed to obtain data on the test. If we penetrated the Manhattan Project, then similar actions by American intelligence cannot be ruled out. To everyone's relief, about a week later, our scientists reported that scientific instruments installed on aircraft, with regular air sampling, could detect traces of an atomic explosion in the atmosphere. The scientists' explanation allowed the security agencies to avoid the accusation that American intelligence managed to introduce its agent into the circles of the creators of domestic atomic weapons.

Kurchatov and Beria for outstanding services in strengthening the power of our country were awarded the highest awards, large cash prizes and special certificates

of lifelong status of honorary citizens of the Soviet Union. All

participants in the Soviet nuclear program received privileges: free travel in transport, state dachas, the right to enroll children in higher educational institutions without entrance exams. The last privilege was maintained until 1991 for the children of intelligence officers - illegal immigrants who are on duty abroad. When evaluating the materials on the atomic problem that have passed

through Department C, one should take into account the statements of Academicians Khariton and Alexandrov at the meeting dedicated to the 85th anniversary of Kurchatov's birth. They noted his genius in designing the atomic bomb and in the crucial decision to start building factories for the production of uranium and plutonium, while we had only a tiny amount of them, obtained by laboratory means. The atomic bomb was created in the USSR in four years. Intelligence materials have certainly accelerated the development of our atomic weapons. Still, my father believed that Kurchatov remained one of the great scientists who played the same role as Oppenheimer,

although, of course, he was not such a scientific giant as Niels Bohr and Enrico Fermi were. Kurchatov's talent, his organizational abilities and Beria's perseverance played an important role in the successful solution of the atomic problem in the Soviet Union. When Niels Bohr visited Moscow State University in 1961 and took part in the students' celebration "Physicist's Day",

the KGB advised Terletsky, a professor at Moscow State University and a laureate of the State Prize in Science and Technology, to stay out of his sight. However, Terletsky came to the meeting, but Bor, fixing his gaze on him, pretended not to recognize him. My father explained this situation as follows: "In those years, I was in prison, and Vasilevsky went

around with the stigma of a

dangerous person, expelled from the party "for treacherous anti-party activities in Paris and Mexico." The KGB, however, acted wisely in not reminding Bohr of his meetings with our intelligence agents in Denmark. Only shortly before Bohr's death, he was visited in Copenhagen by our intelligence officer Rylov, an employee of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the past a young

researcher at Department C, and Bohr recalled his meeting with Soviet specialists in 1945. Vasilevsky

calculated that Western intelligence services would sooner or later record Moscow's contacts with Pontecorvo in Italy and Switzerland, and even then a decision was made on the routes of his possible flight to the USSR. In 1950, immediately after the arrest of Fuchs, Pontecorvo fled to the USSR through Finland. This operation of our intelligence successfully blocked all efforts of the FBI and British counterintelligence to reveal other sources of information on the atomic problem besides Fuchs. Upon arrival at the Union, Pontecorvo began scientific work at the nuclear center near Moscow, in Dubna. He wrote an excellent autobiographical book, in which he told a lot of interesting things about Fermi, but kept silent about his contacts with Soviet intelligence.

Although

Vasilevsky was in disgrace for about seven years - until 1961, he met with Pontecorvo in the 60s and 70s, invited him to dinner at the restaurant of the House of Writers. In 1968, when I was released from prison, Vasilevsky invited me to meet and dine with Pontecorvo. But since the restaurant was in the sphere of constant attention of the KGB, and intelligence leaders were categorically against Vasilevsky's meetings with Pontecorvo, I refused.

In 1970 I became a member of the Moscow association of writers and regularly visited the writers' club. There, in a restaurant, Vasilevsky and I met Ramon Mercader for dinner. I do not like to draw attention to myself, so I asked Ramon not to wear the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. But Mercader and Vasilevsky, on the contrary, took pleasure in challenging the authorities with their awards. Vasilevsky continued to write letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU until the last days of his life, exposing the then head of the KGB intelligence, General Sakharovsky, his failures and mistakes in working with agents. The Rosenbergs were recruited to

cooperate with Soviet intelligence in 1938 by NKVD agents Ovakimyan and Semyonov. Ironically, the Rosenbergs are presented in both the American and Russian press as key figures in atomic espionage for the Soviet Union. The father argued that in reality their role was not so significant. They acted absolutely out of

communications with the main sources of information on the atomic bomb, which were coordinated by a special intelligence apparatus. My father recalled that in

1943-1945 the New York residency was headed by Kvasnikov and Pastelnyak, and then for a short time by Cohen, under whose supervision Semyonov, Feklisov, and Yatskov worked. By the way, Kvasnikov, in an interview with American television in 1990, admitted that the Rosenbergs, helping our intelligence in obtaining information on aviation, chemistry and radio engineering, had nothing to do with serious materials on the atomic bomb had.

In the summer of 1945, Rosenberg's son-in-law, US Army senior sergeant Greenglas (Caliber), who worked in the workshops of Los Alamos, on the eve of the first test of the atomic bomb, prepared a short report for the Center on the operation of checkpoints. The courier could not go to meet him, so Kvasnikov, with the approval of the Center, instructed agent Gold (Raymond), after a scheduled meeting with Fuchs in Santa Fe, to go to Albuquerque and get a message from Rosenberg's son-in-law. With its directive, the Center violated the basic rule of intelligence - in no case should an agent or courier of one intelligence group receive contact and access to another intelligence network that is not connected with it. Gringlas' information on the atomic problem was insignificant and minimal, for this reason our intelligence did not resume contact with him after this meeting with Gold. When Gold was arrested in 1950, he pointed to Gringlas and the latter to the Rosenbergs. The terrible fate of the Rosenbergs (their execution in the electric chair)

caused a huge resonance in the world.

Father wrote in his memoirs: "For the first time I learned about the arrest of the Rosenbergs from a TASS report and was not at all concerned about this news. This may seem strange to some, but it should be noted that, being responsible for the activities of several thousand saboteurs and agents behind German lines and for hundreds of sources of intelligence information in the United States, including operations of illegal immigrants, I did not feel worried about the fate of our main intelligence operations. Having worked at one time as the head of department "C", I certainly knew the main sources

information and I cannot recall that among them, at least according to intelligence materials on the atomic bomb, the Rosenbergs figured as important sources. It occurred to me then that the Rosenbergs might have been involved in our intelligence operations, but in no case did they play any independent role. In general, their arrest did not seem to me an event deserving special attention.

A year passed, and at the end of the summer of the following year, I was genuinely surprised when Lieutenant General Savchenko, at that time deputy head of the intelligence department of the MGB, came to my office and said that the newly appointed Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, ordered me to report to him about all the materials on failures of our intelligence operations in the USA and England in connection with the Rosenberg affair. He also said that a special commission had been set up in the Central Committee of the party to consider possible consequences in connection with the arrests of Gold, Gringlas and the Rosenbergs. As work of operational- understood, it was about the far as I intelligence violations of the rules by

employees of the state security agencies. I knew Savchenko since the 1920s, when he headed the operational department of the headquarters of the border troops on the Romanian border. In 1946, he became Minister of State Security in Ukraine, and later, in 1948, under the patronage of Khrushchev, he went to work in the Information Committee, then became deputy head of the Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, he personally approved the conduct of major intelligence operations in the United States and England. However, Savchenko told me that he could not be sure of the conclusion of his apparatus in the Rosenberg case, since their cooperation with us began even before the war and continued during the war. By that time, our former residents in the United States and Mexico, Gorsky and Vasilevsky, known in these countries as Gromov and Tarasov, had already been dismissed from the intelligence agencies.

The fate of the Zarubins, who knew the circumstances of the operational work of our agents in the United States in the mid-40s, was similar. By this time, Kheifets had been in prison for two years as a member of the "Zionist conspiracy." Therefore, Savchenko could not ask them to comment on archived operational materials for a report to the Central Committee. The most important

witnesses Hovakimyan and Zarubin, who headed the American direction in intelligence during the war years, did not hide their disrespectful attitude towards Savchenko for his incompetence in intelligence matters and openly called him a "son of a bitch." They refused to talk with him, declaring that they would give their explanations only to the Central Committee. Yatskov, Sokolov and Semenov, who were involved in these cases, were abroad at the time, but Savchenko did not want to rely on their explanations or on the conclusions of Kvasnikov, who headed scientific and technical intelligence, as interested parties.

Savchenko and I were summoned to the Central Committee on a single question: who was responsible for the ill-fated telegram that authorized Gold's fatal meeting with Greenglass in

Albuquerque. The Central Committee of the party was presented with a certificate on the results of the work of the commission, in the preparation of which Savchenko and employees of the American branch of intelligence of the security agencies participated. As far as I remember, it claimed that the failures were the result of mistakes allegedly made by Semenov in recruiting and instructing Gold. The memo also stated that Greenglass's secret meeting with Gold had been authorized by the Center. The certificate said that Hovakimyan, the head of the American direction in the 40s, was dismissed from the state security agencies. Of course, there was not a word about his enormous merits.

I categorically objected to these conclusions, since Semyonov and Ovakimyan in specific cases showed themselves to be highly qualified operatives. In fact, it was they who at the end of the 1930s created a very significant network of undercover sources of scientific and technical information in the United States. However, in the Central Committee of the party and the personnel department of the MGB, my ideas were rejected, they were blamed for the failure, and they were dismissed from the intelligence agencies largely on a wave of anti-Semitism, since Semenov was a Jew. I remember how we raised money to support Semyonov until he got a job as a consultant and translator at the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences. The

following year, this scandalous story unexpectedly received a continuation. I was again summoned to the Central Committee to see Kiselyov, Malenkov's assistant. Quite unexpectedly for myself, I saw him

Savchenko. Kiselev was categorical and rude. From his lips, I heard accusations familiar to me from 1938-1939: the Central Committee exposed the attempts of individual employees and a number of senior officials of the MGB to deceive the party by downplaying the role of the Rosenbergs in intelligence work. In an anonymous letter from an official of the MGB, received by the Central Committee, Kiselev said, the significant role of the Rosenbergs in obtaining information on the atomic problem was noted. In conclusion, Kiselyov emphasized that the Party Control Committee would consider these signals about attempts to mislead the Central Committee on the substance of the Rosenberg case.

Savchenko and I categorically objected to Kiselyov with one voice, explaining that our intelligence operations in the USA on the atomic problem were actually stopped in 1946 and we were forced to rely on sources in England. We referred to Beria's instructions received in 1946 to conserve sources of information in order to carry out a political campaign beneficial to us to promote nuclear disarmament among the scientific community and intelligentsia of Western countries.

Kiselyov accused us of insincerity and of trying to belittle the importance of our intelligence contacts with the Rosenbergs. I told him that I was fully responsible for the work of our agents infiltrating US nuclear facilities in 1944-1946. At the same time, I emphasized that, of course, the value of undercover penetration and approach to the objects of interest to us varied sharply depending on the official position of the sources of information. The Rosenbergs were only an insignificant part of our peripheral activities at American nuclear facilities. The materials of the Rosenbergs and their relative Gringlas cannot be classified as important information. The Rosenbergs were a naive, but at the same time devoted to us, by virtue of their communist convictions, a married couple, ready to cooperate with us in everything, but their activities were not of fundamental importance in obtaining American atomic secrets.

Kiselev announced in an official tone that he would bring our explanations to the attention of the Central Committee and Malenkov personally, and the Party Control Committee would establish who exactly was to blame for the failure of intelligence operations in the United States.

The Rosenbergs behaved heroically during the investigation and at the trial. For this reason, the Soviet authorities stopped looking for scapegoats. It becomes obvious that

the Rosenberg case from the very beginning acquired a pronounced political coloring, which overshadowed the insignificance of the scientific and technical information provided by their group in the field of atomic weapons. They gave information on chemistry and radar. Much more important for the American authorities and for the Soviet leadership turned out to be their communist worldview and ideals, which were so necessary for the Soviet Union during the aggravation of the Cold War and anti-communist hysteria. In exceptionally difficult conditions, they proved themselves to be firm supporters and friends of the Soviet Union. The quick arrest of the Rosenbergs immediately after

the Greenglass confessions indicates that the FBI acted in the same way as the NKVD, following political guidelines and instructions, instead of approaching the matter professionally. The FBI neglected to identify all individuals associated with the Rosenbergs. This would require not only outdoor surveillance, but also undercover development of the Rosenbergs in order to identify the operative worker or illegal - a special agent with whom they were in contact. This was the only way to determine the degree of their participation in Soviet intelligence operations. The haste shown by the FBI prevented American counterintelligence from reaching out to Fischer (Colonel Abel), a Soviet illegal immigrant who settled in the United States in 1948 and was arrested only in 1957. A photograph with the code name Helen Sobell, the wife of Morton Sobell, a member of the Rosenberg group, was discovered by FBI agents only at Fischer's arrest in his wallet. It is now clear that the FBI and the NKVD used the

same methods in investigating politically charged espionage cases. In fact, the entire Rosenberg case was built on the basis of the confessions of the accused. This, in particular, is indicated by the arguments of the Rosenbergs' defense that the FBI had previously coached and instructed Gold and Greenglass for their future testimony at the trial. Of course, the FBI's actions were quite logical, for they failed in their main task: to reveal the real role of the Rosenbergs in



obtaining and transferring secret information to the Soviet Union. The so-called "sketches and diagrams" of Gringlas, appearing in the case, could in no way be the basis for drawing conclusions about the nature of the intelligence work and the information provided to Moscow.

The Rosenbergs, as mentioned above, became victims of the Cold War. The American and Soviet sides alike sought to extract the maximum political benefit from the trial. It is significant that during the period of rampant anti-Semitism in our country and the exposure of the so-called "Zionist conspiracy", Soviet propaganda attributed to the American authorities the conduct of an anti-Semitic campaign and the persecution of Jews in connection with the Rosenberg trial.

However, in the United States, the Rosenberg trial caused a certain increase in anti-Semitic sentiment. In the USSR, they used this: they quickly translated into Russian the plays and pamphlets of the American writer, at that time a communist, Howard Fast about anti-Semitism in the USA. The Rosenberg case has become one of the powerful factors of Soviet propaganda in the activities of the World Peace Council, created with our active support in the late 40s years.

Father specified in connection with the Rosenberg trial that in the United States in the 1940s four of our agent networks successfully operated independently of each other: in San Francisco, where there was a consulate; in Washington, where there was an embassy; in New York - on the basis of the Amtorg trade representative office and the consulate; and, finally, in Washington, this network was headed by an illegal resident Akhmerov. He directed the activities of Golos, one of the main organizers of our intelligence work, closely associated with the Communist Party in the 1930s. In addition to this, an independent intelligence group under the leadership of Vasilevsky was actively operating

in Mexico. Father wrote: "I remember that the escape in Canada in 1945 of Gouzenko, a cryptographer from the office of the military attache, had far-reaching consequences. Gouzenko provided the American and Canadian counterintelligence services with data that allowed them to get to our intelligence network, which was active in the United States

Moreover, he provided them with a list of codenames for nuclear scientists in America and Canada, which our intelligence and the military intelligence agency were actively developing. These atomic scientists were not our agents, but were sources of important information on the atomic bomb.

The information received from Gouzenko, as well as the confessions of our military intelligence agent Bentley, who was recruited by the FBI, allowed the American counterintelligence to infiltrate our intelligence network. However, any orientation reported to the FBI by Gouzenko required careful verification, and this turned into years of painstaking work. When the American counterintelligence, after a long development, came to our sources of information, we had already obtained the most important information for us on the atomic bomb and mothballed ties with the agents. The FBI claimed that Gouzenko helped in deciphering our special telegrams, and this allowed us to expose our agents Gold, Nan and Fuchs.

However, I do not believe that the deciphering of the telegrams played a decisive role in revealing our intelligence operations. Back in December 1941, agent Schulze-Boysen (Sergeant Major) from Berlin informed us that the Germans had seized one of our cipher books at Petsamo in Norway. Naturally, we changed our code books. I remember that in 1944, within the framework of cooperation between Stalin and Tito, the question arose of teaching the technique of decoding the Yugoslav state security officers sent to us. Then Hovakimyan, deputy head of the NKVD Intelligence Directorate and head of the American direction, categorically objected to the training of the Yugoslavs. I also remember him saying: "We changed our encryption codes drastically after the failure of our underground groups in Germany. Why should we share experience with Tito's envoys, we have enough reason to suspect them of a double game - in cooperation with British intelligence. Hovakimyan's objections were accepted. Back in 1944, when Zarubin returned from the United States,

Ovakimyan expressed fears that the FBI had succeeded in introducing its agents into our intelligence groups. When Zarubin was explaining himself about the groundless accusations brought against him, nevertheless, as a precaution, we again changed the codes of cipher correspondence. So I

I don't think the FBI came to our intelligence network based on the decryption of the code book captured in Petsamo.

The FBI never made it public and avoided discussing its methods of work and the sources of information used in every possible way. Lemfer, a former American counterintelligence officer, in his book "The FBI-KGB War" talks about the difficult process of restoring our code book: it was partially burned. Perhaps that is how it was. I cannot completely deny that the decryption did not play a role in the access of the US and Canadian counterintelligence to our sources of undercover information. Nevertheless, I believe that the FBI, in an effort to hide their own undercover source, deliberately invented a story about deciphering our correspondence. In May 1995, the FBI denied my version

that our intelligence had obtained data on the atomic bomb. The FBI noted that Fermi, Oppenheimer, Szilard, and Bohr were not, according to them, spies. But I didn't claim it. Now the Americans have managed to

decipher the correspondence between our stations in Washington, San Francisco, New York and Moscow, to a large extent, I believe, because in 1992 we ourselves handed over to the American side a number of Comintern materials, including the full text of cipher telegrams in Russian received by through the NKVD intelligence channels. In view of the constant surveillance by American intelligence services since 1940 of our radio broadcast, they managed to establish, as our press reported, more than two hundred Soviet intelligence agents who participated in the extraction of materials on the atomic bomb and secret documentation of American government agencies, including intelligence agencies. But a number of key codenames remain undisclosed."

In September 1992, at the KGB military hospital, my father met with intelligence veteran Yatskov, who had been in touch with Gold in 1945-1946. They recalled the story told in Lemfer's book about an allegedly intercepted telegram from our New York consulate to Moscow, which served as the basis for American counterintelligence to go to Fuchs. "We discussed the reliability of

our cipher communication systems and the possibility of decrypting them," my father said. — Yatskov and

Feklisov also continued to believe that everything was falsified by the FBI; they presented, as it were, a deciphered telegram from our consulate to the Center about the meeting between Gold and Fuchs in January 1945 at the house of Fuchs's sister Christel. As Feklisov wrote in his book, the map of Santa Fe in the state of New Mexico near Los Alamos was used as evidence against Fuchs, where the meeting place of Gold and Fuchs was marked. Fuchs's fingerprints were alleged to have been on a map found during a search of Gold's apartment. For me,

an intelligence professional, the circumstances that prevented the FBI from infiltrating our intelligence network are quite understandable. The personnel and technical personnel of the Manhattan Project were recruited by the American administration in a big hurry - there were many foreigners involved in the project. The FBI simply did not have time for a year and a half to organize and put into action a powerful counterintelligence network among the scientists of the project. Meanwhile, an absolutely necessary prerequisite for revealing the deeply concealed contacts of atomic scientists with agents and couriers of Soviet intelligence was effective undercover surveillance and work with the personnel of the atomic project. In the USSR, our counterintelligence had much greater opportunities for comprehensive verification of all personnel, both scientific and auxiliary, involved in nuclear development. It relied on a highly developed system of operational accounting materials.

We must bear in mind the historical circumstances as well. In the initial period of the war, the main task of the FBI was to prevent the leakage of information on atomic weapons to the Germans. My guess is that initially in 1942-1943, the FBI was actively developing links to "German" connections and contacts of scientists who started working in the Los Alamos laboratories. Pro-Soviet sympathies were taken into account and recorded, but they acquired significant significance only at the final stage, at the beginning of 1945. As far as I know, the directive on increased

detection of links with pro-communist circles began to be implemented by the administration of the project only at the end of 1944, after the FBI

recorded our great interest in the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. Although we

managed to infiltrate the environment of Oppenheimer, Fermi, and Szilard through Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and others, we never stopped our efforts to get materials from the Berkeley laboratory, since its developments were closely connected with those at Los Alamos. The FBI recorded our interest in this lab, but they overestimated it and focused on opposing our work. Meanwhile, this direction played a subordinate role.

We received extremely valuable information on the atomic bomb at the last stage of work, on the eve of the first experimental explosion and the production of the first bombs. During the period when the American counterintelligence significantly increased its work, we broke off all contacts with the agents embedded in the project. As a result, none of the people who collaborated with us were caught red-handed by American counterintelligence and directly at the time of transferring information to us.

It is now generally recognized that Soviet intelligence initiated the development of large-scale work on the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR and provided, I repeat, significant assistance to our scientists in this matter. However, atomic weapons were created by the colossal efforts of our leading atomic scientists and industrial workers. Of the post-war operations of Soviet

intelligence, the following can also be distinguished. Enlisting the cooperation of English counterintelligence officer George Blake, who reported on the construction in West Berlin of a special tunnel to our underground communication lines and the installation of eavesdropping equipment. Blake also oriented the state security agencies about the abandonment of British intelligence agents. For contacting us, Blake was arrested by the British authorities and sentenced to 42 years in a maximum security prison. After five years in prison, he made a bold and successful escape from prison. Now he lives and works in the Soviet Union. Second example. Illegal withdrawal

of our career intelligence officer Konon the Young to England. For six years of work, he obtained a lot of important information, especially on the navy. As a result of the betrayal, Young was arrested by the British and

sentenced to 25 years. He was released from prison by exchanging for an English intelligence officer arrested by us. Involuntarily, a royal commission gave a high assessment of the work of Molodoy, writing: "Now there are no more important secrets in the naval admiralty of England."

Sometimes intelligence has benefited the state in areas where, it would seem, there is no need for its intervention. Two examples. At the end of the war, intelligence officer N. M. Gorshkov, while in Italy, through his connections received the diaries of the Soviet Tatar poet Musa Jalil, written in a fascist prison. The diaries made it possible to restore the heroic pages in the life of the great Tatar poet. Second example. Thanks to the skillful actions of the intelligence officer B. N. Batraev, the archives of the writer I. A. Bunin became the property of the motherland. This case is described in detail in the weekly "Literary Russia" No. 42 of October 19, 1990.

## Chapter 19

# PAGES OF THE COLD WAR

After the formation of the Ministry of State Security on March 15, 1946, headed by Colonel General V.S. Abakumov, the management of intelligence and counterintelligence work abroad was entrusted to the First Main Directorate (PGU) of the USSR Ministry of State Security. On June 15,

1946, Lieutenant General P. M. Fitin was removed from his post and transferred to the disposal of the Criminal Code of the MGB. In his place was appointed Lieutenant-General Pyotr Nikolaevich Kubatkin, who had previously worked as the head of the UMGB in the Leningrad Region. On September 9, 1946, after his transfer to another job, PGU MGB was a former long-term Second (Counterintelligence) Directorate, headed by Lieutenant General Pyotr Vasilievich Fedotov. At that time, about 600 people worked in the central intelligence apparatus. On May 30, 1947, to coordinate all intelligence

operations abroad, the Information Committee (CI) was formed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was joined by the foreign intelligence of the MGB and the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army. It was headed by the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. The implementation of practical management of the work of the CI was entrusted to the first deputy chairman of the CI. From August 1, 1947, Lieutenant General P.V. Fedotov was in this position, and then, from February 1949, Lieutenant General Sergey Romanovich Savchenko, who previously headed the MGB of Ukraine.

The Information Committee included a number of departments, including strategic intelligence: 1st - Anglo-American, 2nd - European, 4th - illegal intelligence, 7th - encryption, Office of Advisors in People's Democracies, independent areas "EM" (emigration) and "CK" (sovcolonies); six functional departments (operational equipment, communications, etc.).

For the management of reconnaissance apparatuses abroad, the institution of chief residents was introduced, who, as a rule, were appointed ambassadors and envoys.

At the end of 1948, the leaders of the Soviet Army insisted on the return of military intelligence to the General Staff, and the Office of Advisors in People's Democracies and the EM and CK services were transferred to the MGB. In February 1949, the status of the Information Committee was changed.

Intelligence, actually merged with the USSR Foreign Ministry, began to report directly to him. After the release of V. M. Molotov from the post of minister, from March 4, 1949, the chairmen of the CI were the new head of the Foreign Ministry A. Ya. Vyshinsky, and then the deputy head of the diplomatic department V. N. Zorin. On October 17, 1949, the First Directorate was formed as part of the USSR Ministry of State Security, which was entrusted with the tasks of directing foreign counterintelligence:

counterintelligence support of the Soviet colony; detection and suppression of the subversive activities of the counterintelligence agencies of the capitalist countries and emigrant centers directed against the USSR. The first department of the MGB had its own residencies at Soviet missions abroad. On November 1, 1951, in order to avoid unnecessary parallelism, the foreign apparatuses of the Information Committee and the First Directorate of the MGB were merged. KI as a foreign intelligence agency practically ceased to exist, and in January 1952 it was disbanded.

On November 2, 1951, in connection with the transfer of intelligence functions from the Information Committee under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the USSR Ministry of State Security, the First Main Directorate (PGU) was recreated in it. On November 14, 1951, the First Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security (foreign counterintelligence) became part of it. Lieutenant-General S. R. Savchenko headed the PGU.

On December 19, 1951, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, foreign intelligence was returned to the MGB of the USSR on a full scale. The head of the head office received the status of deputy minister of state security. The structure of the PGU

MGB included: a) management (head, his deputies and collegium);



b) secretariat; c) Office of illegal intelligence; d) Department of scientific and technological revolution; e) Department of Foreign Counterintelligence; f) geographical departments: Anglo-American; Latin g) functional departments: "D" (active measures);

Later, on the basis of European (English, German, French, etc.) areas, the Western Europe Department of the PGU MGB was created. On March 6, 1946, Winston Churchill, in

his famous speech at Fulton, first announced the existence of the Iron Curtain. This date is considered the beginning of the Cold War.

However, for the USSR, the confrontation with the Western allies began immediately, as soon as the Red Army entered the territory of the countries of Eastern Europe. There was a conflict of interest. The principle of holding multi-party elections in the liberated lands and the formation of coalition governments (with an actual focus on the West), as President Roosevelt suggested at Yalta, could be acceptable to the Soviet Union only for the transitional period after the defeat of Nazi Germany. In particular, Molotov and Beria believed at the time that coalition governments in Eastern Europe would

not last long. Later, in 1947, at meetings of the Information Committee headed by Molotov, these words took on a new meaning. By the way, from 1947 to 1951, this committee was the main intelligence agency, where almost all information from abroad on military and political issues flowed.

The Yalta Agreement, where the post-war division of the world between the USA, England, and the USSR was officially fixed, was, paradoxically, due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In this treaty of 1939, as they say now, there were no highly moral principles, but for the first time it recognized the USSR as a great world power. After Yalta, Russia became one of the centers of world politics, on which the future of all mankind and the fate of the world depended. Today, many analysts point to the closeness of Stalin and Hitler in their approach to the division

of the world. Stalin is fiercely criticized

for betraying the principles and norms of human morality by signing a pact with Hitler. At the same time, however, they lose sight of the fact that he also signed a secret agreement with Roosevelt and Churchill on the division of Europe (Yalta), and later with President Truman (Potsdam).

Ideological principles are by no means always decisive for secret deals between superpowers: this is one of the realities of our life. My father told me how, it

seems, in December 1941, in Beria's office, he met our ambassador to the United States, Umansky, who had just returned from Washington after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The ambassador then told his father that Harry Hopkins, a close friend of Roosevelt and his personal envoy for especially important matters, on behalf of the president, raised the question of the dissolution of the Comintern and reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church before the USSR. According to him, this is necessary in order to remove obstacles from the opposition in providing assistance under Lend-Lease and to ensure political cooperation with the United States during the war years. These informal recommendations were accepted by Stalin as early as 1943 and created additional favorable conditions for a meeting in Tehran and then in Yalta. This showed the Americans that it was possible to negotiate with Stalin on the most delicate issues, taking into account his interests.

By the way, both we and the Americans stubbornly do not publish all the recordings of Hopkins' conversations with Soviet leaders. The reason is simple - confidential discussions of sensitive issues refute many stereotypes and indicate that the conspiracy of the West with Stalin on the division of spheres of influence in the world after the war was quite real. The leaders of the Western countries put up with the communist presence in world politics, and, moreover, they did not consider the communist regime an obstacle in reaching an agreement on the post-war order of the world.

My father recalled that at the end of 1944, in preparation for the Yalta Conference, which opened, as you know, in February 1945, a meeting of the leaders of the NKVD-NKGB, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy was held, chaired by Molotov. The purpose of this meeting was to find out whether Germany could continue the war and to analyze information on possible areas of agreement with our allies America and England on

post-war order of the world. The exact date of the opening of the conference was not announced then: Molotov simply said that it would take place in the Crimea no later than two months

later. After this meeting, Beria appointed his father the head of a special group for the preparation and verification of materials for the Yalta Conference. He was to inform Molotov and Stalin regularly. Beria himself went to Yalta, but did not take part in the conference. In preparation for the meeting in the Crimea, the group led by my father collected data on the leaders of the allied powers, compiled their psychological portraits, so that the Soviet delegation would know what it might face during the negotiations. It was known that neither the Americans nor the British had a clear position regarding the post-war future of the countries of Eastern Europe. The allies did not have any agreement on this issue, nor a special program. All they wanted was to return to power in Poland and Czechoslovakia the governments that were in exile in London. Father wrote about this, in particular, as follows: "Military intelligence data and our

own indicated that the Americans were open to compromise, so the flexibility of our position could provide an acceptable division of spheres of influence for the Soviet side in post-war Europe and the Far East. We agreed that the Polish government-in-exile should receive several important posts in the new coalition government of Poland. The demands of Roosevelt and Churchill, put forward at Yalta, seemed to us extremely naive: from our point of view, the composition of the Polish post-war government will be determined by those structures that received support from the Red Army. In the period preceding the Yalta Conference, the Red Army was actively fighting against the Germans and was able to liberate a significant part of the

Polish territory. The turn of the political situation favorable for us in all Eastern European countries was not difficult to predict - especially where the Communist Parties played an active role in the National Salvation Committees, which were de facto provisional governments, which were under our influence and partly control.

Indeed, the USSR could well have been flexible and agreed to holding democratic elections, since the so-called governments in exile could not resist Soviet influence. Beneš, for example, fled from Czechoslovakia to England, as we already know, with the money of the NKVD he took the people he needed there and was under our strong influence. Ludvik Svoboda, who later became president of Czechoslovakia, always looked to the Soviet Union. The head of Czechoslovak intelligence, Colonel Moravec, later a general, as his father writes in his memoirs, since 1935 collaborated with Soviet intelligence agencies, first with military intelligence, then with the NKVD, which did not prevent him from simultaneously adhering to anti-Soviet beliefs and close contact with our resident in London, Chichayev.

The young Romanian King Mihai also needed the support of our deeply conspiratorial groups associated with the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party in order to arrest General Antonescu, break the alliance with Hitler and join the anti-Hitler coalition. The situation in Bulgaria was developing

quite favorably for us, given the presence and great influence of the former chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Georgy Dimitrov. "During the Yalta

Conference," my father recalls, "we were already preparing to secretly export uranium ore mined in the Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria (uranium was needed for our nuclear program). In 1945 I met Harriman, the United States ambassador

to the Soviet Union. The first meeting was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: I was introduced as Pavel Matveev, a member of the Molotov secretariat responsible for the technical preparations for the Yalta Conference. After the first official meeting, I invited Harriman to dinner at Aragvi, a restaurant then known for its exquisite Georgian cuisine. Harriman accepted my invitation with evident pleasure. I took with me to dinner, as my interpreter, Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, introduced to Harriman as a Polish patriot living in exile in Moscow (at that time he was our agent, who was in personal contact with Beria).